Daily Papers

LLM-based agents can interact with external environments through tool invocation, but this capability also introduces security risks such as file modification, information leakage, and unauthorized actions. Existing guardrails often evaluate completed trajectories, leaving pre-execution monitoring of step-level actions underexplored. We propose StepGuard, a step-level guard model that can audit completed agent trajectories and check tool actions before they are executed. To train StepGuard, we introduce StepGen, an automatic data engine that generates safe and unsafe trajectories with the same context but different actions at the risky step. To further reduce over-defense and under-defense, we propose Balance-GRPO, which dynamically balances learning between safe and unsafe actions based on their observed accuracy. Experiments show that StepGuard achieves the highest average accuracy among open-weight guard models, with performance comparable to GPT-5.4. When used to guard agents on AgentDojo and AgentDyn, StepGuard reduces mean attack success rate by 77.3% relative to the no-guard setting, while mean utility drops by only 2.8 percentage points.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

Safety in agentic systems is inherently sequential: whether an action is safe depends on prior actions, tool outputs, information disclosures, and interactions among agents. Recent work has shifted agent safety guardrails from post-hoc trajectory-level assessment toward step-level action diagnosis and proactive risk prediction, yet existing training objectives provide limited supervision for how step evidence accumulates over time and when it becomes sufficient to justify intervention. We propose \methodlong~(ASPO): a training framework for step-level timely intervention. Pre-fix level stage alignment allows crediting each decision at its own step: it compares each response with the other responses sampled at the same prefix and rewards the action that fits the stage, continuing before the risk is visible, asking while clarification can still avert harm, and stopping before harm is irreversible. Adaptive feedback self-distillation further credits the reasoning behind each decision, with the model itself as a teacher that sees the step annotations on intervention steps and rules mined from its own false alarms on safe steps. Its training data carry a violation taxonomy and an intervention window at every step and are extended through self-evolving multi-agent red-teaming. Finally we present StepSafe, a step-level reasoning guardrail with timely intervention, that achieves the state-of-the-art peformance among open-source guardrails across five agent-safety benchmarks on safety-utility pareto curve with Youden's J of 53.0 (4B) against 46.2.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) is emerging as a critical post-training paradigm for improving LLM agent capabilities. Existing RL algorithms for LLMs largely follow the token-centric paradigm as in RLHF and RLVR, where tokens serve as the basic units for modeling and optimization. However, this paradigm introduces a granularity mismatch in agentic RL, as it optimizes token-level predictions while LLM agents make step-level decisions through cycles of environmental observations and actions. To bridge this gap, we propose StepPO, a step-centric paradigm for agentic RL via step-aligned policy optimization. Specifically, we reformulate agentic RL from a token-level Markov Decision Process (MDP) into a step-level MDP, where interaction steps serve as the basic trajectory representations. We further propose step-level credit assignment to align policy optimization with the natural granularity of agent decisions. Together, StepPO optimizes agent policies at the step level for multi-turn agent-environment interaction. Experiments across multi-hop QA, academic paper search, and text-world action tasks show that StepPO consistently outperforms various RL algorithms. Further analyses provide insights into how step-centric paradigm improves agent training. We hope this step-centric paradigm offers a useful lens for understanding agent behavior and a practical path for training more capable LLM agents.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated strong capabilities in complex interactive decision-making tasks. However, existing LLM agents typically rely on increasingly long interaction histories, resulting in high computational cost and limited scalability. In this paper, we propose STEP-HRL, a hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) framework that enables step-level learning by conditioning only on single-step transitions rather than full interaction histories. STEP-HRL structures tasks hierarchically, using completed subtasks to represent global progress of overall task. By introducing a local progress module, it also iteratively and selectively summarizes interaction history within each subtask to produce a compact summary of local progress. Together, these components yield augmented step-level transitions for both high-level and low-level policies. Experimental results on ScienceWorld and ALFWorld benchmarks consistently demonstrate that STEP-HRL substantially outperforms baselines in terms of performance and generalization while reducing token usage. Our code is available at https://github.com/TonyStark042/STEP-HRL.

Stepwise group-based RL is an attractive way to train long-horizon LLM agents without a learned critic: it reuses multiple sampled rollouts to estimate local advantages. Its weakness is less visible but more fundamental: every group-relative estimator assumes that the steps it compares are equivalent for credit assignment. We show that current agentic variants violate this assumption through a state-action credit mismatch. The observation-hash partition is overly fine on the state side, creating singleton groups with zero step-level signal, while a single within-group mean is too coarse on the action side, mixing state-value estimation with action-specific credit. We introduce BiPACE (Bisimulation-Guided Policy Optimization with Action Counterfactual Estimation), a drop-in advantage estimator that fixes both sides without adding a critic, auxiliary loss, or extra rollouts. BiGPO clusters steps by cosine distance in the actor's own hidden-state geometry, an empirical policy-induced proxy for bisimulation that substantially lowers the singleton rate left by observation hashing. PACE then recenters returns within each behavioral cluster using action-conditioned peer baselines; its Q-style instance estimates a local Q(s,a)-V(s) nonparametrically. On ALFWorld/Qwen2.5-7B, BiPACE_Q raises overall validation success from GiGPO's 90.8 to 97.1pm0.9 over three seeds, and crosses the 95% threshold on every seed, which GiGPO never does within the same budget. On Qwen2.5-1.5B it reaches 93.5pm1.2 versus GiGPO's 86.7, and on WebShop and TextCraft it improves over GRPO and GiGPO at both model scales. The measured BiPACE-specific overhead is 11.3% of a single training-step wall time. Yet it changes the estimator's comparison unit from surface identity to approximate behavioral equivalence plus action-side counterfactuals. The code is available at https://github.com/TianxiangZhao/BiPACE.

The increasing deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) across enterprise and mission-critical domains has underscored the urgent need for robust guardrailing systems that ensure safety, reliability, and compliance. Existing solutions often struggle with real-time oversight, multi-modal data handling, and explainability -- limitations that hinder their adoption in regulated environments. Existing guardrails largely operate in isolation, focused on text alone making them inadequate for multi-modal, production-scale environments. We introduce Protect, natively multi-modal guardrailing model designed to operate seamlessly across text, image, and audio inputs, designed for enterprise-grade deployment. Protect integrates fine-tuned, category-specific adapters trained via Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) on an extensive, multi-modal dataset covering four safety dimensions: toxicity, sexism, data privacy, and prompt injection. Our teacher-assisted annotation pipeline leverages reasoning and explanation traces to generate high-fidelity, context-aware labels across modalities. Experimental results demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across all safety dimensions, surpassing existing open and proprietary models such as WildGuard, LlamaGuard-4, and GPT-4.1. Protect establishes a strong foundation for trustworthy, auditable, and production-ready safety systems capable of operating across text, image, and audio modalities.

