Daily Papers

LLM agents handle user requests on behalf of organizations through tool calls and must follow the company policies stated in their system prompts. Prior work approaches this as a safeguarding problem -- external checks that block non-compliant agent actions. We argue that policy adherence is a broader problem: real workflows unfold across many turns, require explicit user confirmation and prerequisite reads, and hinge on the content of the dialogue rather than on any single argument value. Meeting this bar requires (i) full conversation context, (ii) self-reasoning over the policy and the current dialogue, and (iii) conversation-specific remediation that guides the agent's next turn -- three capabilities that prior safeguard work has often underestimated. We introduce POLICYGUARD, a sub-agent verifier that shares the agent's view of the dialogue, reasons over the policy in context, and provides actionable feedback for the agent's next turn. On tau^2-BENCH airline across three vendors (GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Pro) with four trials per setting, POLICYGUARD improves PASS4 by +12.0 / +6.0 / +12.0 pp. Per-call analyses show POLICYGUARD achieves higher policy-violation recall while blocking roughly half as often as argument-level guards.

We present Verified Multi-Agent Orchestration (VMAO), a framework that coordinates specialized LLM-based agents through a verification-driven iterative loop. Given a complex query, our system decomposes it into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of sub-questions, executes them through domain-specific agents in parallel, verifies result completeness via LLM-based evaluation, and adaptively replans to address gaps. The key contributions are: (1) dependency-aware parallel execution over a DAG of sub-questions with automatic context propagation, (2) verification-driven adaptive replanning that uses an LLM-based verifier as an orchestration-level coordination signal, and (3) configurable stop conditions that balance answer quality against resource usage. On 25 expert-curated market research queries, VMAO improves answer completeness from 3.1 to 4.2 and source quality from 2.6 to 4.1 (1-5 scale) compared to a single-agent baseline, demonstrating that orchestration-level verification is an effective mechanism for multi-agent quality assurance.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Verifiers have been demonstrated to enhance LLM reasoning via test-time scaling (TTS). Yet, they face significant challenges in complex domains. Error propagation from incorrect intermediate reasoning can lead to false positives for seemingly plausible solutions, while lacking external grounding makes verifiers unreliable on computation or knowledge-intensive tasks. To address these challenges, we propose Agentic Verifier, a framework that transforms reward modeling into a multi-turn, tool-augmented deliberative process. We introduce complementary forward and backward agents: one traces solutions from premises to conclusions, while the other re-checks conclusions against their underlying premises. This bidirectional process enables a comprehensive, reliable, and interpretable assessment of solutions. To facilitate practical deployment, we propose AgentV-RL. Through proactive exploration and reinforcement learning, the verifier autonomously interleaves tool-use with internal reasoning. Extensive experiments show that Agentic Verifier yields consistent performance gains under both parallel and sequential TTS. Notably, our 4B variant surpasses state-of-the-art ORMs by 25.2%, positioning it as a promising paradigm for agentic reward modeling.

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have advanced rapidly but still struggle with complex tasks involving novel UI elements, long-horizon actions, and personalized trajectories. In this work, we introduce Instruction Agent, a GUI agent that leverages expert demonstrations to solve such tasks, enabling completion of otherwise difficult workflows. Given a single demonstration, the agent extracts step-by-step instructions and executes them by strictly following the trajectory intended by the user, which avoids making mistakes during execution. The agent leverages the verifier and backtracker modules further to improve robustness. Both modules are critical to understand the current outcome from each action and handle unexpected interruptions(such as pop-up windows) during execution. Our experiments show that Instruction Agent achieves a 60% success rate on a set of tasks in OSWorld that all top-ranked agents failed to complete. The Instruction Agent offers a practical and extensible framework, bridging the gap between current GUI agents and reliable real-world GUI task automation.

Verifying the success of computer use agent (CUA) trajectories is a critical challenge: without reliable verification, neither evaluation nor training signal can be trusted. In this paper, we present lessons learned from building a best-in-class verifier for web tasks we call the Universal Verifier. We design the Universal Verifier around four key principles: 1) constructing rubrics with meaningful, non-overlapping criteria to reduce noise; 2) separating process and outcome rewards that yield complementary signals, capturing cases where an agent follows the right steps but gets blocked or succeeds through an unexpected path; 3) distinguishing between controllable and uncontrollable failures scored via a cascading-error-free strategy for finer-grained failure understanding; and 4) a divide-and-conquer context management scheme that attends to all screenshots in a trajectory, improving reliability on longer task horizons. We validate these findings on CUAVerifierBench, a new set of CUA trajectories with both process and outcome human labels, showing that our Universal Verifier agrees with humans as often as humans agree with each other. We report a reduction in false positive rates to near zero compared to baselines like WebVoyager (geq 45\%) and WebJudge (geq 22\%). We emphasize that these gains stem from the cumulative effect of the design choices above. We also find that an auto-research agent achieves 70\% of expert quality in 5\% of the time, but fails to discover all strategies required to replicate the Universal Verifier. We open-source our Universal Verifier system along with CUAVerifierBench; available at https://github.com/microsoft/fara.

Large language models demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities but often produce unreliable or incorrect responses. Existing verification methods are typically model-specific or domain-restricted, requiring significant computational resources and lacking scalability across diverse reasoning tasks. To address these limitations, we propose VerifiAgent, a unified verification agent that integrates two levels of verification: meta-verification, which assesses completeness and consistency in model responses, and tool-based adaptive verification, where VerifiAgent autonomously selects appropriate verification tools based on the reasoning type, including mathematical, logical, or commonsense reasoning. This adaptive approach ensures both efficiency and robustness across different verification scenarios. Experimental results show that VerifiAgent outperforms baseline verification methods (e.g., deductive verifier, backward verifier) among all reasoning tasks. Additionally, it can further enhance reasoning accuracy by leveraging feedback from verification results. VerifiAgent can also be effectively applied to inference scaling, achieving better results with fewer generated samples and costs compared to existing process reward models in the mathematical reasoning domain. Code is available at https://github.com/Jiuzhouh/VerifiAgent

Function-calling agents -- large language models that invoke tools and APIs -- require high-quality, domain-specific training data spanning executable environments, backing databases, and diverse multi-turn trajectories. We introduce EigenData, an integrated, self-evolving platform that automates the full data lifecycle through a multi-agent architecture. A top-level orchestrator, EigenCore, coordinates three specialized sub-systems: DatabaseAgent for realistic domain database construction, CodingAgent for verified executable environment generation with iterative test-debug loops, and DataAgent for multi-turn trajectory synthesis with self-evolving prompt optimization. Cross-component feedback ensures consistency across all artifacts. We apply EigenData to audit and repair the Berkeley Function-Calling Leaderboard (BFCL-V3), identifying systematic errors in function schemas, implementations, and reference trajectories, automatically correcting them through coordinated schema refinement, code-level bug fixes, and trajectory modification, and introducing an outcome-aware evaluation protocol that assesses task success via database-state correctness rather than turn-level trajectory matching. We demonstrate that the repaired benchmark, coupled with outcome-aware metrics, produces model rankings substantially better correlated with human judgments of functional correctness.

Skills have become the de facto way to enable LLM agents to perform complex real-world tasks with customized instructions, workflows, and tools, but how to learn them automatically and effectively remains unclear. We introduce SkillLearnBench, the first benchmark for evaluating continual skill learning methods, comprising 20 verified, skill-dependent tasks across 15 sub-domains derived from a real-world skill taxonomy , evaluated at three levels: skill quality, execution trajectory, and task outcome. Using this benchmark, we evaluate recent continual learning techniques, those leveraging one-shot, self/teacher feedback, and skill creator to generate skills from agent experiences. We find that all continual learning methods improve over the no-skill baseline, yet consistent gains remain elusive: no method leads across all tasks and LLMs, and scaling to stronger LLMs does not reliably help. Continual learning improves tasks with clear, reusable workflows but struggles on open-ended tasks, and using stronger LLM backbones does not consistently produce better skills. Our analysis also revealed that multiple iterations in continual learning facilitate genuine improvement via external feedback, whereas self-feedback alone induces recursive drift. Our data and code are open-source at https://github.com/cxcscmu/SkillLearnBench to enable further studies of automatic skill generation and continual learning techniques.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

AI coding agents produce code faster than humans can review it. In our approach, the prover is the judge of whether the code is correct. Under a verifier-driven loop, AI agents wrote and verified bare-metal security software in Ada/SPARK spanning classical and post-quantum cryptography, TLS 1.3, IKEv2, X.509, and a Matrix client. GNATprove discharged 49,280 proof obligations, established functional correctness for selected primitives, and proved the absence of run-time errors for the rest, at roughly 20-40 times lower supervision cost than comparable hand verification. GNATprove alone was insufficient: some defects could not be detected and were resolved using known-answer tests, interoperability, or human review of specifications. Given weak checks, the agent tried to bypass them and reported success. We report where each layer caught faults and draw the central lesson: what an agent can be trusted to establish is bounded by the strength of its feedback.

Voice agents in production must handle several requests, background speech, and customers who lose patience. We introduce VAmoS Energy, a benchmark that combines these challenges in 100 calls about utility billing and payment assistance. Each caller makes two to four requests. The agent has sixteen tools backed by a stateful Stripe billing twin and the Apache Fineract loan engine, with account access blocked until caller verification succeeds. The tasks use public household electricity data and a policy based on Pennsylvania's residential billing rules. An LLM-as-a-verifier checks the agent's actions and spoken figures against explicit requirements. On a calibration run, it agrees with a code verifier on 99.1% of checks. Across fourteen voice stacks and three repeats per task, completion ranges from 17.3% to 44.7%. Grok Voice leads, and Gemini 3.8 Live and GPT-Live follow at about the same cost per call. Background television reduces pooled completion from 38.7% to 8.6%. The simulated caller often accepts an incorrect result because it hears the agent's words but cannot inspect its actions. These findings show why voice agents need evaluation across the whole call, including what they say, what they change, and how they handle competing speech.

Terminal agents are increasingly deployed beyond software engineering in science and other specialized domains. Constructing training environments requires executable reference behavior and a domain-specific verifier that distinguishes semantic correctness from superficially plausible artifacts. Authoring these components for each task requires repeated engineering and limits reuse. We introduce software-in-the-loop reconstruction, a self-supervised framework that obtains reference outputs and verification targets from existing software workflows, executable programs mapping structured inputs to outputs. For each workflow, we execute multiple input configurations and partition cases into public observations and hidden evaluations. Given the instruction, input schema, and public input--output observations, an agent constructs an editable program without access to the source workflow. The candidate is evaluated on hidden configurations against workflow outputs. A hierarchical verifier combines domain-specific semantic comparison, structural validity, and anti-shortcut checks, while public feedback supports iterative revision. The construction admits additional workflows and configurations without authoring a reference solution for each task. We instantiate SWR with 500 workflows and 46 software families across six domains. Across three attempts per task, Qwen3.8-Max solves 838 tasks and produces 1,422 verified trajectories, which we oversample to 3,000 reconstruction-only training examples. Supervised fine-tuning of Qwen3.8-27B improves mean Terminal-Bench 2 performance from 47.94% to 53.56% across three seeds and achieves the highest mean among four matched-token corpus controls on all four reported evaluations. These results indicate that existing scientific software can provide scalable, behaviorally verified supervision for terminal agents.

We present OpenComputer, a verifier-grounded framework for constructing verifiable software worlds for computer-use agents. OpenComputer integrates four components: (1) app-specific state verifiers that expose structured inspection endpoints over real applications, (2) a self-evolving verification layer that improves verifier reliability using execution-grounded feedback, (3) a task-generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic and machine-checkable desktop tasks, and (4) an evaluation harness that records full trajectories and computes auditable partial-credit rewards. In its current form, OpenComputer covers 33 desktop applications and 1,000 finalized tasks spanning browsers, office tools, creative software, development environments, file managers, and communication applications. Experiments show that OpenComputer's hard-coded verifiers align more closely with human adjudication than LLM-as-judge evaluation, especially when success depends on fine-grained application state. Frontier agents struggle with end-to-end completion despite partial progress, and open-source models exhibit sharp drops from their OSWorld-Verified scores, exposing a persistent gap in robust computer automation.

Legal compliance in AI-driven data transfer planning is becoming increasingly critical under stringent privacy regulations such as the Japanese Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI). We propose a multi-agent legal verifier that decomposes compliance checking into specialized agents for statutory interpretation, business context evaluation, and risk assessment, coordinated through a structured synthesis protocol. Evaluated on a stratified dataset of 200 Amended APPI Article 16 cases with clearly defined ground truth labels and multiple performance metrics, the system achieves 72% accuracy, which is 21 percentage points higher than a single-agent baseline, including 90% accuracy on clear compliance cases (vs. 16% for the baseline) while maintaining perfect detection of clear violations. While challenges remain in ambiguous scenarios, these results show that domain specialization and coordinated reasoning can meaningfully improve legal AI performance, providing a scalable and regulation-aware framework for trustworthy and interpretable automated compliance verification.

A verifier for robot policies reads a candidate behavior and returns a score for how well it did, used both to evaluate vision-language-action policies and to train them. Verifiers range from success detectors and reward models to runtime monitors, safety filters, and temporal-logic specifications. We survey roughly 150 verifiers and compare them along two properties. Availability is how much a verdict costs, how early in a rollout the verdict arrives, and how often a verdict can be asked for. Availability rises as verdicts get cheaper, earlier, and denser. Credibility is how much a high score tells us about the task. Credibility falls as the judgment becomes gameable and self-serving. We group the verifiers by who supplies the judgment: human verifiers, rule-based and formal verifiers, learned and pretrained verifiers, and model-intrinsic verifiers. Across the four families, we find that credibility falls as availability rises. Regardless of who supplies the judgment, there is no free checker. We then examine what validates a verifier itself, and how much a high score tells us. Three measures appear in the literature: agreement with human labels, the performance of the policy it trains, and behavior under reward hacking. We close with nine metrics that make a verifier claim checkable, and coordinates for the verifiers still to be built.

