Daily Papers

We introduce the first version of KWBench (Knowledge Work Bench), a benchmark for unprompted problem recognition in large language models: can an LLM identify a professional scenario before attempting to solve it. Existing frontier benchmarks have saturated, and most knowledge-work evaluations to date reduce to extraction or task completion against a specification. KWBench targets the step before that: recognizing the governing structure of the situation from raw inputs alone. The benchmark contains 223 tasks sourced from practitioners across acquisitions, contract negotiations, clinical pharmacy, organizational politics, fraud analysis, and incentive design. Each task encodes a formal game-theoretic pattern (principal-agent conflict, signaling, mechanism design failure, strategic omission, coalitional dynamics, strategic interdependence) and carries structured ground truth recording the expert reading of the situation and the anticipated failure modes. Models receive raw data and a task prompt with no indication of problem type. Scoring is a three-tier rubric gated by a mandatory conjunctive check. Mandatory criteria encode the predicted wrong paths. We evaluate 16 models. The best model passes on 27.9% of tasks. The top two models agree on only 31.7% of their passes. Among the top 8, 44 tasks are solved by exactly one model; routing across the top 8 covers 50.7% of the benchmark, nearly double the best single model. Conditional on passing, quality scores converge (approx 83% across models); unconditional scores do not. Same models articulate the relevant game-theoretic concept correctly when asked, then fail to apply it unprompted. We release KWBench to shift how frontier models are evaluated on knowledge work, scoring them on whether they recognize the right problem from the situation alone, not only on how well they execute once the problem has been framed for them.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.