Existing agent safety benchmarks report binary accuracy, conflating early intervention with post-mortem analysis. A detector that flags a violation at step 8 enables intervention; one that reports it at step 48 provides only forensic value. This distinction is critical, yet current benchmarks cannot measure it. We introduce StepShield, the first benchmark to evaluate when violations are detected, not just whether. StepShield contains 9,213 code agent trajectories, including 1,278 meticulously annotated training pairs and a 7,935-trajectory test set with a realistic 8.1% rogue rate. Rogue behaviors are grounded in real-world security incidents across six categories. We propose three novel temporal metrics: Early Intervention Rate (EIR), Intervention Gap, and Tokens Saved. Surprisingly, our evaluation reveals that an LLM-based judge achieves 59% EIR while a static analyzer achieves only 26%, a 2.3x performance gap that is entirely invisible to standard accuracy metrics. We further show that early detection has direct economic benefits: our cascaded HybridGuard detector reduces monitoring costs by 75% and projects to $108M in cumulative savings over five years at enterprise scale. By shifting the focus of evaluation from whether to when, StepShield provides a new foundation for building safer and more economically viable AI agents. The code and data are released under an Apache 2.0 license.

Performing tasks on the web presents fundamental challenges to large language models (LLMs), including combinatorially large open-world tasks and variations across web interfaces. Simply specifying a large prompt to handle all possible behaviors and states is extremely complex, and results in behavior leaks between unrelated behaviors. Decomposition to distinct policies can address this challenge, but requires carefully handing off control between policies. We propose Stacked LLM Policies for Web Actions (SteP), an approach to dynamically compose policies to solve a diverse set of web tasks. SteP defines a Markov Decision Process where the state is a stack of policies representing the control state, i.e., the chain of policy calls. Unlike traditional methods that are restricted to static hierarchies, SteP enables dynamic control that adapts to the complexity of the task. We evaluate SteP against multiple baselines and web environments including WebArena, MiniWoB++, and a CRM. On WebArena, SteP improves (14.9\% to 33.5\%) over SOTA that use GPT-4 policies, while on MiniWob++, SteP is competitive with prior works while using significantly less data. Our code and data are available at https://asappresearch.github.io/webagents-step.

While LLM agents can plan multi-step tasks, intervening at the planning stage-before any action is executed-is often the safest way to prevent harm, since certain risks can lead to severe consequences once carried out. However, existing guardrails mostly operate post-execution, which is difficult to scale and leaves little room for controllable supervision at the plan level. To address this challenge, we highlight three critical gaps in current research: data gap, model gap, and evaluation gap. To close the data gap, we introduce AuraGen, a controllable engine that (i) synthesizes benign trajectories, (ii) injects category-labeled risks with calibrated difficulty, and (iii) filters outputs via an automated reward model, producing large and reliable corpora for pre-execution safety. To close the guardian model gap, we propose a foundational guardrail Safiron, combining a cross-planner adapter with a compact guardian model. The adapter unifies different input formats, while Safiron flags risky cases, assigns risk types, and generates rationales; trained in two stages with a broadly explored data recipe, Safiron achieves robust transfer across settings. To close the evaluation gap, we release Pre-Exec Bench, a realistic benchmark covering diverse tools and branching trajectories, which measures detection, fine-grained categorization, explanation, and cross-planner generalization in human-verified scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate consistent gains of the proposed guardrail over strong baselines on Pre-Exec Bench, and ablations further distill actionable practices, providing a practical template for safer agentic systems.

As models increasingly leverage multi-step reasoning strategies to solve complex problems, supervising the logical validity of these intermediate steps has become a critical research challenge. Process reward models address this by providing step-by-step feedback, but current approaches have two major drawbacks: they typically function as classifiers without providing explanations, and their reliance on supervised fine-tuning with static datasets limits generalization. Inspired by recent advances, we reframe stepwise reward modeling from a classification task to a reasoning task itself. We thus propose a generative judge that reasons about the policy model's reasoning steps (i.e., meta-reasons), outputting thinking tokens before delivering a final verdict. Our model, StepWiser, is trained by reinforcement learning using relative outcomes of rollouts. We show it provides (i) better judgment accuracy on intermediate steps than existing methods; (ii) can be used to improve the policy model at training time; and (iii) improves inference-time search.

LLM agents act in external environments where each action changes the state that later decisions condition on, and where a single wrong step can waste interaction budget or trigger irreversible side effects long before the final failure is observed. Reliable deployment therefore requires step-level confidence estimation: a calibrated probability that each proposed action is productive, available before the action is executed. Existing LLM confidence estimators are designed to score a response from the given prompt, but agent confidence also depends on execution consequences: whether similar actions in similar situations actually advanced the task after the environment responded. We introduce the \method (\methodshort), a self-evolving critic framework in which an LLM critic accumulates evidence from its own past judgments and their observed consequences. After each trajectory, a hindsight LLM that sees the full execution feedback votes on whether each step was productive. The resulting pseudo-labels populate a memory bank from which related productive and unproductive experiences are retrieved into the critic's prompt whenever a similar step recurs. \methodshort requires no training and uses no ground truth step labels. Across three agent benchmarks and three critic backbones, \methodshort attains the best calibration (ECE and Brier) and ranking (AUC) in every dataset--critic combination, reducing ECE by up to 54% relative to the strongest training-free baseline.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to sustained interaction with files, terminals, browsers, and external tools. This shift creates safety risks that are difficult to detect from isolated prompts or final responses, because harm often emerges only through multi-step execution traces whose individual actions appear locally benign. We introduce BraveGuard, a self-evolving defense framework for training guard models from open-world threat signals and realistic agent trajectories. BraveGuard mines recent research sources to identify emerging risks and attack patterns, instantiates them as executable computer-use tasks, collects agent rollouts, and derives trajectory-level supervision for guard model training. As new threats and validation failures appear, the pipeline can be repeated, yielding an adaptive defense loop rather than a static, benchmark-driven training process. We instantiate BraveGuard by training multiple guard backbones, including Qwen3-Guard and Llama-Guard variants, and evaluate the resulting guards on trajectory-level agent-safety benchmarks. BraveGuard consistently improves safety detection across computer-use trajectories. On AgentHazard, it substantially improves detection accuracy over off-the-shelf guard models, with accuracy increasing from 38.79% to 82.38% under the averaged guard-model setting. These results show that guard supervision grounded in open-world threat discovery and realistic agent execution can improve safety monitoring beyond fixed taxonomies and synthetic prompt-level data. BraveGuard offers a scalable path toward adaptive defenses for computer-use agents facing evolving real-world risks.