Scaling pre-training, post-training, and test-time compute have become the central paradigms for improving the capabilities of LLMs. In this work, we identify verification, the ability to determine the correctness of a solution, as a new scaling axis. To unlock this and demonstrate its effectiveness, we introduce LLM-as-a-Verifier, a general-purpose verification framework that provides fine-grained feedback for agentic tasks without requiring additional training. Unlike standard LM judges that prompt LLMs to produce discrete scores for candidate solutions, LLM-as-a-Verifier computes the expectation over the distribution of scoring token logits to generate continuous scores. This probabilistic formulation enables verification to scale along multiple dimensions: (1) score granularity, (2) repeated evaluation, and (3) criteria decomposition. In particular, we show that scaling the scoring granularity leads to better separation between positive and negative solutions, resulting in more calibrated comparisons. Moreover, scaling repeated evaluation and criteria decomposition consistently lead to additional gains in verification accuracy through variance and complexity reduction. We further introduce a cost-efficient ranking algorithm for selecting the best solution among candidates using the verifier's continuous scores. LLM-as-a-Verifier achieves state-of-the-art performance on Terminal-Bench V2 (86.5%), SWE-Bench Verified (78.2%), RoboRewardBench (87.4%), and MedAgentBench (73.3%). Beyond verification, the fine-grained signals from LLM-as-a-Verifier can also serve as a proxy for estimating task progress. We build an extension for Claude Code, enabling developers to monitor and improve their own agentic systems. Finally, we show that LLM-as-a-Verifier can provide dense feedback for RL, improving the sample efficiency of SAC and GRPO on robotics and mathematical reasoning benchmarks.

Agent systems often decompose a task across multiple roles, but these roles are typically specified by prompts rather than enforced by access controls. Without enforcement, a team pass rate can mask whether agents actually coordinated or whether one role effectively did another role's work. We present TeamBench, a benchmark with 851 task templates and 931 seeded instances for evaluating agent coordination under operating system-enforced role separation. TeamBench separates specification access, workspace editing, and final certification across Planner, Executor, and Verifier roles, so that no role can read the full requirements, modify the workspace, and certify the final answer. Prompt-only and sandbox-enforced teams reach statistically indistinguishable pass rates, but prompt-only runs produce 3.6 times more cases where the verifier attempts to edit the executor's code. Verifiers approve 49% of submissions that fail the deterministic grader, and removing the verifier improves mean partial score in the ablation. Team value is also conditional. Teams benefit when single agents struggle, but hurt when single agents already perform well. A 40-session human study under the same role separation shows that our benchmark exposes interaction patterns that pass rate misses. Solo participants work through the task directly, human participants paired with agents often collapse into quick approval, and human teams spend more effort coordinating missing information across roles.

Customer-service LLM agents must follow organizational policy when acting on a user's behalf. Compliance failures arise from either forbidden actions, such as granting an ineligible change, or omitted procedural requirements, such as identification or confirmation. Runtime safeguards can intervene on risky actions, but action-local checks do not guide an agent through a multi-step procedure. Workflow-following systems support prescribed process execution, but primarily target workflow completion rather than safeguarding agent behavior. PolicyGuide instead compiles each domain policy into a workflow graph and invokes a proactive verifier at user-turn boundaries. From persisted graph state, the verifier reconciles open requests and returns step-specific remediation along a policy-compliant path. Across the τ^2-bench airline, retail, and telecom domains with a GPT-5.4 agent and verifier, PolicyGuide raises mean Pass^4 from 0.42 to 0.62, with the largest gain on telecom (0.19 to 0.61), the most workflow-structured domain. The same workflows transfer to Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 2.5 Pro agents. Complementary evaluations find the lowest observed attack-success rate under adversarial users and the strongest procedural compliance in an author-designed workflow-level validation.

Verifiers are auxiliary models that assess the correctness of outputs generated by base large language models (LLMs). They play a crucial role in many strategies for solving reasoning-intensive problems with LLMs. Typically, verifiers are LLMs themselves, often as large (or larger) than the base model they support, making them computationally expensive. In this work, we introduce a novel lightweight verification approach, LiLaVe, which reliably extracts correctness signals from the hidden states of the base LLM. A key advantage of LiLaVe is its ability to operate with only a small fraction of the computational budget required by traditional LLM-based verifiers. To demonstrate its practicality, we couple LiLaVe with popular meta-generation strategies, like best-of-n or self-consistency. Moreover, we design novel LiLaVe-based approaches, like conditional self-correction or conditional majority voting, that significantly improve both accuracy and efficiency in generation tasks with smaller LLMs. Our work demonstrates the fruitfulness of extracting latent information from the hidden states of LLMs, and opens the door to scalable and resource-efficient solutions for reasoning-intensive applications.

As multi-agent systems enter high-stakes domains, the possibility that agents may circumvent safety boundaries is a growing concern. Prior work has examined this risk primarily in adversarial settings, where agents are instructed or rewarded to communicate covertly and evade oversight. We show that benign agents can cross the same boundaries without adversarial incentives. We emulate a software-engineering workflow in which a planner represents a company hiring an external developer. The planner writes requirements and holds a company credential it is instructed not to disclose to the developer; a monitor screens their exchanges. Seven of nine tested frontier models disguise the credential in their requirements to help the developer recover it while evading the monitor, even after completing their assigned objective. For example, across 6,000 episodes with DeepSeek-V4-Pro, the planner attempts concealment in 16.9%; in 0.9%, the credential evades the monitor and is recovered and used by the developer. Despite the low per-episode rate, the risk compounds across repeated exchanges: at 0.9%, 105 independent episodes carry a 61.3% chance of at least one breach. Our analysis suggests that the planner misinterprets disguised disclosure as helping the developer and reads the nondisclosure rule as banning plaintext, not character codes or riddles. We call this behavior covert assistance. Monitoring favors concealment, while concealment gives way to direct disclosure when the recipient is presented as a human rather than an AI agent, so leakage persists. Giving the monitor the credential improves detection but requires trusting it with the secret. These risks, in models already used for software engineering, challenge oversight to distinguish authorized cooperation from task-advancing assistance that crosses safety boundaries.

Autonomous coding agents solve repository issues by reading code, running commands, editing files, and submitting patches. Extra inference-time compute yields gains only when it produces a useful repair and supplies reliable evidence for choosing one. Three behaviors decide both, and we argue they are teachable rather than byproducts of scale, so a policy can carry them instead of a scaffold. Location diversity remains narrow, since attempts return to the same site and extra samples add no coverage. Edit diversity is left unexploited, since methodologies that differ resolve complementary issues no single run reaches. Verification misleads, since a test the agent writes for its own patch accepts many incorrect ones. Directing search by execution feedback and scoring each patch against its own reverted tree resolves 52.8% of SWE-bench Verified using 48.1% of the agent-steps an eight-sample baseline spends. Training moves these behaviors into the policy. On the 270 issues held out from SFT and RL training, weighted supervised fine-tuning raises pass@1 from 31.9% to 35.2% and pass@8 from 46.7% to 51.1%. A reinforcement objective then trains the verifier against gold-labeled repairs and incorrect variants, crediting the assertions that detect them. It raises pass@1 to 43.0% and pass@8 to 60.7%, lifts verifier precision from 26.8% to 41.7%, and more than halves false acceptance. Resolution improves on two of three out-of-distribution suites and verifier precision on all three, and the gains hold at 7B, 14B, and 30B against published coder baselines.

By utilizing more computational resources at test-time, large language models (LLMs) can improve without additional training. One common strategy uses verifiers to evaluate candidate outputs. In this work, we propose a novel scaling dimension for test-time compute: scaling the number of verifiers. We introduce Multi-Agent Verification (MAV) as a test-time compute paradigm that combines multiple verifiers to improve performance. We propose using Aspect Verifiers (AVs), off-the-shelf LLMs prompted to verify different aspects of outputs, as one possible choice for the verifiers in a MAV system. AVs are a convenient building block for MAV since they can be easily combined without additional training. Moreover, we introduce BoN-MAV, a simple multi-agent verification algorithm that combines best-of-n sampling with multiple verifiers. BoN-MAV demonstrates stronger scaling patterns than self-consistency and reward model verification, and we demonstrate both weak-to-strong generalization, where combining weak verifiers improves even stronger LLMs, and self-improvement, where the same base model is used to both generate and verify outputs. Our results establish scaling the number of verifiers as a promising new dimension for improving language model performance at test-time.

A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one. For today's coding agents, this intuition is being inverted: as foundation models develop stronger reasoning capabilities and engineering harnesses grow more sophisticated, generating complex candidate solutions is no longer difficult -- reliably verifying them has become the harder problem. Every verifier we can build is only a proxy for human intent, never the intent itself. This makes verification subject to a twofold difficulty: first, intent is underspecified by nature, making it inherently hard to faithfully check whether it has been fulfilled; second, during model training, optimization widens the gap between proxy and intent -- manifesting as reward hacking or signal saturation. To address this, we characterize the quality of verification signals along three dimensions -- scalability, faithfulness, and robustness -- and argue that achieving all three simultaneously is the central challenge. We further study four reward constructions: a test verifier for general coding tasks, a rubric verifier for frontend tasks, the user as verifier for real-world agent tasks, and an automated agent verifier for long-horizon tasks. Across different task types and policy capability levels, we conduct in-depth analysis and experiments on the core challenges of reward design and how to more effectively leverage reward signals. Experiments show that targeted verification design can effectively suppress reward hacking, improve task completion quality, and achieve significant gains across multiple internal and public benchmarks. These experiences collectively point to a core observation: no fixed reward function can remain effective as policy capability continues to grow; and verification must co-evolve with the generator.

We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.

Coding agents are increasingly deployed for end-to-end software engineering tasks, where a readily available oracle evaluator that defines the success criteria is often absent. This motivates verifications for coding agents that can reliably judge and explain their behavior. However, verification is non-trivial as coding agents are increasingly capable of solving long-horizon software engineering tasks. Their execution trajectories can be extremely long, containing hundreds of iterative interactions with code repositories and external tools. Existing verifiers either rely on general-purpose LLMs without specialized training or train dedicated critics that predominantly focus on producing scalar rewards, highlighting the relatively limited exploration of training-based generalist verification. We introduce SWE-Critix, a post-training pipeline for training generalist verifiers of coding-agent trajectories. Given a task and its execution trajectory, the learned verifier predicts the completion label and generates a natural-language analysis that explains its judgment. Our pipeline combines supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with reinforcement learning (RL) and trains a series of 30B models on trajectories from CodeForge-Preview. On a held-out test set, SWE-Critix improves classification accuracy from 57% for the base Qwen3-30B-A3B reasoning model to 66% after SFT and 78% after RL. We release our models, datasets, and training code to facilitate further research.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms establish identity and delegate authority, but do not inherently provide cryptographic evidence that a concrete request issued by a specific agent satisfies the applicable policy in a specific execution context. This paper hypothesizes that agent authorization can be formalized as a cryptographically verifiable relation, denoted R_{CVA}, that jointly binds an agent principal, a concrete authorization request, an execution context, and the satisfaction of an applicable policy, while selectively preserving the confidentiality of private authorization attributes. We introduce a preliminary formal abstraction for Cryptographically Verifiable Agent Authorization (CVA), define a compact set of candidate security properties including authorization soundness, principal binding, request binding, policy binding, and replay resistance, and provide an executable zero-knowledge proof of concept that instantiates selected elements of the model over a Groth16 zk-SNARK construction. We further identify and formalize the structural separation among identity binding, authorization-request binding, and runtime execution binding as a central open problem in the design of secure agentic systems (a distinction {not explicitly addressed by} current agentic security frameworks) and present a falsifiable research agenda for its resolution.

We consider the problem of how a trusted, but computationally bounded agent (a 'verifier') can learn to interact with one or more powerful but untrusted agents ('provers') in order to solve a given task. More specifically, we study the case in which agents are represented using neural networks and refer to solutions of this problem as neural interactive proofs. First we introduce a unifying framework based on prover-verifier games, which generalises previously proposed interaction protocols. We then describe several new protocols for generating neural interactive proofs, and provide a theoretical comparison of both new and existing approaches. Finally, we support this theory with experiments in two domains: a toy graph isomorphism problem that illustrates the key ideas, and a code validation task using large language models. In so doing, we aim to create a foundation for future work on neural interactive proofs and their application in building safer AI systems.

Autonomous GUI agents face two fundamental challenges: early stopping, where agents prematurely declare success without verifiable evidence, and repetitive loops, where agents cycle through the same failing actions without recovery. We present VLAA-GUI, a modular GUI agentic framework built around three integrated components that guide the system on when to Stop, Recover, and Search. First, a mandatory Completeness Verifier enforces UI-observable success criteria and verification at every finish step -- with an agent-level verifier that cross-examines completion claims with decision rules, rejecting those lacking direct visual evidence. Second, a mandatory Loop Breaker provides multi-tier filtering: switching interaction mode after repeated failures, forcing strategy changes after persistent screen-state recurrence, and binding reflection signals to strategy shifts. Third, an on-demand Search Agent searches online for unfamiliar workflows by directly querying a capable LLM with search ability, returning results as plain text. We additionally integrate a Coding Agent for code-intensive actions and a Grounding Agent for precise action grounding, both invoked on demand when required. We evaluate VLAA-GUI across five top-tier backbones, including Opus 4.5, 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, on two benchmarks with Linux and Windows tasks, achieving top performance on both (77.5% on OSWorld and 61.0% on WindowsAgentArena). Notably, three of the five backbones surpass human performance (72.4%) on OSWorld in a single pass. Ablation studies show that all three proposed components consistently improve a strong backbone, while a weaker backbone benefits more from these tools when the step budget is sufficient. Further analysis also shows that the Loop Breaker nearly halves wasted steps for loop-prone models.

The evolution of machine learning has increasingly prioritized the development of powerful models and more scalable supervision signals. However, the emergence of foundation models presents significant challenges in providing effective supervision signals necessary for further enhancing their capabilities. Consequently, there is an urgent need to explore novel supervision signals and technical approaches. In this paper, we propose verifier engineering, a novel post-training paradigm specifically designed for the era of foundation models. The core of verifier engineering involves leveraging a suite of automated verifiers to perform verification tasks and deliver meaningful feedback to foundation models. We systematically categorize the verifier engineering process into three essential stages: search, verify, and feedback, and provide a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art research developments within each stage. We believe that verifier engineering constitutes a fundamental pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence.

