Condor-27B

A security-reasoning fine-tune of Jackrong/Qwopus3.5-27B-v3, distilled from Claude Opus reasoning traces on exploit development, vulnerability analysis, and defensive security topics.

Model Summary

  • Base model: Jackrong/Qwopus3.5-27B-v3 (27B, Qwen3.5 hybrid linear/full attention architecture)
  • Training type: Full fine-tune (bf16, DeepSpeed ZeRO-3)
  • Focus: Security reasoning — binary exploitation, web/app vulnerabilities, kernel/OS internals, cryptography, network attacks, defensive analysis
  • Intended use: CTF assistance, security research, reading along with security books, pentesting thought-partner

Training

Dataset size 7,735 reasoning traces
Source prompts 35+ security books (seed prompts per chapter)
Trace generator Claude Opus (Anthropic API)
Steps 1,395
Wall time 43h 43m
Hardware 8× H100 (RunPod)
Precision bf16
Parallelism DeepSpeed ZeRO-3
Final eval loss 0.99

The training data was generated by prompting Claude Opus with questions derived from security literature (books, papers, writeups) and capturing its full reasoning chain. No multi-turn dialogue — single-prompt reasoning traces only.

Serving

The model uses the same Qwen3.5-27B hybrid mamba architecture as the base, so any serving framework that supports that base works here. Tested with sglang on 2× A100 40GB:

python -m sglang.launch_server \
  --model-path dangell7/Condor-27B \
  --trust-remote-code \
  --tp-size 2 \
  --dtype bfloat16 \
  --context-length 8192 \
  --mem-fraction-static 0.85 \
  --kv-cache-dtype fp8_e5m2 \
  --port 30000

Requires transformers>=5.3.0 and sglang with PR #21404 (merged 2026-03-30) — earlier versions leak mamba slots under concurrent load and deadlock the scheduler.

Observed decode throughput: ~38 tok/s on 2× A100 40GB, tp=2, single client.

Known caveats

  1. Chat template quirk (inherited from base): Responses may emit a stray </think> closing tag without a matching opening tag. This is a pre-existing quirk of Qwopus3.5-27B-v3 and not introduced by this fine-tune. Strip it in post-processing if it breaks your parser.
  2. Longer outputs: This fine-tune learned to produce denser, longer reasoning than the base (structured sections, code snippets, citations). Set max_tokens ≥ 4096 for complex prompts or expect truncation.
  3. Tokenizer: Native tokenizer is included (identical vocab to the Qwen3.5-27B base model; no new tokens were added during fine-tuning). Requires transformers>=5.3.0 to load.
  4. Concurrent serving: sglang's hybrid mamba scheduler leaks mamba slots under 2+ concurrent requests in versions before PR #21404 (merged 2026-03-30). Use sglang main post that commit, or serialize requests at a gateway for older versions.

Evaluation

Qualitative side-by-side vs base (Jackrong/Qwopus3.5-27B-v3) on 5 fixed prompts covering math, code debugging, systems reasoning, logic, and networking:

Prompt Base Condor-27B
Multi-step math Correct Correct, headered sections + verification
Code bug hunt Correct Correct, more senior-voice (itertools.accumulate alternative)
GC vs manual vs ownership tradeoffs Correct, textbook-shallow Correct, dramatically deeper (G1/ZGC internals, code, fairness analysis)
Three-box logic puzzle Correct Correct, tighter deduction chain
TCP congestion control Correct, Reno-focused Correct, deeper (RFC citations, ASCII sawtooth, what-this-didn't-solve table)

Summary: Correctness preserved across all 5 prompts with no regressions. Responses are markedly denser and more specific — more Opus-like in voice and structure. No repetition, mode collapse, or drift observed.

Full eval traces: see eval/ (if published) or reproduce with the vibe_client.py harness.

Intended Use & Limitations

Intended use:

  • Security research, CTF assistance, reading/learning alongside security literature
  • Thought-partner for pentesting workflows with human oversight
  • Reasoning-chain generation for further distillation

Out of scope / don't use for:

  • Autonomous offensive security operations
  • Targeting systems you don't own or have explicit authorization to test
  • Factual lookup on specific CVEs, RFCs, or fast-moving details — verify independently (the model has been observed to confidently mis-cite RFC numbers)
  • Non-English prompts (trained on English reasoning traces only)

Provenance

Distilled from Claude Opus outputs via the Anthropic API. Anthropic's terms of service allow using model outputs for your own purposes including training; downstream users of this model should read Anthropic's usage policy and determine their own compliance obligations.

License

MIT (see LICENSE). The base model's license applies to its weights; this fine-tune's delta is released under MIT.

Citation

@misc{condor-27b,
  author = {Angell, Denis},
  title  = {Condor-27B: A security-reasoning fine-tune of Qwopus3.5-27B-v3},
  year   = {2026},
  url    = {https://huggingface.co/dangell7/Condor-27B},
}
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