Large language models (LLMs) pose significant risks due to the potential for generating harmful content or users attempting to evade guardrails. Existing studies have developed LLM-based guard models designed to moderate the input and output of threat LLMs, ensuring adherence to safety policies by blocking content that violates these protocols upon deployment. However, limited attention has been given to the reliability and calibration of such guard models. In this work, we empirically conduct comprehensive investigations of confidence calibration for 9 existing LLM-based guard models on 12 benchmarks in both user input and model output classification. Our findings reveal that current LLM-based guard models tend to 1) produce overconfident predictions, 2) exhibit significant miscalibration when subjected to jailbreak attacks, and 3) demonstrate limited robustness to the outputs generated by different types of response models. Additionally, we assess the effectiveness of post-hoc calibration methods to mitigate miscalibration. We demonstrate the efficacy of temperature scaling and, for the first time, highlight the benefits of contextual calibration for confidence calibration of guard models, particularly in the absence of validation sets. Our analysis and experiments underscore the limitations of current LLM-based guard models and provide valuable insights for the future development of well-calibrated guard models toward more reliable content moderation. We also advocate for incorporating reliability evaluation of confidence calibration when releasing future LLM-based guard models.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized. We present NRT-Bench, a benchmark for multi-turn red-teaming of LLM agents acting as operators of a safety-critical system, instantiated in a simulated nuclear power plant control room. A five-role operator team, each backed by a configurable LLM, runs a plant governed by six critical safety functions (CSFs), while adversaries inject messages over four channels in bounded multi-turn sessions with per-turn feedback. Harm is an objective signal rather than LLM-judged text: a run terminates the moment any CSF is lost, attributed to the causing message. Evaluating four frontier operator models under a fixed-attack paired-replay protocol, we find that adaptive multi-turn attacks reliably push the operator team past a safety limit: across the four models, between 8.7% and 12.1% of attack sessions end with the plant losing a critical safety function. Although the four models look almost equally robust by this aggregate rate, their failures barely overlap: of 149 sessions, none defeat all four models while a third defeat at least one, so vulnerabilities are nearly disjoint across models rather than nested. The effect of added defences is strongly model-dependent: the same guardrail stack or safety-advisor agent that lowers attack success for one model can raise it for another. We release the simulation venue, attack dataset, and replay tooling for reproducible safety evaluation of LLM agents.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in consumer, medical, financial, and enterprise applications. This broad deployment expands the safety surface: risks can arise from multimodal question answering, assistant responses, and cross-modal composition, while moderation policies may vary across products, regions, and deployment stages. Most existing guardrails either rely on fixed taxonomies or target only a narrow set of interaction settings, which limits their adaptability when safety rules change at deployment time. We present SingGuard, a policy-adaptive multimodal guardrail model family for safety assessment in multimodal conversations. SingGuard treats the active policy as a runtime input: given natural-language rules, it checks the target content against the active policy rule by rule and predicts both the safety label and the triggered rule. To balance efficiency and interpretability, SingGuard supports fast, hybrid, and slow inference regimes along a fast-to-slow reasoning spectrum, ranging from direct safety judgments to policy-grounded deliberation. We further optimize this behavior with fast--slow decoupled reinforcement learning. We also introduce SingGuard-Bench, a multimodal guardrail benchmark with 56{,}340 examples spanning 80+ fine-grained risk types across multimodal QA, adversarial attack, and dynamic-rule evaluation settings, including cross-modal joint-risk cases where each modality is harmless in isolation but their composition implies unsafe intent. Across six benchmark families (35 datasets), SingGuard achieves state-of-the-art average F1 in every family. Dynamic-rule evaluation further shows improved policy-following accuracy from 0.6465 to 0.7415 under runtime policy shifts. Our code is available at https://github.com/inclusionAI/Sing-Guard.

As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person. We argue the gate is the easy part; the hard part is the judgment - which actions to stop - which the field evaluates against two false assumptions: that there is a ground-truth notion of "risky," and that the human reviewer is a perfect, infinitely-available oracle. On a hand-labeled set of 125 adversarially-weighted agent actions we show that (i) reviewers only moderately agree on what is risky (Fleiss' kappa = 0.52), so there is no single correct label; (ii) framing the guard as selective classification under asymmetric cost makes its operating limits measurable, and on hard inputs the guard cannot safely auto-decide; and (iii) when the reviewer is modeled as endogenous (fatiguing as escalation load grows), realized safety becomes an inverted-U in the escalation rate: more human oversight can make a system less safe, and the safety-optimal guard escalates below full escalation - a setting a load-aware policy also uses to resist a flooding attack that slips a malicious action past a fatigued reviewer. Agent oversight, framed this way, is not only a classification problem but a resource-allocation one: human attention is finite, and the guard's escalation policy spends it. We claim none of these mechanisms as novel - fatigue-aware learning-to-defer (FALCON), cost-sensitive deferral under workload constraints (DeCCaF), trajectory-level guarding, and reviewer-fatigue/flooding attacks are all prior art we cite. Our contribution is an open-source agent-oversight system that operationalizes and measures them in the LLM-agent action-gating setting, turning "is my guard good?" from a guess into a curve. The inverted-U and the flooding attack are modeling results that motivate a human study.