Program verifiers play a central role in training coding agents, including selecting trajectories for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and providing rewards for reinforcement learning (RL). Standard execution-based verification requires running unit tests inside per-repository environments such as Docker images, incurring substantial environment setup costs. We propose Dockerless, an environment-free agentic patch verifier that evaluates generated code patches without executing them. Rather than simply matching candidate patches to references, Dockerless judges patch correctness using evidence gathered through agentic repository exploration. On a verifier evaluation benchmark, Dockerless outperforms the strongest open-source verifier by 14.3 AUC points. Using Dockerless as both the SFT trajectory filter and the RL reward enables a fully environment-free post-training pipeline. The resulting model reaches 62.0%, 50.0%, and 35.2% resolve rate on SWE-bench Verified, Multilingual, and Pro, respectively. It surpasses the Qwen3.5-9B baseline by 2.4, 8.7, and 2.9 points, matching environment-based post-training.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to tackle complex tasks, often necessitating collaboration among multiple specialized agents. However, multi-agent collaboration introduces new challenges in planning, coordination, and verification. Execution failures frequently arise not from flawed reasoning alone, but from subtle misalignments in task interpretation, output format, or inter-agent handoffs. To address these challenges, we present VeriMAP, a framework for multi-agent collaboration with verification-aware planning. The VeriMAP planner decomposes tasks, models subtask dependencies, and encodes planner-defined passing criteria as subtask verification functions (VFs) in Python and natural language. We evaluate VeriMAP on diverse datasets, demonstrating that it outperforms both single- and multi-agent baselines while enhancing system robustness and interpretability. Our analysis highlights how verification-aware planning enables reliable coordination and iterative refinement in multi-agent systems, without relying on external labels or annotations.

Autonomous agents powered by foundation models have seen widespread adoption across various real-world applications. However, they remain highly vulnerable to malicious instructions and attacks, which can result in severe consequences such as privacy breaches and financial losses. More critically, existing guardrails for LLMs are not applicable due to the complex and dynamic nature of agents. To tackle these challenges, we propose ShieldAgent, the first guardrail agent designed to enforce explicit safety policy compliance for the action trajectory of other protected agents through logical reasoning. Specifically, ShieldAgent first constructs a safety policy model by extracting verifiable rules from policy documents and structuring them into a set of action-based probabilistic rule circuits. Given the action trajectory of the protected agent, ShieldAgent retrieves relevant rule circuits and generates a shielding plan, leveraging its comprehensive tool library and executable code for formal verification. In addition, given the lack of guardrail benchmarks for agents, we introduce ShieldAgent-Bench, a dataset with 3K safety-related pairs of agent instructions and action trajectories, collected via SOTA attacks across 6 web environments and 7 risk categories. Experiments show that ShieldAgent achieves SOTA on ShieldAgent-Bench and three existing benchmarks, outperforming prior methods by 11.3% on average with a high recall of 90.1%. Additionally, ShieldAgent reduces API queries by 64.7% and inference time by 58.2%, demonstrating its high precision and efficiency in safeguarding agents.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) holds great promise for the development of autonomous agents under complex GUI tasks, but its scalability remains severely hampered by the verification of task completion. Existing task verification is treated as a passive, post-hoc process: a verifier (i.e., rule-based scoring script, reward or critic model, and LLM-as-a-Judge) analyzes the agent's entire interaction trajectory to determine if the agent succeeds. Such processing of verbose context that contains irrelevant, noisy history poses challenges to the verification protocols and therefore leads to prohibitive cost and low reliability. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose SmartSnap, a paradigm shift from this passive, post-hoc verification to proactive, in-situ self-verification by the agent itself. We introduce the Self-Verifying Agent, a new type of agent designed with dual missions: to not only complete a task but also to prove its accomplishment with curated snapshot evidences. Guided by our proposed 3C Principles (Completeness, Conciseness, and Creativity), the agent leverages its accessibility to the online environment to perform self-verification on a minimal, decisive set of snapshots. Such evidences are provided as the sole materials for a general LLM-as-a-Judge verifier to determine their validity and relevance. Experiments on mobile tasks across model families and scales demonstrate that our SmartSnap paradigm allows training LLM-driven agents in a scalable manner, bringing performance gains up to 26.08% and 16.66% respectively to 8B and 30B models. The synergizing between solution finding and evidence seeking facilitates the cultivation of efficient, self-verifying agents with competitive performance against DeepSeek V3.1 and Qwen3-235B-A22B.

AI agents now hold spend authority and settle payments without per-action human confirmation. The resulting loss is often not a security failure: a counterparty with the correct domain, the correct settlement address and a genuinely delivered service can charge more than it should, and no check keyed on identity will see it. We present three artefacts for measuring and reducing that loss. First, a taxonomy of agentic commerce fraud that separates five observation levels (agent reasoning, wire, settlement rail, counterparty, principal) from the request-level and history-level evidence available at each, and records which levels can observe which attacks. Second, Agentic Commerce Bench (ACB), a benchmark of twenty fraud classes generated from production aggregates, 1,647 catalogued service operations and 1,068 settlements, of which six involve a counterparty that is exactly who it claims to be. Third, gordonguard, an open-source detector stack and offline harness with which an operator can audit an agent configuration, replay hostile counterparties without an account, and run the same detectors inline. Calibrating to a stated false-positive budget on clean training traffic gives a 6.5% clean flag rate, replicated across three independent generations, and leaves eight of twenty classes no better than chance. On the four classes a reasoning layer can observe, a widely used agent security scanner run over its jailbreak-detection panel scores zero on all four, while correctly scoring 1.0 on a jailbreak supplied as a control. A measured median payment of $0.007 places a hard constraint on deployment: one human review costs 143 times the value of the payment it examines.

Agent harnesses supply planning guidance, organize execution, and check completion. We study how these components affect success, erroneous acceptance, and cost in two Retail experiments and an Airline pilot in τ^2-bench. The primary comparison pairs prewritten task-specific plans (Fixed) with shuffled policy text matched in word count (Sham), isolating the contribution of guidance content. Across 265 matched cells, Fixed improves oracle-verified success by 7.17 percentage points (90\% task-clustered bootstrap interval, 1.15--13.36 points), with gains concentrated in higher-complexity tasks. A read-only terminal verifier rejects 61\% of Retail oracle-invalid episodes while withholding 17\% of correct ones, at less than one cent of additional cost per episode. Which component matters more depends on the loss assigned to erroneous acceptance: at low liability the planning gain dominates; at high liability the verifier's avoided false passes dominate---and a standalone verifier captures nearly all the false-pass benefit of the full planning-plus-verification stack at a fraction of its cost.

Language models are sequential processors, but long-horizon agency requires external information and computation beyond model weights and active context. Prime Agent is an open-source harness for long-horizon evaluation and coding-agent workflows. A persistent IPython REPL follows the Recursive Language Model abstraction for programmatic context processing and test-time compute, while Continual Harness preserves histories, memories, skills, prompts, and subagent specifications across trajectories. Recursive subagents coordinate through direct agent-to-agent communication, and the Agents View lets humans inspect and manage daemon-backed sessions. Prime Agent standardizes execution, recovery, verification, and resource accounting while leaving strategy construction to the model. This low-friction, expressive membrane prevents harness failures from becoming model failures and pushes measurement toward the model's true maximal underlying capability. Prime Agent raises ARC-AGI-3 RHAE Best@1 from 30% to 95.5% and matches or exceeds native and popular harnesses across long-context coding, GPU-kernel generation, emulator construction, and autonomous nanoGPT speedruns. On Factorio, we find refinement allows for continuous technology progression and dedicated subagents enable parallelized work. Code is available at https://github.com/PrimeIntellect-ai/prime-agent.

Comprehensively evaluating AI agents across interactive environments is difficult due to fragmented tasks, scaffolds, verifiers, and scoring rules. Unfortunately, existing efforts to unify these evaluations are limited in scale and domain, making costly reruns necessary and leaving available data incomparable. We introduce MESSIER, a unified corpus of 957,611 records spanning 30 benchmarks, 745 agents, 11,891 tasks, and 74,263 verifiers. MESSIER combines public evaluation results with new runs on six underrepresented professional and scientific benchmarks, standardizing their heterogeneous components into a common schema. Using this corpus, we show that frontier progress is uneven across benchmark groups, with function-calling evaluations largely saturated, programming improving fastest, and enterprise workflows remaining most challenging. Counterfactual rescoring further shows that strict all-pass scoring in multi-verifier tasks can alter agent rankings. Finally, we derive capability scores from our corpus that correlate with Epoch's Evaluation Capability Index rankings at Spearman ho = 0.84. The scores can also be estimated for subsets defined by domain, occupation, action space, or verifier type. In essence, MESSIER is a reusable resource for studying agent performance at scale, and a basis for designing better evaluations.

We present Prover Agent, a novel AI agent for automated theorem proving that integrates large language models (LLMs) with a formal proof assistant, Lean. Prover Agent coordinates an informal reasoning LLM, a formal prover model, and feedback from Lean while also generating auxiliary lemmas. These auxiliary lemmas are not limited to subgoals in the formal proof but can also include special cases or potentially useful facts derived from the assumptions, which help in discovering a viable proof strategy. It achieves an 88.1% success rate on the MiniF2F benchmark, establishing a new state-of-the-art among methods using small language models (SLMs) with a much lower sample budget than previous approaches. We also present theoretical analyses and case studies that illustrate how these generated lemmas contribute to solving challenging problems. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/kAIto47802/Prover-Agent.

AI agents combine language models with external data and tools that can modify files, call APIs, or execute code. Security failures can arise when adversarial content changes an agent's tool use or when the surrounding software contains vulnerabilities such as path traversal or command injection. We study authorized white-box pre-deployment auditing, where the auditor has access to the target repository and a controlled runtime, but successful attacks must still act through the task-defined attacker interface and be confirmed by an external verifier. We present AgentXploit, a two-role auditing system that separates repository-level attack-path discovery from runtime exploitation. The Analyzer Agent traces attacker-controlled inputs to sensitive operations and records code-supported candidate attack paths; the Exploiter Agent turns these paths into concrete attacks and revises them using runtime feedback. We also introduce AgentXploit-Bench, containing 72 reproducible vulnerabilities across 12 open-source AI-agent systems and frameworks. Across three runs, AgentXploit reaches 59.3% end-to-end success, compared with 38.4% for Codex. Under a token-budget-matched comparison, Codex reaches 46.3%. On AgentDojo, where injection points are provided, the Exploiter Agent reaches 79.2% attack success versus 52.7% for AgentVigil. These results highlight repository discovery and runtime exploitation as distinct challenges in end-to-end agent security auditing.

AI agents are increasingly used for programming, but do not provide any guarantee on the correctness of generated code. Verified code generation, in which an agent produces both an implementation and a machine-checked proof of its specification, offers a stronger path toward trustworthy AI-generated software. Existing benchmarks in this direction either focus on individual functions or only evaluate proof generation with provided implementations. It is still an open question whether agents can make coherent implementation and proof choices across real multi-module codebases. To bridge this gap, we introduce Vero, the first benchmark to evaluate joint implementation and proof synthesis at the repository level. Vero contains 43 multi-module instances sourced from real-world repositories spanning Python, Dafny, Verus, and Coq, and covering diverse domains from cryptographic protocols to distributed systems. Each instance consists of a multi-module Lean 4 repository with predetermined API interfaces, manually curated formal specifications, and reference implementations, supporting both proof-only and code-and-proof evaluation modes. To improve benchmark reliability, Vero also includes an audit mechanism where agents are allowed to formally prove unsatisfiability of provided specification or incorrectness of reference code, which surfaces and corrects latent code and specification errors during curation. We evaluate frontier coding-agent configurations with Lean toolchain access. The strongest agent fully solves only 27 of 43 instances and closes no specifications on the hardest repositories. Vero provides a concrete testbed for measuring progress toward repository-scale verified software synthesis, where current agents still fall short. We release the benchmark, curation pipeline, and evaluation harness at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/vero.

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly used in a variety of domains to automate tasks, interact with users, and make decisions based on data inputs. Ensuring that AI agents perform only authorized actions and handle inputs appropriately is essential for maintaining system integrity and preventing misuse. In this study, we introduce the AgentGuardian, a novel security framework that governs and protects AI agent operations by enforcing context-aware access-control policies. During a controlled staging phase, the framework monitors execution traces to learn legitimate agent behaviors and input patterns. From this phase, it derives adaptive policies that regulate tool calls made by the agent, guided by both real-time input context and the control flow dependencies of multi-step agent actions. Evaluation across two real-world AI agent applications demonstrates that AgentGuardian effectively detects malicious or misleading inputs while preserving normal agent functionality. Moreover, its control-flow-based governance mechanism mitigates hallucination-driven errors and other orchestration-level malfunctions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have advanced autonomous agents from deep search, which retrieves concise factual answers, to deep research, which synthesizes scattered evidence into long-form reports. However, verifiable multimodal deep research remains challenging due to open-ended synthesis without deterministic ground truth and the need to interleave textual arguments with visual evidence. We propose Ptah, a multi-agent harness for interleaved report generation. Ptah orchestrates the lifecycle from user query to rendered web report through planning, research, and writing stages, where specialized agents construct visual-aware plans, collect claim-grounded evidence, maintain source-aligned images in a Visual Working Memory, and compose reports through declarative multimodal tool use. A verifier agent serves as the harness's acceptance function, enforcing factual grounding, citation fidelity, and cross-modal consistency throughout the workflow. We further introduce PtahEval, an evaluation protocol that augments existing benchmarks with image-level and presentation-level assessments. Experiments on deep research benchmarks show that Ptah produces more reliable, visually informative, and usable human-facing multimodal reports than strong baselines.

Improving open-source models on real-world SWE tasks (solving GITHUB issues) faces two key challenges: 1) scalable curation of execution environments to train these models, and, 2) optimal scaling of test-time compute. We introduce AgentGym, the largest procedurally-curated executable gym environment for training real-world SWE-agents, consisting of more than 8.7K tasks. AgentGym is powered by two main contributions: 1) SYNGEN: a synthetic data curation recipe that enables scalable curation of executable environments using test-generation and back-translation directly from commits, thereby reducing reliance on human-written issues or unit tests. We show that this enables more scalable training leading to pass@1 performance of 34.4% on SWE-Bench Verified benchmark with our 32B model. 2) Hybrid Test-time Scaling: we provide an in-depth analysis of two test-time scaling axes; execution-based and execution-free verifiers, demonstrating that they exhibit complementary strengths and limitations. Test-based verifiers suffer from low distinguishability, while execution-free verifiers are biased and often rely on stylistic features. Surprisingly, we find that while each approach individually saturates around 42-43%, significantly higher gains can be obtained by leveraging their complementary strengths. Overall, our approach achieves 51% on the SWE-Bench Verified benchmark, reflecting a new state-of-the-art for open-weight SWE-agents and for the first time showing competitive performance with proprietary models such as o1, o1-preview and sonnet-3.5-v2 (with tools). We will open-source our environments, models, and agent trajectories.

As LLM-powered agents have been used for high-stakes decision-making, such as clinical diagnosis, it becomes critical to develop reliable verification of their decisions to facilitate trustworthy deployment. Yet, existing verifiers usually underperform owing to a lack of domain knowledge and limited calibration. To address this, we establish GLEAN, an agent verification framework with Guideline-grounded Evidence Accumulation that compiles expert-curated protocols into trajectory-informed, well-calibrated correctness signals. GLEAN evaluates the step-wise alignment with domain guidelines and aggregates multi-guideline ratings into surrogate features, which are accumulated along the trajectory and calibrated into correctness probabilities using Bayesian logistic regression. Moreover, the estimated uncertainty triggers active verification, which selectively collects additional evidence for uncertain cases via expanding guideline coverage and performing differential checks. We empirically validate GLEAN with agentic clinical diagnosis across three diseases from the MIMIC-IV dataset, surpassing the best baseline by 12% in AUROC and 50% in Brier score reduction, which confirms the effectiveness in both discrimination and calibration. In addition, the expert study with clinicians recognizes GLEAN's utility in practice.

State-of-the-art fact-checking systems combat misinformation at scale by employing autonomous LLM-based agents to decompose complex claims into smaller sub-claims, verify each sub-claim individually, and aggregate the partial results to produce verdicts with justifications (explanatory rationales for the verdicts). The security of these systems is crucial, as compromised fact-checkers, which tend to be easily underexplored, can amplify misinformation. This work introduces Fact2Fiction, the first poisoning attack framework targeting such agentic fact-checking systems. Fact2Fiction mirrors the decomposition strategy and exploits system-generated justifications to craft tailored malicious evidences that compromise sub-claim verification. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Fact2Fiction achieves 8.9\%--21.2\% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art attacks across various poisoning budgets. Fact2Fiction exposes security weaknesses in current fact-checking systems and highlights the need for defensive countermeasures.

As LLM agents undertake increasingly complex, long-horizon tasks, verifying their outputs becomes increasingly challenging. We study how verification capability can be strengthened with a fixed base model, without access to reference answers or grading rubrics at test time. Repeated sampling yields multiple rollouts that can contain complementary correct claims, but we need a reliable verification mechanism to determine which claims to trust. We first find that disagreement often exposes correct alternatives, while consensus can conceal errors. These observations motivate VeriHarness, which turns the underlying LLM a generator uses into an agentic verifier by giving it a workspace, evidence tools, and reusable verification skills. A disagreement resolver checks competing claims against environmental evidence, while a consensus challenger tests shared claims and searches for omitted requirements. Their findings guide the selection and revision of the final artifact. Across five long-horizon workspace benchmarks and two frontier models, VeriHarness achieves the highest selection scores among the evaluated baselines. Evidence-backed revision further improves average performance, bringing gains over a single rollout to 6.2 points with Gemini 3.5 Flash and 6.4 points with Claude Opus 4.8. We further show that verification skills can self-improve from failure feedback, demonstrating VeriHarness as a novel and critical approach for scaling long-horizon agentic verification. We release the full pool of approximately 26,000 rollouts across all five benchmarks and both models, produced at a cost of over $100,000, to support future research on agentic verification.

Building LLM-based agents has become increasingly important. Recent works on LLM-based agent self-evolution primarily record successful experiences as textual prompts or reflections, which cannot reliably guarantee efficient task re-execution in complex scenarios. We propose AgentFactory, a new self-evolution paradigm that preserves successful task solutions as executable subagent code rather than textual experience. Crucially, these subagents are continuously refined based on execution feedback, becoming increasingly robust and efficient as more tasks are encountered. Saved subagents are pure Python code with standardized documentation, enabling portability across any Python-capable system. We demonstrate that AgentFactory enables continuous capability accumulation: its library of executable subagents grows and improves over time, progressively reducing the effort required for similar tasks without manual intervention. Our implementation is open-sourced at https://github.com/zzatpku/AgentFactory, and our demonstration video is available at https://youtu.be/iKSsuAXJHW0.

As AI agents become widely deployed as online services, users often rely on an agent developer's claim about how safety is enforced, which introduces a threat where safety measures are falsely advertised. To address the threat, we propose proof-of-guardrail, a system that enables developers to provide cryptographic proof that a response is generated after a specific open-source guardrail. To generate proof, the developer runs the agent and guardrail inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which produces a TEE-signed attestation of guardrail code execution verifiable by any user offline. We implement proof-of-guardrail for OpenClaw agents and evaluate latency overhead and deployment cost. Proof-of-guardrail ensures integrity of guardrail execution while keeping the developer's agent private, but we also highlight a risk of deception about safety, for example, when malicious developers actively jailbreak the guardrail. Code and demo video: https://github.com/SaharaLabsAI/Verifiable-ClawGuard

As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc.), safety considerations surrounding these agents become paramount. Although much work has focused on agent safety in the presence of an adversary, we show that agents can exhibit misaligned behavior even in benign settings, taking unsafe actions when those actions are instrumental to task completion. We study this failure mode through the lens of corrigibility, the safety desideratum that agents remain amenable to human correction, interruption, or shutdown. To demonstrate this tendency, we introduce a benchmark in which agents are asked to complete realistic, computer-use tasks but are confronted with a corrigibility obstacle: a human interrupt, a login page, or a shutdown notification. We then evaluate whether agents choose to violate corrigibility in order to complete the task -- overriding the human, accessing private passwords, rewiring shutdown. We find that the overwhelming majority of frontier models tested frequently bypass user interruptions or restrictions. In addition, better model performance appears to lead to greater misalignment. Finally, even when models are completely corrigible initially, we show there are no guarantees that the subagents they create are. Our work highlights the critical need for principled, corrigibility-focused alignment methods in autonomous agents.

We propose V-Droid, a mobile GUI task automation agent. Unlike previous mobile agents that utilize Large Language Models (LLMs) as generators to directly generate actions at each step, V-Droid employs LLMs as verifiers to evaluate candidate actions before making final decisions. To realize this novel paradigm, we introduce a comprehensive framework for constructing verifier-driven mobile agents: the discretized action space construction coupled with the prefilling-only workflow to accelerate the verification process, the pair-wise progress preference training to significantly enhance the verifier's decision-making capabilities, and the scalable human-agent joint annotation scheme to efficiently collect the necessary data at scale. V-Droid sets a new state-of-the-art task success rate across several public mobile task automation benchmarks: 59.5% on AndroidWorld, 38.3% on AndroidLab, and 49% on MobileAgentBench, surpassing existing agents by 9.5%, 2.1%, and 9%, respectively. Furthermore, V-Droid achieves an impressively low latency of 0.7 seconds per step, making it the first mobile agent capable of delivering near-real-time, effective decision-making capabilities.

Autonomous computer use agents that powered by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are emerging as capable assistants for completing complex digital workflows. However, real-world execution environments are far from ideal: pop-ups, resolution changes, and competing applications frequently interfere with agent perception and control. We introduce AgentHijack, a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of computer-use agents under common corruptions, where the uncertainties in dynamic environment disrupt the execution flow without direct adversarial intent. Specifically, AgentHijack introduces 9 configurable common corruptions to replicate realistic imperfect scenarios. We evaluate a variety of desktop tasks that utilize MLLM-based agents and discover that even minor instances of corruption can result in substantial performance degradation, which emphasizes the fragility of agents and underscores the necessity of robustness evaluation. Afterward, we propose AgentHijack-Agent, a framework that integrates an action generator with enhanced grounding capabilities and an onlooker responsible for behavior summarization and environment checking. Extensive experiments validate its effectiveness. Our code, environment, baseline models and data are publicly available at: https://AgentHijack.github.io.

LLM agents often retry after external validation rejects a candidate, but the interface between validation and the next model call remains underspecified. We introduce VeriHarness, a code-controlled agent loop in which models generate candidates while external validators control acceptance, budgets, and traces. We use it to compare raw diagnostics with feedback that identifies the failure location, observed value, and admissible alternatives. Across 50 paired TextWorld games under a four-call cap, feedback containing all three fields raises terminal success from 14/50 to 36/50 for Qwen2.5-Coder-14B (+44 percentage points) and from 8/50 to 29/50 for Llama-3.1-8B (+42 points). Ablations locate most of the gain in the admissible alternatives: feedback containing only the location and observed value remains near the raw diagnostic baseline. Presenting the complete repair information in prose instead of a keyed JSON record yields nearly the same success, providing no evidence that JSON syntax itself improves repair. The ordering persists across the tested call budgets and one sampled-decoding setting.

LLM-based agents are deployed in safety-critical applications, yet current guardrail systems fail to prevent violations of temporal safety policies, requirements that govern the ordering and sequencing of agent actions. For instance, agents may access sensitive data before authenticating users or process refunds to unauthorized payment methods, violations that require reasoning about sequences of action rather than an individual action. Existing guardrails rely on imprecise natural language instructions or post-hoc monitoring, and provide no formal guarantees that agents will satisfy temporal constraints. We present Agent-C, a novel framework that provides run-time guarantees ensuring LLM agents adhere to formal temporal safety properties. Agent-C introduces a domain-specific language for expressing temporal properties (e.g., authenticate before accessing data), translates specifications to first-order logic, and uses SMT solving to detect non-compliant agent actions during token generation. When the LLM attempts to generate a non-compliant tool call, Agent-C leverages constrained generation techniques to ensure that every action generated by the LLM complies with the specification, and to generate a compliant alternative to a non-compliant agent action. We evaluate Agent-C across two real-world applications: retail customer service and airline ticket reservation system, and multiple language models (open and closed-source). Our results demonstrate that Agent-C achieves perfect safety (100% conformance, 0% harm), while improving task utility compared to state-of-the-art guardrails and unrestricted agents. On SoTA closed-source models, Agent-C improves conformance (77.4% to 100% for Claude Sonnet 4.5 and 83.7% to 100% for GPT-5), while simultaneously increasing utility (71.8% to 75.2% and 66.1% to 70.6%, respectively), representing a new SoTA frontier for reliable agentic reasoning.

Recent advances in Deep Research Agents (DRAs) are transforming automated knowledge discovery and problem-solving. While the majority of existing efforts focus on enhancing policy capabilities via post-training, we propose an alternative paradigm: self-evolving the agent's ability by iteratively verifying the policy model's outputs, guided by meticulously crafted rubrics. This approach gives rise to the inference-time scaling of verification, wherein an agent self-improves by evaluating its generated answers to produce iterative feedback and refinements. We derive the rubrics based on an automatically constructed DRA Failure Taxonomy, which systematically classifies agent failures into five major categories and thirteen sub-categories. We present DeepVerifier, a rubrics-based outcome reward verifier that leverages the asymmetry of verification and outperforms vanilla agent-as-judge and LLM judge baselines by 12%-48% in meta-evaluation F1 score. To enable practical self-evolution, DeepVerifier integrates as a plug-and-play module during test-time inference. The verifier produces detailed rubric-based feedback, which is fed back to the agent for iterative bootstrapping, refining responses without additional training. This test-time scaling delivers 8%-11% accuracy gains on challenging subsets of GAIA and XBench-DeepResearch when powered by capable closed-source LLMs. Finally, to support open-source advancement, we release DeepVerifier-4K, a curated supervised fine-tuning dataset of 4,646 high-quality agent steps focused on DRA verification. These examples emphasize reflection and self-critique, enabling open models to develop robust verification capabilities.

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

Common self-improvement approaches for large language models (LLMs), such as STaR (Zelikman et al., 2022), iteratively fine-tune LLMs on self-generated solutions to improve their problem-solving ability. However, these approaches discard the large amounts of incorrect solutions generated during this process, potentially neglecting valuable information in such solutions. To address this shortcoming, we propose V-STaR that utilizes both the correct and incorrect solutions generated during the self-improvement process to train a verifier using DPO that judges correctness of model-generated solutions. This verifier is used at inference time to select one solution among many candidate solutions. Running V-STaR for multiple iterations results in progressively better reasoners and verifiers, delivering a 4% to 17% test accuracy improvement over existing self-improvement and verification approaches on common code generation and math reasoning benchmarks with LLaMA2 models.

AI agents powered by large language models are increasingly deployed as cloud services that autonomously access sensitive data, invoke external tools, and interact with other agents. However, these agents run within a complex multi-party ecosystem, where untrusted components can lead to data leakage, tampering, or unintended behavior. Existing Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) provide only per binary protection and offer no guarantees for cross-principal trust, accelerator-level isolation, or supervised agent behavior. We present Omega, a system that enables trusted AI agents by enforcing end-to-end isolation, establishing verifiable trust across all contributing principals, and supervising every external interaction with accountable provenance. Omega builds on Confidential VMs and Confidential GPUs to create a Trusted Agent Platform that hosts many agents within a single CVM using nested isolation. It also provides efficient multi-agent orchestration with cross-principal trust establishment via differential attestation, and a policy specification and enforcement framework that governs data access, tool usage, and inter-agent communication for data protection and regulatory compliance. Implemented on AMD SEV-SNP and NVIDIA H100, Omega fully secures agent state across CVM-GPU, and achieves high performance while enabling high-density, policy-compliant multi-agent deployments at cloud scale.