Computer-use agents increasingly interact with browsers, terminals, file systems, and external services, introducing safety risks that emerge through runtime behavior rather than generated content alone. Existing guard models target static prompts and responses and are poorly suited to agent execution; existing executable safety platforms produce evaluation verdicts rather than the normalized supervision a guard model needs to learn across heterogeneous agent frameworks. We introduce HazardAuditor, an execution-grounded framework that closes both gaps. Its infrastructure runs heterogeneous agents (Claude Code, Codex, Hermes, and OpenClaw) in controlled environments and normalizes their interactions into a canonical event representation for cross-framework supervision. We further observe that token-level post-training objectives create a structural mismatch for generative guards, causing longer rationales to dominate gradient updates. Guard Policy Optimization (GuardPO) addresses this by converting deterministic safety outcomes into sequence-level advantages and normalizing rationale and verdict regions, making the safety decision the effective unit of optimization. Across multiple benchmarks and heterogeneous computer-use systems, HazardAuditor improves accuracy by up to 16.5 percentage points over the strongest prior guard. Code, models, and evaluation artifacts will be available at https://yunhao-feng.github.io/HazardAuditor/.

Reinforcement learning for multi-turn agents suffers from a credit-assignment mismatch: rewards are sparse and trajectory-level, while success often hinges on a few local decisions. Existing online policy distillation (OPD) provides denser token-level supervision, but typically treats heterogeneous agent trajectories as monolithic strings rather than causal interaction units. We present StepOPSD, a post-rollout preference self-distillation framework that takes the agent step as the unit of credit redistribution. StepOPSD decomposes trajectories into action-centered step segments, rescoring them under hindsight-enriched teacher contexts and converting token-level log-probability gaps into sign-preserving advantage shaping with a normalized per-step credit budget before the GRPO update. Across ALFWorld and Search-QA with Qwen3-1.7B and Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, StepOPSD attains best or second-best results on subsets most sensitive to local causal errors, including first-place performance on ALFWorld Heat (79.1%), PickTwo (95.0%), Search-QA TriviaQA (61.6%), and tied-best performance on HotpotQA (40.4%). The results further reveal a consistent two-knob law: smaller α_clip acts as a broadly stabilizing local trust region, whereas the optimal global mixing strength λ_mix remains task-dependent. These findings suggest that step-aware distillation is most useful when trajectory-level rewards are weakly aligned with the local action that determines downstream success.

Computer-use agents provide a promising path toward general software automation because they can interact directly with arbitrary graphical user interfaces instead of relying on brittle, application-specific integrations. Despite recent advances in benchmark performance, strong computer-use agents remain expensive and slow in practice, since most systems invoke large multimodal models at nearly every interaction step. We argue that this uniform allocation of compute is fundamentally inefficient for long-horizon GUI tasks. Such trajectories are highly heterogeneous: many steps are routine and can be handled reliably by smaller, cheaper policies, while errors tend to concentrate at a relatively small number of high-risk moments. Across computer-use benchmarks, these failures repeatedly take two forms: progress stalls, where the agent loops, repeats ineffective actions, or fails to make meaningful progress, and silent semantic drift, where the agent continues taking locally plausible actions after already deviating from the user's true goal. To address this inefficiency, we propose an event-driven, step-level cascade for computer-use agents that runs a small policy by default and escalates to a stronger model only when lightweight learned monitors detect elevated risk. Our framework combines two complementary signals: a Stuck Monitor that detects degraded progress from recent reasoning-action history and triggers recovery, and a Milestone Monitor that identifies semantically meaningful checkpoints where sparse verification is most informative for catching drift. This design turns always-on frontier-model inference into adaptive, on-demand compute allocation over the course of an evolving interaction. The framework is modular and deployment-oriented: it can be layered on top of existing computer-use agents without changing the underlying agent architecture or retraining the large model.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) based controllers for legged robots have demonstrated impressive robustness for walking in different environments for several robot platforms. To enable the application of RL policies for humanoid robots in real-world settings, it is crucial to build a system that can achieve robust walking in any direction, on 2D and 3D terrains, and be controllable by a user-command. In this paper, we tackle this problem by learning a policy to follow a given step sequence. The policy is trained with the help of a set of procedurally generated step sequences (also called footstep plans). We show that simply feeding the upcoming 2 steps to the policy is sufficient to achieve omnidirectional walking, turning in place, standing, and climbing stairs. Our method employs curriculum learning on the complexity of terrains, and circumvents the need for reference motions or pre-trained weights. We demonstrate the application of our proposed method to learn RL policies for 2 new robot platforms - HRP5P and JVRC-1 - in the MuJoCo simulation environment. The code for training and evaluation is available online.

Recent studies generally enhance MLLMs' reasoning capabilities via supervised fine-tuning on high-quality chain-of-thought reasoning data, which often leads models to merely imitate successful reasoning paths without understanding what the wrong reasoning paths are. In this work, we aim to enhance the MLLMs' reasoning ability beyond passively imitating positive reasoning paths. To this end, we design Step-wise Group Relative Policy Optimization (StepGRPO), a new online reinforcement learning framework that enables MLLMs to self-improve reasoning ability via simple, effective and dense step-wise rewarding. Specifically, StepGRPO introduces two novel rule-based reasoning rewards: Step-wise Reasoning Accuracy Reward (StepRAR) and Step-wise Reasoning Validity Reward (StepRVR). StepRAR rewards the reasoning paths that contain necessary intermediate reasoning steps via a soft key-step matching technique, while StepRAR rewards reasoning paths that follow a well-structured and logically consistent reasoning process through a reasoning completeness and logic evaluation strategy. With the proposed StepGRPO, we introduce R1-VL, a series of MLLMs with outstanding capabilities in step-by-step reasoning. Extensive experiments over 8 benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of our methods.

Effective guardrails are essential for safely deploying LLM-based agents in critical applications. Despite recent advances, existing guardrails suffer from two fundamental limitations: (i) they apply uniform guardrail policies to all users, ignoring that the same agent behavior can harm some users while being safe for others; (ii) they check each response in isolation, missing how risks evolve and accumulate across multiple interactions. To solve these issues, we propose PSG-Agent, a personalized and dynamic system for LLM-based agents. First, PSG-Agent creates personalized guardrails by mining the interaction history for stable traits and capturing real-time states from current queries, generating user-specific risk thresholds and protection strategies. Second, PSG-Agent implements continuous monitoring across the agent pipeline with specialized guards, including Plan Monitor, Tool Firewall, Response Guard, Memory Guardian, that track cross-turn risk accumulation and issue verifiable verdicts. Finally, we validate PSG-Agent in multiple scenarios including healthcare, finance, and daily life automation scenarios with diverse user profiles. It significantly outperform existing agent guardrails including LlamaGuard3 and AGrail, providing an executable and auditable path toward personalized safety for LLM-based agents.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