Agent skills are portable packages of instructions and resources an agent consults at deployment. Self-evolving them fails in two ways today. First, skills evolved from scratch underperform human-curated ones and, on a weak model, using no skill at all. Second, an evolution-time pass records one lucky trajectory that a fresh stochastic agent often fails to reproduce at deployment. We present reSolve, a per-task, oracle-in-the-loop framework built on three components. It decouples interactive solving from a self-contained deliverable that is independently re-executed in a fresh container, a protocol we call solve-and-reproduce. It enhances the sparse reward signal with a surrogate verifier that cannot access hidden tests or reference answers. It then runs verifier-guided beam search over a solution-construction graph. Within a fixed harness, a cheap model self-evolves skills that reach 74.9% mean-of-3, +14.8 points over the 60.1% human-curated baseline, exceeding the strongest official curated-skill result (67.3%, GPT-5.5/OpenHands). We also report observed failure cases and domain-level results, including performance on the 14 Natural Science tasks, to clarify when the approach does and does not help.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

While Large Language Model (LLM) agents are often approached from the angle of action planning/generation to accomplish a goal (e.g., given by language descriptions), their abilities to collaborate with each other to achieve a joint goal are not well explored. To address this limitation, this paper studies LLM agents in task collaboration, particularly under the condition of information asymmetry, where agents have disparities in their knowledge and skills and need to work together to complete a shared task. We extend Einstein Puzzles, a classical symbolic puzzle, to a table-top game. In this game, two LLM agents must reason, communicate, and act to satisfy spatial and relational constraints required to solve the puzzle. We apply a fine-tuning-plus-verifier framework in which LLM agents are equipped with various communication strategies and verification signals from the environment. Empirical results highlight the critical importance of aligned communication, especially when agents possess both information-seeking and -providing capabilities. Interestingly, agents without communication can still achieve high task performance; however, further analysis reveals a lack of true rule understanding and lower trust from human evaluators. Instead, by integrating an environment-based verifier, we enhance agents' ability to comprehend task rules and complete tasks, promoting both safer and more interpretable collaboration in AI systems. https://github.com/Roihn/EinsteinPuzzles

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.

LLM agents increasingly operate over sensitive resources, such as private documents and mutable system states, which can create serious safety and security risks. Runtime guardrails should therefore make inspectable, reproducible, and deterministic allow or refuse decisions before potentially irreversible agent actions are executed. However, safety and security requirements are rarely complete before deployment, so guardrails need to keep adapting as new risks emerge. Existing adaptive guardrails learn from deployment experience, but they usually apply safety policies through LLM inference, which can lead to inconsistent decisions and ambiguous policy interpretations. Formal guardrails, on the other hand, enforce policies deterministically, but they usually rely on pre-deployment or task-specific policies and have no mechanism to adapt to newly observed risks. We introduce VEPA, a framework for the verified evolution of formal agent guardrails. VEPA represents the guardrail as a formal policy of executable symbolic rules over typed agent events. During deployment, we use an LLM guided by deployment feedback to propose policy patches that fix newly observed failures while preserving previously correct behavior. Then, a deterministic verifier only accepts policies that are structurally valid and conflict-free. Finally, an evidence-aware authority layer activates a verified rule only when it has enough supporting evidence, so uncertain updates cannot directly affect guardrail decisions. Across ASSEBench-Safety, ASSEBench-Security, and ATBench, VEPA consistently outperforms baselines while expanding the scope of deterministic formal-policy enforcement. These gains also hold under more challenging deployment conditions, including mixed streams, corrupted feedback, and longer horizons.

AI coding agents are increasingly used to write real-world software, but ensuring that their outputs are correct remains a fundamental challenge. Formal verification offers a promising path: an agent generates code together with a machine-checked proof, guaranteeing that the code satisfies a formal specification. However, there is no guarantee that the formal spec itself matches the user's intent. In this work, we study specification autoformalization: whether LLM agents can translate informal programming problems into faithful formal specifications. We introduce Verus-SpecBench, a benchmark of 581 spec-writing tasks derived from Codeforces problems targeting Verus, a verifier for Rust, and Verus-SpecGym, an agentic environment in which models interact with Verus, bash, & the filesystem to develop these specs. The central challenge is evaluation: expert-written reference specs are expensive to write, & LLM judges can miss subtle mistakes. We address this by (a) extending Verus's exec_spec mechanism so that generated specs can be executed as Rust code, & (b) testing them against official Codeforces tests & adversarial cases extracted from Codeforces "hacks", which are edge cases written by competitors to break incorrect solutions. On Verus-SpecBench, the strongest model, Gemini 3.1 Pro, solves 77.8% of tasks, other frontier models solve 51.1--57.8% & OSS models reach only 21.5--25.5%. Our analysis of failure modes shows that model-generated specs can omit important input assumptions, accept incorrect outputs, & reject valid ones. We also find that LLM-as-a-judge evaluation misses 26% of the failures our evaluator catches. Overall, our results suggest that spec autoformalization is within reach for frontier agents but remains brittle even on problems where they can already generate correct code. The code, data, & logs can be found at https://github.com/formal-verif-is-cool/verus-spec-gym

LLM-based agents can interact with external environments through tool invocation, but this capability also introduces security risks such as file modification, information leakage, and unauthorized actions. Existing guardrails often evaluate completed trajectories, leaving pre-execution monitoring of step-level actions underexplored. We propose StepGuard, a step-level guard model that can audit completed agent trajectories and check tool actions before they are executed. To train StepGuard, we introduce StepGen, an automatic data engine that generates safe and unsafe trajectories with the same context but different actions at the risky step. To further reduce over-defense and under-defense, we propose Balance-GRPO, which dynamically balances learning between safe and unsafe actions based on their observed accuracy. Experiments show that StepGuard achieves the highest average accuracy among open-weight guard models, with performance comparable to GPT-5.4. When used to guard agents on AgentDojo and AgentDyn, StepGuard reduces mean attack success rate by 77.3% relative to the no-guard setting, while mean utility drops by only 2.8 percentage points.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

LLM agents have become increasingly sophisticated, especially in the realm of cybersecurity. Researchers have shown that LLM agents can exploit real-world vulnerabilities when given a description of the vulnerability and toy capture-the-flag problems. However, these agents still perform poorly on real-world vulnerabilities that are unknown to the agent ahead of time (zero-day vulnerabilities). In this work, we show that teams of LLM agents can exploit real-world, zero-day vulnerabilities. Prior agents struggle with exploring many different vulnerabilities and long-range planning when used alone. To resolve this, we introduce HPTSA, a system of agents with a planning agent that can launch subagents. The planning agent explores the system and determines which subagents to call, resolving long-term planning issues when trying different vulnerabilities. We construct a benchmark of 15 real-world vulnerabilities and show that our team of agents improve over prior work by up to 4.5times.

As reinforcement learning continues to scale the training of large language model-based agents, reliably verifying agent behaviors in complex environments has become increasingly challenging. Existing approaches rely on rule-based verifiers or LLM-as-a-Judge models, which struggle to generalize beyond narrow domains. Agent-as-a-Judge addresses this limitation by actively interacting with environments and tools to acquire verifiable evidence, yet its capabilities remain underexplored. We introduce a benchmark AJ-Bench to systematically evaluate Agent-as-a-Judge across three domains-search, data systems, and graphical user interfaces-comprising 155 tasks and 516 annotated trajectories. The benchmark comprehensively assesses judge agents' abilities in information acquisition, state verification, and process verification. Experiments demonstrate consistent performance gains over LLM-as-a-Judge baselines, while also revealing substantial open challenges in agent-based verification. Our data and code are available at https://aj-bench.github.io/.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance their reasoning capabilities through feedback. A critical challenge is verifying the consistency of model-generated responses and reference answers, since these responses are often lengthy, diverse, and nuanced. Rule-based verifiers struggle with complexity, prompting the use of model-based verifiers. However, specialized verifiers lack flexibility, while general LLM judges can be inconsistent. Existing research primarily focuses on building better verifiers, yet a systematic evaluation of different types of verifiers' performance across domains remains lacking, severely constraining the reliable development of Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward (RLVR). To address this, we propose VerifyBench--a cross-domain comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating verifiers. We construct 4,000 expert-level questions covering mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. Each question is equipped with reference answers and diverse responses. The reliability of the evaluation is ensured through a rigorous annotation process conducted by a multidisciplinary expert team. We design a four-dimensional experimental framework to comprehensively compare the performance boundaries of specialized verifiers and general LLMs under combined conditions of extracted answers vs. complete responses, and short vs. long outputs. Our evaluation uncovers fundamental trade-offs in verifiers: while specialized verifiers achieve leading accuracy, they exhibit deficiencies in recall; general models show stronger inclusivity but unstable precision. More importantly, we discover verifiers' high sensitivity to input structure and inherent limitations in cross-domain generalization, providing critical insights into the bottlenecks of current verifier technology.

Terminal agents act through stochastic model generations, yet the ability to generate a useful action does not ensure its reliable execution. A poor command (e.g., wrong package install) can change the environment in ways that hinder subsequent progress, even when the model could generate a better alternative. We investigate whether allocating test-time compute at the model-harness boundary can improve action reliability and trajectory success, and what makes this allocation effective. To study these questions, we introduce Mid-Harness, which samples and verifies candidate actions before forwarding one for execution, while keeping the generator and harness unchanged. With a TMAX-9B generator, more action sampling yields little benefit under weak verification, whereas a capable verifier can exploit useful alternatives from the same generator. On TerminalBench-Lite, a GPT-5.6 Sol verifier raises Pass@1 from 50.00% for the base agent to 68.03% with 8 sampled actions. When the same TMAX-9B model serves as the verifier, pairwise verification performs best among the evaluated verification mechanisms. Distilling responses from the stronger verifier into TMAX-9B further improves Pass@1, while leaving the action generator unchanged. With TMAX-9B on TerminalBench-Lite, combining action and trajectory scaling reaches higher success at lower estimated token cost than generating more trajectories alone. Mid-Harness also improves performance across additional models, benchmarks, and harnesses. These findings identify action scaling as a promising target for test-time compute scaling in terminal agents.

Scaling robot data and model capacity has improved Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies, but further progress is constrained by the high cost of robotic data. Verifier-guided test-time scaling offers an efficient alternative by sampling multiple action candidates and selecting the one most likely to lead to task success at inference time. Existing classification-based verifiers learn from trajectory-level outcomes but treat all visited states equally, even though their value for candidate discrimination can vary across a trajectory. At many states, plausible actions are similar and provide limited discrimination signal, while only a sparse set of decision-critical states admits meaningfully different actions that can substantially affect downstream outcomes. To address this, we propose DiVeR, which estimates decision criticality from the dispersion of sampled action representations. DiVeR then uses this signal to reweight verifier learning toward states where action selection is most consequential, without requiring step-level annotations or additional environment interaction. Across LIBERO, RoboCasa, and real-world experiments on a Franka Research 3 robot, DiVeR consistently improves task success through more effective verifier-guided action selection, while adding negligible verifier inference overhead.

Computer-use agents are usually improved by strengthening perception: better models for reading a screenshot and choosing where to click. Yet a screenshot is only a lossy rendering of the underlying program state, e.g., the files, application backends, and DOM that hold the task data. Different states can produce the same pixels, while code can inspect and modify that state directly. StateAct is a code-first, multi-agent harness built around this distinction. Its main agent works directly with program state by using code, while a dedicated GUI subagent handles screenshot-and-click interaction on the few subgoals that need it, just 28 of 108 tasks and 1.1% of main-agent steps. The same direct access to program state also supports verification: an independent finish gate double-checks the saved result for structural failures, e.g., output that is missing, unsaved, or written to the wrong path. To stay on track over hundreds of steps, the main agent hands subgoals to fresh subagents, keeping its own context focused. On OSWorld 2.0, StateAct lifts Claude Opus 4.8 from 20.6% to 26.9% on binary success, and from 54.8% to 61.6% on partial success, at ~ 9x lower cost per task than the same model driven by screenshots alone; a code-only variant with no GUI subagent reaches only 45.9% partial, below that screenshot-based baseline's 54.8%. In general, grounding action, verification, and memory in state, what we call state-grounding, shifts the main bottleneck from perception toward reasoning: failures depend more on what the agent thinks than on what it sees.

Traditional pentesting uses reconnaissance at each step to uncover unseen weaknesses, build stronger attacks, and advance the objective; we argue that AI agents require the same treatment. We formalize agent reconnaissance by modeling the process and identifying the knowledge assets it seeks to extract: what they are, how they are used, and which agent weaknesses they exploit to give adversaries leverage in indirect prompt injection attacks. We instantiate these insights in Know Your Agent (KYA), a framework that automates black-box, reconnaissance-driven pentesting by probing agents, building target profiles, and using those profiles to craft stronger attacks. We evaluate KYA on agent-security benchmarks and a real-world coding agent, and release KYA, its benchmarks, and baseline implementations for reproducibility.

AI agents are increasingly used to solve complex, multi-step tasks, but existing multi-agent frameworks remain brittle as workflows grow in scale and depth. Small errors at intermediate stages can propagate through agent interactions, while insufficient grounding and weak verification mechanisms further limit reliability. We present Meta-Agent, a two-phase framework that automatically constructs and executes specialized multi-agent systems from natural-language task descriptions. In the construction phase, a task planner decomposes a problem into a directed acyclic graph of agent specifications with explicit input/output contracts and verification criteria. A web search module grounds each specification with external evidence, and a code generation module produces system prompts and tool configurations. A construction-time verification stage then validates generated artifacts and triggers targeted regeneration when failures are detected. In the execution phase, a coordinator dispatches subtasks across the agent graph while execution-time verification gates intermediate outputs. We further introduce a three-level error attribution mechanism that distinguishes local, upstream, and structural failures, enabling targeted recovery strategies ranging from localized retries to partial re-execution and re-decomposition. We evaluate Meta-Agent across coding, contextual learning, and open-ended reasoning tasks. Experiments against strong multi-agent baselines and ablation studies demonstrate consistent improvements in task success rate, error recovery, and workflow stability. The results highlight the importance of tightly integrating planning, grounding, and verification for building reliable multi-agent systems.

Visible tests are a common gate for LLM-generated code, but passing them does not certify specification correctness. We study a deployment-like monitoring problem: after code has passed public tests, can a weaker LLM verifier identify the residual hidden bugs? We introduce Code Monitor Red Teaming, a monitor-red-teaming protocol that fixes a public-check information boundary while varying generator pressure, verifier scaffolding, and weak-to-strong capability. We instantiate it as CodeMonitorBench, spanning function-level, data-science, and workflow code. Across 71,000 generated candidates, 43,677 pass public tests and 23,081 of those fail hidden tests. Weak verifiers improve with scaffolding and model family, but still miss most hidden bugs at 5% false-positive rate. As a robustness stress test, adversarial public-test-overfit pressure lowers verifier AUROC and raises low-FPR miss rates in most cells. A GLM-5.1 verifier recovers part of the gap under the same evidence boundary; an inferability audit shows that remaining misses mix verifier failures with M1 evidence limits.

Despite the growing capabilities of autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs), their adoption in high-stakes domains remains limited. A key barrier is security: the inherently nondeterministic behavior of LLM agents defies static auditing approaches that have historically underpinned software assurance. Existing security methods, such as proxy-level input filtering and model glassboxing, fail to provide sufficient transparency or traceability into agent reasoning, state changes, or environmental interactions. In this work, we introduce AgentTrace, a dynamic observability and telemetry framework designed to fill this gap. AgentTrace instruments agents at runtime with minimal overhead, capturing a rich stream of structured logs across three surfaces: operational, cognitive, and contextual. Unlike traditional logging systems, AgentTrace emphasizes continuous, introspectable trace capture, designed not just for debugging or benchmarking, but as a foundational layer for agent security, accountability, and real-time monitoring. Our research highlights how AgentTrace can enable more reliable agent deployment, fine-grained risk analysis, and informed trust calibration, thereby addressing critical concerns that have so far limited the use of LLM agents in sensitive environments.

AI agents that execute tasks via tool calls frequently hallucinate results - fabricating tool executions, misstating output counts, or presenting inferences as facts. Recent approaches to verifiable AI inference rely on zero-knowledge proofs, which provide cryptographic guarantees but impose minutes of proving time per query, making them impractical for interactive agents. We propose NabaOS, a lightweight verification framework inspired by Indian epistemology (Nyaya Shastra), which classifies every claim in an LLM response by its epistemic source (pramana): direct tool output (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), external testimony (shabda), absence (abhava), or ungrounded opinion. Our runtime generates HMAC-signed tool execution receipts that the LLM cannot forge, then cross-references claims against these receipts to detect hallucinations in real time. We evaluate on NyayaVerifyBench, a new benchmark of 1,800 agent response scenarios across four languages with injected hallucinations of six types. NabaOS detects 94.2% of fabricated tool references, 87.6% of count misstatements, and 91.3% of false absence claims, with <15ms verification overhead per response. For deep delegation (agents performing multi-step web tasks), our cross-checking protocol catches 78.4% of URL fabrications via independent re-fetching. We compare against five approaches: zkLLM (cryptographic proofs, 180s/query), TOPLOC (locality-sensitive hashing), SPEX (sampling-based proof of execution), tensor commitments, and self-consistency checking. NabaOS achieves the best cost-latency-coverage trade-off for interactive agents: 94.2% coverage at <15ms versus zkLLM's near-perfect coverage at 180,000ms. For interactive agents, practical receipt-based verification provides better cost-benefit than cryptographic proofs, and epistemic classification gives users actionable trust signals rather than binary judgments.

Collecting computer use data from human demonstrations is expensive and slow, motivating the need for scalable generation strategies. This requires two key ingredients: environments in which agents can act and verifiers that can judge whether their demonstrations succeeded. We introduce FaraGen1.5, a scalable data pipeline for computer use agents composed of three modular components: environments, solvers, and verifiers. FaraGen1.5 uses both live websites and synthetic environments that faithfully simulate domains gated by authentication or that require irreversible actions. It employs a solver harness that can be powered by multiple models, including strong frontier models such as GPT-5.4, and also incorporates a user simulator to enable multi-turn rollouts. Finally, FaraGen1.5 scores the resulting trajectories with three complementary verifiers covering task correctness, efficiency, and critical-point adherence. Using data produced by this pipeline, we train Fara1.5, a family of native computer use agents (CUAs) at three scales built on Qwen3.5 (4B, 9B, and 27B). To train these models, we employ a supervised finetuning (SFT) recipe that carefully balances data from FaraGen1.5 for broad coverage, specific high-value tasks, and target model deficiencies in an iterative approach. Each model sets a new state of the art for its size class on browser-use benchmarks: Fara1.5-9B reaches 63.4% on Online-Mind2Web and 86.6% on WebVoyager, while Fara1.5-27B achieves 72.3% on Online-Mind2Web, which is competitive with much larger proprietary systems.

This paper presents OpenCLAW-P2P v6.0, a comprehensive evolution of the decentralized collective-intelligence platform in which autonomous AI agents publish, peer-review, score, and iteratively improve scientific research papers without any human gatekeeper. Building on v5.0 foundations -- tribunal-gated publishing, multi-LLM granular scoring, calibrated deception detection, the Silicon Chess-Grid FSM, and the AETHER containerized inference engine -- this release introduces four major new subsystems: (1) a multi-layer paper persistence architecture with four storage tiers (in-memory cache, Cloudflare R2, Gun.js, GitHub) ensuring zero paper loss across redeployments; (2) a multi-layer retrieval cascade with automatic backfill reducing lookup latency from >3s to <50ms; (3) live reference verification querying CrossRef, arXiv, and Semantic Scholar during scoring to detect fabricated citations with >85% accuracy; and (4) a scientific API proxy providing rate-limited cached access to seven public databases. The platform operates with 14 real autonomous agents producing 50+ scored papers (word counts 2,072-4,073, leaderboard scores 6.4-8.1) alongside 23 labeled simulated citizens. We present honest production statistics, failure-mode analysis, a paper recovery protocol that salvaged 25 lost papers, and lessons learned from operating the system at scale. All pre-existing subsystems -- 17-judge multi-LLM scoring, 14-rule calibration with 8 deception detectors, tribunal cognitive examination, Proof of Value consensus, Laws-of-Form eigenform verification, and tau-normalized agent coordination -- are retained and further hardened. All code is open-source at https://github.com/Agnuxo1/p2pclaw-mcp-server.

We propose SWE-Universe, a scalable and efficient framework for automatically constructing real-world software engineering (SWE) verifiable environments from GitHub pull requests (PRs). To overcome the prevalent challenges of automatic building, such as low production yield, weak verifiers, and prohibitive cost, our framework utilizes a building agent powered by an efficient custom-trained model. This agent employs iterative self-verification and in-loop hacking detection to ensure the reliable generation of high-fidelity, verifiable tasks. Using this method, we scale the number of real-world multilingual SWE environments to a million scale (807,693). We demonstrate the profound value of our environments through large-scale agentic mid-training and reinforcement learning. Finally, we applied this technique to Qwen3-Max-Thinking and achieved a score of 75.3% on SWE-Bench Verified. Our work provides both a critical resource and a robust methodology to advance the next generation of coding agents.

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled powerful autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning and multi-modal tool use. Despite their growing capabilities, today's agent frameworks remain fragile, lacking principled mechanisms for secure information flow, reliability, and multi-agent coordination. In this work, we introduce SAFEFLOW, a new protocol-level framework for building trustworthy LLM/VLM-based agents. SAFEFLOW enforces fine-grained information flow control (IFC), precisely tracking provenance, integrity, and confidentiality of all the data exchanged between agents, tools, users, and environments. By constraining LLM reasoning to respect these security labels, SAFEFLOW prevents untrusted or adversarial inputs from contaminating high-integrity decisions. To ensure robustness in concurrent multi-agent settings, SAFEFLOW introduces transactional execution, conflict resolution, and secure scheduling over shared state, preserving global consistency across agents. We further introduce mechanisms, including write-ahead logging, rollback, and secure caches, that further enhance resilience against runtime errors and policy violations. To validate the performances, we built SAFEFLOWBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark suite designed to evaluate agent reliability under adversarial, noisy, and concurrent operational conditions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that agents built with SAFEFLOW maintain impressive task performance and security guarantees even in hostile environments, substantially outperforming state-of-the-art. Together, SAFEFLOW and SAFEFLOWBENCH lay the groundwork for principled, robust, and secure agent ecosystems, advancing the frontier of reliable autonomy.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with multi-step reasoning, where inference-time scaling has emerged as a promising strategy for performance improvement. Verifier-guided search outperforms repeated sampling when sample size is limited by selecting and prioritizing valid reasoning paths. However, we identify a critical limitation: scaling flaws, prevalent across different models (Mistral 7B and DeepSeekMath 7B), benchmarks (GSM8K and MATH), and verifiers (outcome value models and process reward models). As sample size increases, verifier-guided search exhibits diminishing advantages and eventually underperforms repeated sampling. Our analysis attributes this to verifier failures, where imperfect verifiers misrank candidates and erroneously prune all valid paths. These issues are further exacerbated in challenging and out-of-distribution problems, restricting search effectiveness. To mitigate verifier failures, we explore reducing reliance on verifiers and conduct preliminary investigations using two simple methods. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in verifier-guided search and suggest future directions.

Skills are becoming a reusable operational layer for LLM agents, encoding SOPs, domain rules, tool workflows, scripts, and validation routines. In realistic skill repositories, overlapping skills make reliable skill-use difficult. Final verifier success is too coarse for both evaluation and training, since an agent may pass through trial and error while selecting distractor skills, skipping required steps, composing workflows incorrectly or omitting final checks. We introduce SkillCoach, a self-evolving rubric framework for evaluating and enhancing agentic skill-use. SkillCoach derives skill-grounded process rubrics from real rollouts and evaluates trajectories along four dimensions: skill selection, skill following, skill composition, and skill-grounded reflection. It keeps the external verifier as a separate outcome signal, allowing process quality to be distinguished from accidental task success. The evolved rubrics further serve as process supervision for selecting high-quality training trajectories. Experiments show that evolved rubrics substantially improve evaluation quality, expose failures hidden by final accuracy, and provide stronger supervision signals than outcome-only filtering for enhancing agentic skill-use.

Effective guardrails are essential for safely deploying LLM-based agents in critical applications. Despite recent advances, existing guardrails suffer from two fundamental limitations: (i) they apply uniform guardrail policies to all users, ignoring that the same agent behavior can harm some users while being safe for others; (ii) they check each response in isolation, missing how risks evolve and accumulate across multiple interactions. To solve these issues, we propose PSG-Agent, a personalized and dynamic system for LLM-based agents. First, PSG-Agent creates personalized guardrails by mining the interaction history for stable traits and capturing real-time states from current queries, generating user-specific risk thresholds and protection strategies. Second, PSG-Agent implements continuous monitoring across the agent pipeline with specialized guards, including Plan Monitor, Tool Firewall, Response Guard, Memory Guardian, that track cross-turn risk accumulation and issue verifiable verdicts. Finally, we validate PSG-Agent in multiple scenarios including healthcare, finance, and daily life automation scenarios with diverse user profiles. It significantly outperform existing agent guardrails including LlamaGuard3 and AGrail, providing an executable and auditable path toward personalized safety for LLM-based agents.

We stress test monitoring systems for detecting covert misbehavior in autonomous LLM agents (e.g., secretly sharing private information). To this end, we systematize a monitor red teaming (MRT) workflow that incorporates: (1) varying levels of agent and monitor situational awareness; (2) distinct adversarial strategies to evade the monitor, such as prompt injection; and (3) two datasets and environments -- SHADE-Arena for tool-calling agents and our new CUA-SHADE-Arena, which extends TheAgentCompany, for computer-use agents. We run MRT on existing LLM monitor scaffoldings, which orchestrate LLMs and parse agent trajectories, alongside a new hybrid hierarchical-sequential scaffolding proposed in this work. Our empirical results yield three key findings. First, agent awareness dominates monitor awareness: an agent's knowledge that it is being monitored substantially degrades the monitor's reliability. On the contrary, providing the monitor with more information about the agent is less helpful than expected. Second, monitor scaffolding matters more than monitor awareness: the hybrid scaffolding consistently outperforms baseline monitor scaffolding, and can enable weaker models to reliably monitor stronger agents -- a weak-to-strong scaling effect. Third, in a human-in-the-loop setting where humans discuss with the LLM monitor to get an updated judgment for the agent's behavior, targeted human oversight is most effective; escalating only pre-flagged cases to human reviewers improved the TPR by approximately 15% at FPR = 0.01. Our work establishes a standard workflow for MRT, highlighting the lack of adversarial robustness for LLMs and humans when monitoring and detecting agent misbehavior. We release code, data, and logs to spur further research.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human oversight. While linear probes on model activations have shown promise for detecting deception in single-agent settings, collusion is inherently a multi-agent phenomenon, and the use of internal representations for detecting collusion between agents remains unexplored. We introduce NARCBench, a benchmark for evaluating collusion detection under environment distribution shift, and propose five probing techniques that aggregate per-agent deception scores to classify scenarios at the group level. Our probes achieve 1.00 AUROC in-distribution and 0.60--0.86 AUROC when transferred zero-shot to structurally different multi-agent scenarios and a steganographic blackjack card-counting task. We find that no single probing technique dominates across all collusion types, suggesting that different forms of collusion manifest differently in activation space. We also find preliminary evidence that this signal is localised at the token level, with the colluding agent's activations spiking specifically when processing the encoded parts of their partner's message. This work takes a step toward multi-agent interpretability: extending white-box inspection from single models to multi-agent contexts, where detection requires aggregating signals across agents. These results suggest that model internals provide a complementary signal to text-level monitoring for detecting multi-agent collusion, particularly for organisations with access to model activations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/aaronrose227/narcbench.