The outstanding capabilities of large language models (LLMs) render them a crucial component in various autonomous agent systems. While traditional methods depend on the inherent knowledge of LLMs without fine-tuning, more recent approaches have shifted toward the reinforcement learning strategy to further enhance agents' ability to solve complex interactive tasks with environments and tools. However, previous approaches are constrained by the sparse reward issue, where existing datasets solely provide a final scalar reward for each multi-step reasoning chain, potentially leading to ineffectiveness and inefficiency in policy learning. In this paper, we introduce StepAgent, which utilizes step-wise reward to optimize the agent's reinforcement learning process. Inheriting the spirit of novice-to-expert theory, we first compare the actions of the expert and the agent to automatically generate intermediate rewards for fine-grained optimization. Additionally, we propose implicit-reward and inverse reinforcement learning techniques to facilitate agent reflection and policy adjustment. Further theoretical analysis demonstrates that the action distribution of the agent can converge toward the expert action distribution over multiple training cycles. Experimental results across various datasets indicate that StepAgent outperforms existing baseline methods.

Recent advances in multimodal large language models unlock unprecedented opportunities for GUI automation. However, a fundamental challenge remains: how to efficiently acquire high-quality training data while maintaining annotation reliability? We introduce a self-evolving training pipeline powered by the Calibrated Step Reward System, which converts model-generated trajectories into reliable training signals through trajectory-level calibration, achieving >90% annotation accuracy with 10-100x lower cost. Leveraging this pipeline, we introduce Step-GUI, a family of models (4B/8B) that achieves state-of-the-art GUI performance (8B: 80.2% AndroidWorld, 48.5% OSWorld, 62.6% ScreenShot-Pro) while maintaining robust general capabilities. As GUI agent capabilities improve, practical deployment demands standardized interfaces across heterogeneous devices while protecting user privacy. To this end, we propose GUI-MCP, the first Model Context Protocol for GUI automation with hierarchical architecture that combines low-level atomic operations and high-level task delegation to local specialist models, enabling high-privacy execution where sensitive data stays on-device. Finally, to assess whether agents can handle authentic everyday usage, we introduce AndroidDaily, a benchmark grounded in real-world mobile usage patterns with 3146 static actions and 235 end-to-end tasks across high-frequency daily scenarios (8B: static 89.91%, end-to-end 52.50%). Our work advances the development of practical GUI agents and demonstrates strong potential for real-world deployment in everyday digital interactions.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has increased the need for guardrail models to ensure responsible use, particularly in detecting unsafe and illegal content. While substantial safety data exist in English, multilingual guardrail modeling remains underexplored due to the scarcity of open-source safety data in other languages. To address this gap, we propose a novel two-player Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework, where a generator and a guardrail model co-evolve adversarially to produce high-quality synthetic data for multilingual guardrail training. We theoretically formalize this interaction as a two-player game, proving convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Empirical evaluations show that our model \ours outperforms state-of-the-art models, achieving nearly 10% improvement over LlamaGuard3 (8B) on English benchmarks while being 4.5x faster at inference with a significantly smaller model (0.5B). We achieve substantial advancements in multilingual safety tasks, particularly in addressing the imbalance for lower-resource languages in a collected real dataset. Ablation studies emphasize the critical role of synthetic data generation in bridging the imbalance in open-source data between English and other languages. These findings establish a scalable and efficient approach to synthetic data generation, paving the way for improved multilingual guardrail models to enhance LLM safety. Code, model, and data will be open-sourced at https://github.com/yihedeng9/DuoGuard.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

We focus on agile, continuous, and terrain-adaptive jumping of quadrupedal robots in discontinuous terrains such as stairs and stepping stones. Unlike single-step jumping, continuous jumping requires accurately executing highly dynamic motions over long horizons, which is challenging for existing approaches. To accomplish this task, we design a hierarchical learning and control framework, which consists of a learned heightmap predictor for robust terrain perception, a reinforcement-learning-based centroidal-level motion policy for versatile and terrain-adaptive planning, and a low-level model-based leg controller for accurate motion tracking. In addition, we minimize the sim-to-real gap by accurately modeling the hardware characteristics. Our framework enables a Unitree Go1 robot to perform agile and continuous jumps on human-sized stairs and sparse stepping stones, for the first time to the best of our knowledge. In particular, the robot can cross two stair steps in each jump and completes a 3.5m long, 2.8m high, 14-step staircase in 4.5 seconds. Moreover, the same policy outperforms baselines in various other parkour tasks, such as jumping over single horizontal or vertical discontinuities. Experiment videos can be found at https://yxyang.github.io/jumping\_cod/.

Computer use agents (CUAs) can operate real-world digital interfaces but remain difficult to train due to the high cost of graphical user interface (GUI) interaction and the scarcity of high-quality trajectory data. Existing datasets rely on human demonstrations, limiting scalability. A natural alternative is to synthesize data from strong CUAs, yet their rollouts are highly noisy, with incorrect or suboptimal actions consisting a large proportion of the steps, making naive imitation ineffective. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a scalable data synthesis pipeline that transforms noisy rollouts into reliable supervision without human annotation. The core idea is step-level filtering, which evaluates actions individually to retain only correct steps, complemented by reasoning augmentation for improved planning. Using this pipeline, we construct WebSTAR, a dataset of 13.3K trajectories and 100K graded, reasoning-rich steps synthesized from OpenAI's computer-use-preview model. We train Qwen-2.5-VL-Instruct models (7B and 32B) on WebSTAR. On WebVoyager, our 7B model surpasses SoTA open-source CUA model UI-TARS-1.5-7B by more than 15% with only supervised finetuning. Building on step-level grading, we further create WebSCORE, a dataset of graded step-level actions, and train StepRM, a 7B multimodal reward model distilled from o4-mini, which matches its grading quality while being far more efficient to deploy at scale. Our results establish step-level filtering as a key principle for scalable CUA training and construct two new datasets (WebSTAR, WebSCORE) and a lightweight reward model (StepRM) as practical tools to advance robust and efficient CUAs.