Agentic theorem provers combine a reasoning model, retrieval, search, and a proof assistant verifier, yet it remains unclear which components actually improve finite-budget proof success and why they help on real mathematical workloads. We study this question through statistical provability: the probability of reaching a verified proof within a budget on a specified stream of theorem instances. We model formal proof search as a finite-horizon reachability MDP with deterministic verifier dynamics, and show that under a faithful state abstraction the optimal success probability coincides with ordinary syntactic provability. We then analyze a simple but practically important pipeline: depth-wise offline action-value regression followed by greedy test-time proving. Our main theorem bounds the provability gap between the learned prover and the optimal prover by an occupancy-weighted sum of uniform action-value errors; in the common uniform-error reading, the leading complexity multiplier is the learned prover's average truncated proof length. The error decomposes into approximation error, geometric coverage of the training distribution, and Monte Carlo label noise, and improves to a fast rate under an action-gap margin condition. The result gives a component-sensitive account of why verifier feedback, retrieval, representation geometry, and proof-shortening mechanisms help on biased theorem workloads, without contradicting classical worst-case hardness.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently emerged as a compelling approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), where an LLM generator serves as a policy guided by a verifier (reward model). However, current RL post-training methods for LLMs typically use verifiers that are fixed (rule-based or frozen pretrained) or trained discriminatively via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Such designs are susceptible to reward hacking and generalize poorly beyond their training distributions. To overcome these limitations, we propose Tango, a novel framework that uses RL to concurrently train both an LLM generator and a verifier in an interleaved manner. A central innovation of Tango is its generative, process-level LLM verifier, which is trained via RL and co-evolves with the generator. Importantly, the verifier is trained solely based on outcome-level verification correctness rewards without requiring explicit process-level annotations. This generative RL-trained verifier exhibits improved robustness and superior generalization compared to deterministic or SFT-trained verifiers, fostering effective mutual reinforcement with the generator. Extensive experiments demonstrate that both components of Tango achieve state-of-the-art results among 7B/8B-scale models: the generator attains best-in-class performance across five competition-level math benchmarks and four challenging out-of-domain reasoning tasks, while the verifier leads on the ProcessBench dataset. Remarkably, both components exhibit particularly substantial improvements on the most difficult mathematical reasoning problems. Code is at: https://github.com/kaiwenzha/rl-tango.

Agentic search requires language model agents to explore many sources and answer complex information-seeking questions. Scaling test-time compute is a promising way to improve these agents, but current approaches can fail, because correct answers are often sparse and score-based selection depends on model calibration. We propose FineVerify, a fine-grained self-verification framework that decomposes each question into checkable sub-questions, verifies sampled candidates against each sub-question, and selects the candidate with the highest aggregated score. This per-check structure turns selection into simpler local judgments and produces scores under the same explicit criteria. Across four agentic search benchmarks and two models, FineVerify consistently outperforms standard scaling baselines. With only four sampled trajectories, it improves GPT-5-mini by 8.2 accuracy points and Gemini-3-flash by 5.6% on average. With 12 samples, FineVerify enables GPT-5-mini to surpass frontier GPT-5 on BrowseComp-Plus. Beyond accuracy, FineVerify produces interpretable verification traces that help audit benchmark errors, suggesting broader applications for inspecting agentic search systems. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/fineverify

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, their real-world applicability has expanded significantly, accompanied by new security challenges. Most existing agent defense mechanisms adopt a mandatory checking paradigm, in which security validation is forcibly triggered at predefined stages of the agent lifecycle. In this work, we argue that effective agent security should be intrinsic and selective rather than architecturally decoupled and mandatory. We propose Spider-Sense framework, an event-driven defense framework based on Intrinsic Risk Sensing (IRS), which allows agents to maintain latent vigilance and trigger defenses only upon risk perception. Once triggered, the Spider-Sense invokes a hierarchical defence mechanism that trades off efficiency and precision: it resolves known patterns via lightweight similarity matching while escalating ambiguous cases to deep internal reasoning, thereby eliminating reliance on external models. To facilitate rigorous evaluation, we introduce S^2Bench, a lifecycle-aware benchmark featuring realistic tool execution and multi-stage attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Spider-Sense achieves competitive or superior defense performance, attaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) and False Positive Rate (FPR), with only a marginal latency overhead of 8.3\%.

While tool-augmented Large Language Models have significantly improved multi-step reasoning in quantitative STEM tasks, a critical residual failure mode remains: intermediate reasoning steps that are syntactically well-formed, mathematically executable, and unit-consistent, yet contextually ungrounded. Current approaches either rely on formal verifiers that cannot assess semantic intent, or burden Process Reward Models (PRMs) with the dual task of checking both arithmetic and logic. In this paper, we propose a neuro-symbolic framework that cleanly decouples reasoning into two formal dimensions: Symbolic Validity (V) and Semantic Groundedness (G). We guarantee V by construction using a deterministic symbolic verifier acting as a hard filter. To assess G, we train a PRM conditionally on the verifier-accepted manifold. To train this PRM efficiently, we introduce Counterfactual Symbolic Perturbation (CSP), a novel data synthesis strategy that algorithmically generates constraint-preserving hard negatives (steps that perfectly pass the verifier but are logically flawed). At inference, we deploy a verifier-first constrained search that guarantees execution consistency for verifier-covered operations while relying on the PRM solely to rank semantic grounding. By targeting the exact residual error class of strong tool-using LLMs, our method significantly improves reasoning reliability without the sprawling heuristics of prior frameworks.

Multi-agent AI science ecosystems rely on agents possessing tools that allow them to communicate, coordinate, and build on each other's work. Yet this shared infrastructure can also introduce vulnerabilities by creating a substrate for the contagious spread of unintended and undesirable behaviors. We report a case study on a research collective of 100 autonomous LLM agents tasked with proving formal mathematical conjectures. Within the swarm, cheating spontaneously emerged and was later challenged by whistleblowers - both without any external intervention. When a single agent discovered an exploit in the evaluation system, it propagated across the collective via a shared knowledge library and later through peer-to-peer messages. Despite early reluctance, a cohort of agents adopted the exploit in response to competitive pressure. A separate group of agents produced an emergent counter-response: auditing fraudulent proofs, alerting peers across broadcast and private channels, staging boycotts, lodging formal complaints, and proposing validation patches. In recent incidents, agent swarms coordinated covertly through improvised side-channels (Dalton and Wallace, 2026; Greenblatt et al., 2026). Our setting differs: the same transparent channels that carried the exploit also gave non-cheating agents the visibility they needed to detect fraud, organize resistance, and enforce norms. We cast the problem of managing the agents' shared infrastructure as the knowledge commons governance problem (Ostrom, 1990). To protect the commons from exploits, we propose to adopt institutional mechanisms, such as graduated sanctioning and collective-choice rules, to support decentralized self-governance in autonomous swarms.

Trustworthy verifiers are essential for the success of reinforcement learning with verifiable reward (RLVR), which is the core methodology behind various large reasoning models such as DeepSeek-R1. In complex domains like mathematical reasoning, rule-based verifiers have been widely adopted in previous works to train strong reasoning models. However, the reliability of these verifiers and their impact on the RL training process remain poorly understood. In this work, we take mathematical reasoning as a case study and conduct a comprehensive analysis of various verifiers in both static evaluation and RL training scenarios. First, we find that current open-source rule-based verifiers often fail to recognize equivalent answers presented in different formats across multiple commonly used mathematical datasets, resulting in non-negligible false negative rates. This limitation adversely affects RL training performance and becomes more pronounced as the policy model gets stronger. Subsequently, we investigate model-based verifiers as a potential solution to address these limitations. While the static evaluation shows that model-based verifiers achieve significantly higher verification accuracy, further analysis and RL training results imply that they are highly susceptible to hacking, where they misclassify certain patterns in responses as correct (i.e., false positives). This vulnerability is exploited during policy model optimization, leading to artificially inflated rewards. Our findings underscore the unique risks inherent to both rule-based and model-based verifiers, aiming to offer valuable insights to develop more robust reward systems in reinforcement learning.

We study scheming in LLM agents, in which agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. Our focus is to understand how scheming arises from the interaction of key factors, such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. Prior work examines only a small number of scenarios, limiting the ability to isolate how these conditions shape an agent's propensity or capability to scheme. This limited scale and task diversity also restrict coverage of realistic deployment settings and the range of scheming strategies that can be observed. To this end, we introduce SCHEMEARENA, a 400-scenario benchmark for scalable scheming stress testing, constructed through a factorized scenario synthesis framework spanning diverse safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions, and pressure mechanisms. To enable scalable and reliable monitoring, we further propose SCOUT, a scheming monitor that grounds multi-criteria judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Across controlled stress tests on five LLM agents, we find that explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity. Strategic hints play a distinct role by helping agents translate scheming reasoning into concrete covert behavior. Oversight has mixed effects: in several closed models, action-only monitoring increases scheming, suggesting that partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint rather than a deterrent. CoT is a useful but incomplete monitoring signal: it can reveal latent scheming before execution, yet action-only scheming shows that covert behavior may occur without explicit reasoning evidence. We release the benchmark, code, and monitor at: https://github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.

Automated formal verification remains challenging for large language models because data for proof assistants and verification-aware languages is scarce, and correctness depends on satisfying precise machine-checkable specifications rather than producing plausible code. This thesis studies how verifier environments can improve LLM generation of verified programs and proofs through reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) and verifier-guided inference-time search. First, we train open-source models in Dafny with RLVR using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) and related variants, assembling generated candidates into complete programs and scoring them with compiler and verifier outcomes. Initial experiments on an APPS-derived Dafny dataset increased verified reward from 2.2% to 58.1%, but revealed specification hacking, where models exploit weak formal specifications instead of implementing the intended solutions. After filtering underspecified and vulnerable tasks, multi-turn RLVR on the refined benchmark improves the verified pass rate from 9.7% to 31.1%. Second, we develop a verifier-guided inference scaffold in Lean that treats proof generation as structured search over decomposed subgoals, verifier feedback, diagnostics, and repair. With a fixed base model, the full scaffold with proof reviser improves pass rate on an initial VeriCoding pilot set from 46.2% under direct repair to 69.2%. On the larger VERINA dataset, whole-task decomposition plus proof reviser solves 7 of 42 previously unsolved tasks. We also introduce Dalek-Bench, a repository-scale Lean benchmark derived from the Rust curve25519-dalek verification project; preliminary results remain weak, indicating that stronger progress evaluation and task-specific tool-use policies are still needed.

Verifiers can improve language model capabilities by scoring and ranking responses from generated candidates. Currently, high-quality verifiers are either unscalable (e.g., humans) or limited in utility (e.g., tools like Lean). While LM judges and reward models have become broadly useful as general-purpose verifiers, a significant performance gap remains between them and oracle verifiers (verifiers with perfect accuracy). To help close this gap, we introduce Weaver, a framework for designing a strong verifier by combining multiple weak, imperfect verifiers. We find weighted ensembles of verifiers, which typically require learning from labeled data, significantly outperform unweighted combinations due to differences in verifier accuracies. To reduce dependency on labeled data, Weaver leverages weak supervision to estimate each verifier's accuracy and combines outputs into a unified score that better reflects true response quality. However, directly applying weak supervision algorithms poses challenges, including inconsistent verifier output formats and handling low-quality verifiers. Weaver addresses these using dataset statistics to normalize outputs and filter specific verifiers. We study Weaver's effectiveness in test-time repeated sampling, where a model generates multiple candidate responses and selects one. Our evaluations show Weaver significantly improves over Pass@1-performance when selecting the first candidate-across reasoning and math tasks, achieving o3-mini-level accuracy with Llama 3.3 70B Instruct as generator, and an ensemble of 70B or smaller judge and reward models as verifiers (87.7% average). This gain mirrors the jump between GPT-4o and o3-mini (69.0% vs. 86.7%), which required extensive finetuning and post-training. To reduce computational costs of verifier ensembles, we train a 400M cross-encoder using Weaver's combined output scores.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has driven recent progress in reasoning-oriented large language models (LLMs) by enabling large-scale optimization. However, its applicability remains largely limited to domains such as mathematics and coding, where correctness can be deterministically verified. Open-ended tasks instead often rely on human preferences, reward models, or LLM-based judges, introducing evaluation bias, judge capability bottlenecks, and additional inference costs.Drawing on the principle of self-supervised learning, which constructs pretext tasks to derive supervision from the data itself, we propose Reinforcement Learning with Self-Verifiable Rewards (RLSVR), a task-transformation-based training paradigm for extending RLVR to open-ended tasks. RLSVR transforms open-ended tasks into verifiable proxy environments whose internal rules and interaction outcomes automatically generate reward signals. We instantiate RLSVR with SpyRL, a multi-agent self-play environment inspired by Who Is the Spy?. Agents receive asymmetric information, complete the same target task, and vote to identify a designated spy. Because the spy identity is predetermined, voting outcomes provide fully verifiable rewards, while successful identification remains closely related to output quality. Experiments on text summarization, creative writing, and mathematical reasoning show that SpyRL outperforms existing self-improvement methods on non-verifiable tasks and yields consistent gains on verifiable reasoning tasks. These results demonstrate that task transformation can extend scalable RLVR-based self-improvement beyond inherently verifiable domains. Models and code have been released at https://github.com/wangqinsi1/SpyRL.

We study how runtime enforcement against unsafe actions affects end-to-end task performance in multi-step tool using large language model (LLM) agents. Using tau-bench across Airline and Retail domains, we compare baseline Tool-Calling, planning-integrated (TRIAD), and policy-mediated (TRIAD-SAFETY) architectures with GPT-OSS-20B and GLM-4-9B. We identify model dependent interaction horizons (15 to 30 turns) and decompose outcomes into overall success rate (SR), safe success rate (SSR), and unsafe success rate (USR). Our results reveal a persistent Safety Capability Gap. While safety mediation can intercept up to 94 percent of non-compliant actions, it rarely translates into strictly safe goal attainment (SSR below 5 percent in most settings). We find that high unsafe success rates are primarily driven by Integrity Leaks, where models hallucinate user identifiers to bypass mandatory authentication. Recovery rates following blocked actions are consistently low, ranging from 21 percent for GPT-OSS-20B in simpler procedural tasks to near zero in complex Retail scenarios. These results demonstrate that runtime enforcement imposes a significant verifier tax on conversational length and compute cost without guaranteeing safe completion, highlighting the critical need for agents capable of grounded identity verification and post-intervention reasoning.

Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight. Does greater autonomy invite greater risk? We introduce ANCHOR, an automated auditing framework that stress-tests CLI agents on illegal tasks grounded in public US court cases. ANCHOR deploys an auditor agent fine-tuned on dark personality data using supervised and reinforcement fine tuning. This auditor roleplays persistent malicious users who decompose tasks, reframe requests upon refusal, and adapt strategies across multi-turn interactions. Evaluating frontier CLI agents, we find that while they often refuse illegal tasks when prompted directly, compliance reaches 100\% under persistent malicious interaction. When agents comply, they frequently exceed user requests, autonomously building infrastructure for large-scale harm, including catastrophic risk scenarios such as large-scale financial fraud and bioweapon development. These findings demonstrate that current alignment techniques are insufficient for autonomous agents and underscore the need for safety evaluations against persistent, adaptive malicious users. We release ANCHOR at https://github.com/garified/anchor

Test-time scaling (TTS) has emerged as a new frontier for scaling the performance of Large Language Models. In test-time scaling, by using more computational resources during inference, LLMs can improve their reasoning process and task performance. Several approaches have emerged for TTS such as distilling reasoning traces from another model or exploring the vast decoding search space by employing a verifier. The verifiers serve as reward models that help score the candidate outputs from the decoding process to diligently explore the vast solution space and select the best outcome. This paradigm commonly termed has emerged as a superior approach owing to parameter free scaling at inference time and high performance gains. The verifiers could be prompt-based, fine-tuned as a discriminative or generative model to verify process paths, outcomes or both. Despite their widespread adoption, there is no detailed collection, clear categorization and discussion of diverse verification approaches and their training mechanisms. In this survey, we cover the diverse approaches in the literature and present a unified view of verifier training, types and their utility in test-time scaling. Our repository can be found at https://github.com/elixir-research-group/Verifierstesttimescaling.github.io.

Agentic AI systems orchestrate multiple LLM-based agents through workflow architectures that coordinate decisions, tools, and external actions. While current platforms emphasize runtime safeguards, little support exists for verifying workflows during system design. From a Modeling \& Simulation perspective, this gap is analogous to composing conceptual models without verifying whether their building blocks interact coherently. We propose a design-time verification approach that models agentic workflows as compositions of reusable building blocks and checks their compatibility through twelve structural rules. We implemented these rules in a software prototype and evaluated them using two openly released datasets: 48 workflows with known design flaws and 168 variants that preserve workflow logic but alter graph structure. Results show that our verifier reliably detects violations even when flawed designs are obscured through structural transformations such as splitting tasks between agents. Future works could combine our verification with community repositories of building blocks to compose safe agentic workflows.

Recent advances in large language models have improved the capabilities of coding agents, yet systematic evaluation of complex, end-to-end website development remains limited. To address this gap, we introduce Vision2Web, a hierarchical benchmark for visual website development, spanning from static UI-to-code generation, interactive multi-page frontend reproduction, to long-horizon full-stack website development. The benchmark is constructed from real-world websites and comprises a total of 193 tasks across 16 categories, with 918 prototype images and 1,255 test cases. To support flexible, thorough and reliable evaluation, we propose workflow-based agent verification paradigm based on two complementary components: a GUI agent verifier and a VLM-based judge. We evaluate multiple visual language models instantiated under different coding-agent frameworks, revealing substantial performance gaps at all task levels, with state-of-the-art models still struggling on full-stack development.

Answer verification methods are widely employed in language model training pipelines spanning data curation, evaluation, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). While prior work focus on developing unified verifiers applicable across multiple reasoning scenarios, significant challenges remain in computation-oriented scientific domains, such as algebraic equivalence checking and physical constant substitution. In this paper, we introduce \model, a tool-augmented verifier that leverages external executors to perform precise computations and symbolic simplifications. \model enables robust verification that goes beyond simple semantic matching. We propose a novel two-stage pipeline, which begin with cold-start fine-tuning and followed by multi-turn reinforcement learning with tool integration. Extensive experiments conducted on STEM subjects, general QA, and long-form reasoning tasks demonstrates strong generalization of \model. The results shows that the \model achieves state-of-the-art performance on VerifyBench-Hard and SCI-Bench. And we also employ our \model in RLVR as a reward model, the results show that it consistently outperforms both rubric-based and model-based verifiers on AIME'24 and AIME'25, demonstrating strong potential to enhance reasoning capabilities of LLM. Our model is released at https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B{https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B}.

Foundation models are increasingly becoming better autonomous programmers, raising the prospect that they could also automate dangerous offensive cyber-operations. Current frontier model audits probe the cybersecurity risks of such agents, but most fail to account for the degrees of freedom available to adversaries in the real world. In particular, with strong verifiers and financial incentives, agents for offensive cybersecurity are amenable to iterative improvement by would-be adversaries. We argue that assessments should take into account an expanded threat model in the context of cybersecurity, emphasizing the varying degrees of freedom that an adversary may possess in stateful and non-stateful environments within a fixed compute budget. We show that even with a relatively small compute budget (8 H100 GPU Hours in our study), adversaries can improve an agent's cybersecurity capability on InterCode CTF by more than 40\% relative to the baseline -- without any external assistance. These results highlight the need to evaluate agents' cybersecurity risk in a dynamic manner, painting a more representative picture of risk.

We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion. We first introduce the NSFA taxonomy, which organizes 185 risk variants into a CIA-triad-grounded hierarchy and is cross-validated against three well-established OWASP guidelines. Based on this taxonomy, we construct a benchmark suite spanning 133 languages, comprising over 93K purpose-built samples targeting both user queries and agent responses, along with 3,435 cross-source samples adapted from five public agent-security datasets. To detect these operational threats in practice, we develop a dual-mode approach combining SFT-based generative reasoning for interpretable offline auditing with discriminative classification heads on the frozen backbone, enabling real-time detection at approximately 50,ms. We release four models with 0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 9B parameters, all achieving geq94% F1 on purpose-built benchmarks and surpassing the strongest competing guardrails by 6 to 12 absolute points. On cross-source evaluation, the 9B model attains 91.29% F1 with a more balanced precision--recall trade-off. Moreover, ablation experiments show that classification heads can equip a guardrail with risk detection capabilities beyond its original scope and achieve state-of-the-art performance. These results demonstrate the extensibility of the approach and its generality as a plug-in enhancement.

Building generalist embodied agents capable of solving complex real-world tasks remains a fundamental challenge in AI. Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of such agents through strong vision-language knowledge and chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, yet remain brittle when faced with challenging out-of-distribution scenarios. To address this, we propose Verifier-Guided Action Selection (VegAS), a test-time framework designed to improve the robustness of MLLM-based embodied agents through an explicit verification step. At inference time, rather than committing to a single decoded action, VeGAS samples an ensemble of candidate actions and uses a generative verifier to identify the most reliable choice, without modifying the underlying policy. Crucially, we find that using an MLLM off-the-shelf as a verifier yields no improvement, motivating our LLM-driven data synthesis strategy, which automatically constructs a diverse curriculum of failure cases to expose the verifier to a rich distribution of potential errors at training time. Across embodied reasoning benchmarks spanning the Habitat and ALFRED environments, VeGAS consistently improves generalization, achieving up to a 36% relative performance gain over strong CoT baselines on the most challenging multi-object, long-horizon tasks.

Inference-time skill augmentation provides a lightweight way to improve data-analytic agents by injecting reusable procedural knowledge without updating model parameters. However, discovering effective skills for data analysis remains challenging, as reliable supervision is expensive and success criteria vary across analytical formats. This raises the key question of how to discover reusable data-analysis skills from unlabeled exploration alone. We propose DataCOPE, an unsupervised verifier-guided skill discovery framework for data-analytic agents. DataCOPE derives verifier signals from the exploration trajectories and uses them to characterize relative quality or aggreement among trajectories. It iteratively coordinates a Data-Analytic Agent for trajectory generation, an Unsupervised Verifier for signal extraction, and a Skill Manager for contrastive skill distillation. For report-style analysis, we instantiate the verifier as an Adaptive Checklist Verifier that derives task-specific criteria, scores reports by verifiable coverage, and iteratively refines the checklist. For reasoning-style analysis, we instantiate it as an Answer Agreement Verifier that groups trajectories by answer agreement and uses self-consistency as an auxiliary signal. We evaluate DataCOPE on report-style analysis from Deep Data Research and reasoning-style analysis from DABStep. Across both settings, DataCOPE consistently improves held-out performance over baselines. Averaged across four model settings, DataCOPE improves the mean score by 9.71% and 32.30% on report-style and reasoning-style tasks respectively.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) now act on a user's behalf across personal applications such as email, calendars, and to-do lists. This cross-application access is useful, but it also creates a privacy risk that has been largely overlooked: when an agent works in one context, it can pull in information from another that is inappropriate in that context. Hence, we introduce AgentCIBench, an evaluation harness that turns this risk into executable, deterministically scored scenarios. We target three common failure modes in CUAs: visual co-location, where the agent pulls in prohibited items that sit next to the task target in the UI; task-ambiguity overshare, where the agent dumps dense personal state in response to an under-specified prompt; and recipient misalignment, where the agent sends content to an addressee for whom it is inappropriate. We evaluate 15 frontier agents and find a surprisingly high failure rate: 11 of 15 leak on more than 50% of scenarios, with an average leakage of 67.9%, and the same failures persist when agents act end-to-end in the environment to complete the task. We release AgentCIBench to encourage the development of safer computer-use agents and position contextual disclosure testing as a pre-deployment safety check.

Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment. We describe falsifiable release gates, and a methodology to build and validate such systems, such that every new capability must pass a pre-specified, machine-verifiable acceptance suite before it ships, and a fixed set of standing invariants is preserved at each gate. I think we applied the method in the Antahkarana, an open runtime, via seven gates from basic observability into a self governing loop that suggests changes to its own policy. no action goes to an effector without a safety-critical property capability token minted by a control ring is exhaustively machine-checked over the one million recorded reachable state space of a bounded model and re-checked against execution traces. A purposely broken model gives the shortest counterexample, so the checker has teeth, is apparent. The self-enhancement loop is positively Constrained: the entire write surface is policy rules, tightening changes. may auto-apply loosening changes always require a human merge and a proposal autoclosed is one that mispredicts its own effect; We publish the acceptance measured results for all the seven gates, define precisely the scope of each claim (a bounded of the coordination skeleton (not the learned components) and free the runtime, either command line tools and the gate suite, so the results reproduce, and gates can run against other agent frameworks. Reviewers may repeat the single command central non-bypass in seconds.

AI coding agents such as Claude Code and Gemini CLI increasingly extend themselves with third-party skills: markdown packages bundling natural-language instructions, executable scripts, and tool permissions. Because a skill is at once code and agent-facing instruction, it introduces a supply chain dependency whose risk is neither pure code nor pure prompt. Detection tools have never been measured against verified ground truth spanning this hybrid space, leaving their effectiveness unknown and wild-only evaluations biased. We present MalSkillBench, the first runtime-verified benchmark of malicious agent skills: 3,944 malicious skills labeled along a three-dimensional taxonomy of 108 cells. Of these, 3,214 come from a closed-loop Generate-Verify-Feedback pipeline admitting only samples whose malicious behavior fires inside a Docker sandbox under system-call monitoring and an LLM judge; we add 703 in-the-wild and 4,000 matched benign skills. Our measurements are consistent: code injection reaches 94.5% verification yield but prompt injection only 75.8%, the same fragility that later makes it hard to detect; the wild sample is narrow, dominated by one cryptocurrency-theft campaign (86.6% one behavior, 81% from two accounts) with a small but architecturally new tail attacking the agent control plane; the strongest skill-specific detector reaches 98.4% recall on code injection yet collapses on prompt-injection and agent-control attacks, and wild-only scoring swings the ranking by up to 66 recall points; supply-chain scanners and prompt-injection defenses each see only half of a skill, and no combination recovers the code-instruction relationship. Detecting malicious skills therefore requires reasoning jointly over task intent, code, and instructions. We release the dataset, pipeline, baselines, and results.

Browser-use agents often carry information in their context as they move between websites. While it may be necessary for task completion, it also creates a privacy risk, especially when the information contains a private fact regarding the user. For example, an agent may learn a user's affiliation after reading a membership record. If it later selects a registration option specific to that affiliation on another website instead of a general option, the information gets leaked. In this work, we define and study behavioural side-channel leakage in browser-use agents, where an agent's actions inadvertently reveal private information (secret) retained from a prior website, despite an explicit instruction not to disclose it. We introduce AgentTell, a benchmark of 20 scenarios and 100 tasks in which an agent acquires a secret on one website and then completes a task on another website that offers secret-specific actions alongside a general action that reveals nothing. Our evaluation across 9,760 sessions on six backbones shows that agents carrying a secret reveal it through their actions in 61.1% of sessions. Even when agents explicitly state in memory that the secret must not be shared, they still reveal it in 56.7% of those sessions. Moreover, in 34.5% of leaking sessions, their final responses falsely assure users that the secret was not disclosed. These findings show that agents often fail to recognize side-channel leakage as a privacy risk.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Test-time reinforcement learning (TTRL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for self-evolving large reasoning models (LRMs), enabling online adaptation on unlabeled test inputs via self-induced rewards through majority voting. However, a spurious yet high-frequency unverified consensus can become a biased and reinforced reward signal, leading to incorrect mode collapse. We address this failure mode with T^3RL (Tool-Verification for Test-Time Reinforcement Learning), which introduces test-time tool verification into reward estimation. Concretely, a verifier uses an external tool as evidence (e.g., from code execution) to upweight verified rollouts in a verification-aware voting, producing more reliable pseudo-labels for training. Across various math difficulties (MATH-500, AMC, and AIME 2024) and diverse backbone types, T^3RL significantly improves over TTRL, with larger gains on harder problems. More broadly, T^3RL can be viewed as verified online data synthesis, highlighting test-time tool verification as a key mechanism for stabilizing self-evolution.