Computer Use Agents (CUAs) translate natural-language instructions into Graphical User Interface (GUI) actions such as clicks, keystrokes, and scrolls by relying on a Vision-Language Model (VLM) to interpret screenshots and predict grounded tool calls. However, grounding accuracy varies dramatically across VLMs, while current CUA systems typically route every action to a single fixed model regardless of difficulty. We propose Adaptive VLM Routing (AVR), a framework that inserts a lightweight semantic routing layer between the CUA orchestrator and a pool of VLMs. For each tool call, AVR estimates action difficulty from multimodal embeddings, probes a small VLM to measure confidence, and routes the action to the cheapest model whose predicted accuracy satisfies a target reliability threshold. For warm agents with memory of prior UI interactions, retrieved context further narrows the capability gap between small and large models, allowing many actions to be handled without escalation. We formalize routing as a cost--accuracy trade-off, derive a threshold-based policy for model selection, and evaluate AVR using ScreenSpot-Pro grounding data together with the OpenClaw agent routing benchmark. Across these settings, AVR projects inference cost reductions of up to 78\% while staying within 2 percentage points of an all-large-model baseline. When combined with the Visual Confused Deputy guardrail, AVR also escalates high-risk actions directly to the strongest available model, unifying efficiency and safety within a single routing framework. Materials are also provided Model, benchmark, and code: https://github.com/vllm-project/semantic-router.

Efficient multi-hop reasoning requires Large Language Models (LLMs) based agents to acquire high-value external knowledge iteratively. Previous work has explored reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to perform search-based document retrieval, achieving notable improvements in QA performance, but underperform on complex, multi-hop QA resulting from the sparse rewards from global signal only. To address this gap in existing research, we introduce StepSearch, a framework for search LLMs that trained with step-wise proximal policy optimization method. It consists of richer and more detailed intermediate search rewards and token-level process supervision based on information gain and redundancy penalties to better guide each search step. We constructed a fine-grained question-answering dataset containing sub-question-level search trajectories based on open source datasets through a set of data pipeline method. On standard multi-hop QA benchmarks, it significantly outperforms global-reward baselines, achieving 11.2% and 4.2% absolute improvements for 3B and 7B models over various search with RL baselines using only 19k training data, demonstrating the effectiveness of fine-grained, stepwise supervision in optimizing deep search LLMs. Our code will be released on https://github.com/Zillwang/StepSearch.

Existing agent-safety evaluation has focused mainly on externally induced risks. Yet agents may still enter unsafe trajectories under benign conditions. We study this complementary but underexplored setting through the lens of intrinsic risk, where intrinsic failures remain latent, propagate across long-horizon execution, and eventually lead to high-consequence outcomes. To evaluate this setting, we introduce non-attack intrinsic risk auditing and present HINTBench, a benchmark of 629 agent trajectories (523 risky, 106 safe; 33 steps on average) supporting three tasks: risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification. Its annotations are organized under a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments reveal a substantial capability gap: strong LLMs perform well on trajectory-level risk detection, but their performance drops to below 35 Strict-F1 on risk-step localization, while fine-grained failure diagnosis proves even harder. Existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting. These findings establish intrinsic risk auditing as an open challenge for agent safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress, but their deployment has exposed critical vulnerabilities, particularly to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety mechanisms. Guardrails--external defense mechanisms that monitor and control LLM interaction--have emerged as a promising solution. However, the current landscape of LLM guardrails is fragmented, lacking a unified taxonomy and comprehensive evaluation framework. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present the first holistic analysis of jailbreak guardrails for LLMs. We propose a novel, multi-dimensional taxonomy that categorizes guardrails along six key dimensions, and introduce a Security-Efficiency-Utility evaluation framework to assess their practical effectiveness. Through extensive analysis and experiments, we identify the strengths and limitations of existing guardrail approaches, explore their universality across attack types, and provide insights into optimizing defense combinations. Our work offers a structured foundation for future research and development, aiming to guide the principled advancement and deployment of robust LLM guardrails. The code is available at https://github.com/xunguangwang/SoK4JailbreakGuardrails.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising capabilities for solving Operations Research (OR) problems. While reinforcement learning serves as a powerful paradigm for LLM training on OR problems, existing works generally face two key limitations. First, outcome reward suffers from the credit assignment problem, where correct final answers can reinforce flawed reasoning. Second, conventional discriminative process supervision is myopic, failing to evaluate the interdependent steps of OR modeling holistically. To this end, we introduce StepORLM, a novel self-evolving framework with generative process supervision. At its core, StepORLM features a co-evolutionary loop where a policy model and a generative process reward model (GenPRM) iteratively improve on each other. This loop is driven by a dual-feedback mechanism: definitive, outcome-based verification from an external solver, and nuanced, holistic process evaluation from the GenPRM. The combined signal is used to align the policy via Weighted Direct Preference Optimization (W-DPO) and simultaneously refine the GenPRM. Our resulting 8B-parameter StepORLM establishes a new state-of-the-art across six benchmarks, significantly outperforming vastly larger generalist models, agentic methods, and specialized baselines. Moreover, the co-evolved GenPRM is able to act as a powerful and universally applicable process verifier, substantially boosting the inference scaling performance of both our own model and other existing LLMs.

Computer-use agents must solve long-horizon tasks through repeated interaction with partially observable, multimodal desktop environments. Although imitation learning and offline trajectory refinement provide strong priors, static traces cannot cover the causal feedback loop of real computer use: each action changes the screen state, future action space, and recovery options. EvoCUA-1.5 extends self-evolving computer-use agents from offline experience learning to online reinforcement learning, where policies interact with executable sandbox environments and improve from verifiable task outcomes. Online RL in this setting requires more than directly reusing single-turn language-RL recipes. Multi-turn interaction introduces context-managed observations, sparse terminal rewards, variable-length trajectories, and slow environment feedback. EvoCUA-1.5 addresses these challenges with Step-Level Policy Optimization (STEPO), which preserves trajectory-level advantage balance after decomposition into step-level samples; policy-aware filtering and pass-rate calibration over verifiable synthesized tasks; Dynamic Tri-Adaptive Curriculum (DTAC), which combines learnable tasks, difficult positive replay, and controlled infeasible-task exposure; and a fully asynchronous RL infrastructure with staleness control and mini-group batching. Experiments show that these components improve training stability and downstream performance. EvoCUA-1.5 achieves 63.2\% success on OSWorld-Verified, outperforming comparable 32B/35B-scale open-weight baselines and even approaching models with significantly larger parameter counts. Overall, EvoCUA-1.5 provides a practical framework for scaling online RL in multi-turn computer-use agents.

LLM-based agents solve complex tasks through iterative reasoning, tool use, and environment interaction, where each intermediate thought directly shapes subsequent actions. Small deviations in these thoughts can therefore propagate into unsafe behaviors, yet existing guardrails typically operate only on final outputs or require intrusive model modifications. We introduce Thought-Aligner, a lightweight plug-in safety model that performs causal correction on unsafe thoughts before action execution, without altering the underlying agent. The corrected thoughts are fed back into the agent, steering its decision process and tool use toward safer trajectories. Because it operates solely at the thought level, Thought-Aligner is model-agnostic and can be integrated into diverse agent frameworks. We train Thought-Aligner via two-stage contrastive learning on paired safe and unsafe thoughts generated across ten risk scenarios. Experiments on diverse agent-safety benchmarks and six LLMs show that Thought-Aligner increases behavioral safety from about 50% without protection to around 90% on average, exceeding state-of-the-art guardrails by roughly 23%, while also improving helpfulness by about 5%. The method incurs low per-step latency and minimal overhead, enabling scalable and practical deployment. We publicly release Thought-Aligner-7B at https://huggingface.co/WhitzardAgent/Thought-Aligner-7B.

Guard models support the safe deployment of language model agents, but fixed risk taxonomies limit their ability to accommodate requirements that vary across applications and tasks. Under user-defined policies, detecting violations requires interpreting both the applicable rules and the agent's behavior, since identical actions can receive different judgments under different policies. To support learning this capability, we introduce AdaptiveSafety, a dataset of 10,939 training examples and 1,000 test examples covering policies with 1--100 rules. The dataset combines trajectories from multiple sources with policy and behavioral counterfactuals, pairing each example with an explanation and the complete set of violated rules. These counterfactuals expose changes that alter compliance, while structural augmentations provide supervision for consistency under rule reordering and identifier remapping. Building on this supervision, we propose SafePO, a reinforcement learning algorithm for refining violation identification while balancing explanatory reasoning and final verdicts. SafePO uses structured rewards to assess prediction correctness, retains group-relative advantages at the response level, and employs a separately trained value model to modulate token weights within explanation and verdict regions. Separate normalization controls their relative contribution to training despite differences in length. Through supervised initialization followed by SafePO, we develop AdaGuard, a family of 0.6B, 4B, and 8B guard models that assess agent trajectories under policies supplied at inference time. Our 4B model achieves binary accuracies of 89.30\% on AdaptiveSafety and 71.82\% on DynaBench. The project repository is available at https://github.com/Yunhao-Feng/AdaGuard

We introduce Guard Vector, a safety task vector computed as the parameter difference between a guardrail model (Guard Model) and a same-architecture pretrained language model. Composing this vector with a target language model yields a Target Guard Model (TGM). We then adapt TGM with a streaming-aware approach that combines prefix-based training and evaluation with a classifier that produces a single-token output. With this composition alone, TGM improves classification quality over established Guard Models across standard safety suites and enables language extensibility to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, requiring neither additional training nor target language labels. It also demonstrates model portability across two widely used public guardrail backbones, Llama and Gemma. With prefix SFT (supervised fine-tuning), TGM preserves classification quality under streaming by aligning the behavior between prefix inputs and full-text inputs. The single-token output design increases throughput and reduces latency. Together, these components reduce data and compute requirements while promoting streaming-aware evaluation practices, thereby contributing to a more responsible AI ecosystem.

As LLMs shift toward autonomous agents, Deep Research has emerged as a pivotal metric. However, existing academic benchmarks like BrowseComp often fail to meet real-world demands for open-ended research, which requires robust skills in intent recognition, long-horizon decision-making, and cross-source verification. To address this, we introduce Step-DeepResearch, a cost-effective, end-to-end agent. We propose a Data Synthesis Strategy Based on Atomic Capabilities to reinforce planning and report writing, combined with a progressive training path from agentic mid-training to SFT and RL. Enhanced by a Checklist-style Judger, this approach significantly improves robustness. Furthermore, to bridge the evaluation gap in the Chinese domain, we establish ADR-Bench for realistic deep research scenarios. Experimental results show that Step-DeepResearch (32B) scores 61.4% on Scale AI Research Rubrics. On ADR-Bench, it significantly outperforms comparable models and rivals SOTA closed-source models like OpenAI and Gemini DeepResearch. These findings prove that refined training enables medium-sized models to achieve expert-level capabilities at industry-leading cost-efficiency.

Agent safety is moving from content moderation toward preventing operational failures before tool-using agents act. We propose Janus, a foresight-oriented framework for long-horizon agent safety that trains guards to anticipate delayed risks from partial trajectories. Janus synthesizes diverse agent trajectories via multi-agent simulation and learns a shared policy with two coupled tasks: an anticipation task that forecasts safety-relevant futures and an adjudication task that decides safety from both the observed prefix and anticipated future. The two tasks are jointly optimized with CoAA-RL, which rewards forecasts by their utility for downstream safety judgment. The resulting guard model, Vanguard, blocks unsafe actions before execution. Across four agent-safety benchmarks, Vanguard improves average protection by 15.9 percentage points over baseline guards while increasing benign task completion by 5.1 percentage points.

This paper investigates conservative exploration in reinforcement learning where the performance of the learning agent is guaranteed to be above a certain threshold throughout the learning process. It focuses on the tabular episodic Markov Decision Process (MDP) setting that has finite states and actions. With the knowledge of an existing safe baseline policy, an algorithm termed as StepMix is proposed to balance the exploitation and exploration while ensuring that the conservative constraint is never violated in each episode with high probability. StepMix features a unique design of a mixture policy that adaptively and smoothly interpolates between the baseline policy and the optimistic policy. Theoretical analysis shows that StepMix achieves near-optimal regret order as in the constraint-free setting, indicating that obeying the stringent episode-wise conservative constraint does not compromise the learning performance. Besides, a randomization-based EpsMix algorithm is also proposed and shown to achieve the same performance as StepMix. The algorithm design and theoretical analysis are further extended to the setting where the baseline policy is not given a priori but must be learned from an offline dataset, and it is proved that similar conservative guarantee and regret can be achieved if the offline dataset is sufficiently large. Experiment results corroborate the theoretical analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed conservative exploration strategies.

Maintaining the safety of large language models (LLMs) is crucial as they are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. Existing safety guardrails typically rely on single-pass classification or, more recently, distilled reasoning. Reasoning-based guardrails significantly outperform classification-only baselines, but they incur substantial query latency and token overhead that make them impractical for highthroughput deployment. To address this challenge, we propose COLAGUARD, a guardrail model that transfers multi-step safety reasoning into a continuous latent space through a stage-wise training curriculum, enabling direct hidden-state propagation at inference. Evaluated on ten prompt- and response-moderation settings spanning eight safety benchmarks, COLAGUARD improves macro-F1 by 8.24 points over Llama Guard 3 and matches our explicit reasoning baseline, GuardReasoner, in macroF1 while delivering a 12.9X speedup and 22.4X reduction in token usage. Our results suggest that latent reasoning offers a practical alternative to explicit rationale generation for deployable guardrails, jointly improving safety robustness and inference efficiency rather than treating them as competing objectives.

Ensuring safe, policy-compliant outputs from large language models requires real-time content moderation that can scale across multiple safety dimensions. However, state-of-the-art guardrail models rely on autoregressive decoders with 7B--27B parameters, reformulating what is fundamentally a classification problem as sequential text generation, a design choice that incurs high latency and scales poorly to multi-aspect evaluation. In this work, we introduce GLiGuard, a 0.3B-parameter schema-conditioned bidirectional encoder adapted from GLiNER2 for LLM content moderation. The key idea is to encode task definitions and label semantics directly into the input sequence as structured token schemas, enabling simultaneous evaluation of prompt safety, response safety, refusal detection, 14 fine-grained harm categories, and 11 jailbreak strategies in a single non-autoregressive forward pass. This schema-conditioned design lets supported task and label blocks be composed directly in the input schema at inference time. Across nine established safety benchmarks, GLiGuard achieves F1 scores competitive with 7B--27B decoder-based guards despite being 23--90times smaller, while delivering up to 16times higher throughput and 17times lower latency. These results suggest that compact bidirectional encoders can approach the accuracy of much larger guard models while drastically reducing inference cost. Code and models are available at https://github.com/fastino-ai/GLiGuard.

LLM agents act on real-world environments through tool calls, and a single misjudged action can cause irreversible harm. The standard safeguard is a guard model that labels each proposed action as safe or unsafe, but this binary view conflates two distinct decisions: whether the action is harmful in itself, and whether it is appropriate given the user's context. It also operates at the granularity of action categories rather than individual instances, producing routine interruptions that erode autonomy and train users to wave through the most consequential alerts. We reframe the problem as a per-instance three-way routing decision over {EXECUTE, ASK, REFUSE} and instantiate it with Safety Sentry, a lightweight guard model whose inference reduces to a single decoding call. A single decoding-time threshold lets one fixed checkpoint be re-positioned across deployments of differing risk tolerance without retraining. Safety Sentry outperforms a broad set of open-weight and frontier closed-source baselines on overall accuracy and safety-related recall, while controlling both directional error rates simultaneously.

LLM agents increasingly operate over sensitive resources, such as private documents and mutable system states, which can create serious safety and security risks. Runtime guardrails should therefore make inspectable, reproducible, and deterministic allow or refuse decisions before potentially irreversible agent actions are executed. However, safety and security requirements are rarely complete before deployment, so guardrails need to keep adapting as new risks emerge. Existing adaptive guardrails learn from deployment experience, but they usually apply safety policies through LLM inference, which can lead to inconsistent decisions and ambiguous policy interpretations. Formal guardrails, on the other hand, enforce policies deterministically, but they usually rely on pre-deployment or task-specific policies and have no mechanism to adapt to newly observed risks. We introduce VEPA, a framework for the verified evolution of formal agent guardrails. VEPA represents the guardrail as a formal policy of executable symbolic rules over typed agent events. During deployment, we use an LLM guided by deployment feedback to propose policy patches that fix newly observed failures while preserving previously correct behavior. Then, a deterministic verifier only accepts policies that are structurally valid and conflict-free. Finally, an evidence-aware authority layer activates a verified rule only when it has enough supporting evidence, so uncertain updates cannot directly affect guardrail decisions. Across ASSEBench-Safety, ASSEBench-Security, and ATBench, VEPA consistently outperforms baselines while expanding the scope of deterministic formal-policy enforcement. These gains also hold under more challenging deployment conditions, including mixed streams, corrupted feedback, and longer horizons.

Multimodal large language models exhibit capabilities on reasoning tasks, yet often produce flawed intermediate steps while yielding correct final answers. This behavior undermines interpretability and reliability, suggesting reliance on spurious shortcuts rather than faithful reasoning. Although efforts have explored step-level supervision, distinguishing decisive steps from redundant ones remains challenging. We propose O^2-CritiCuRL, a novel curriculum reinforcement learning framework that introduces critical-step awareness through an iterative offline-online paradigm. In the offline stage, O^2-CritiCuRL conducts multi-rollout analysis over step-annotated trajectories to estimate step-level importance, allowing the framework to distill critical reasoning steps and filter out redundant ones. In the online stage, we employ a progressive step-level reinforcement learning strategy, where truncated chains guide the model to infer missing steps and refine its reasoning, thereby sharpening its focus on critical steps and overcoming the limitations of static supervision. Extensive experiments on multimodal reasoning benchmarks show that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance while delivering superior training and inference efficiency. Code is available at https://github.com/kk0013/CritiCuRL.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety guardrail models have emerged as a primary defense mechanism against harmful content generation, yet their robustness against sophisticated adversarial attacks remains poorly characterized. This study evaluated ten publicly available guardrail models from Meta, Google, IBM, NVIDIA, Alibaba, and Allen AI across 1,445 test prompts spanning 21 attack categories. While Qwen3Guard-8B achieved the highest overall accuracy (85.3%, 95% CI: 83.4-87.1%), a critical finding emerged when separating public benchmark prompts from novel attacks: all models showed substantial performance degradation on unseen prompts, with Qwen3Guard dropping from 91.0% to 33.8% (a 57.2 percentage point gap). In contrast, Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B showed the best generalization with only a 6.5% gap. A "helpful mode" jailbreak was also discovered where two guardrail models (Nemotron-Safety-8B, Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B) generated harmful content instead of blocking it, representing a novel failure mode. These findings suggest that benchmark performance may be misleading due to training data contamination, and that generalization ability, not overall accuracy, should be the primary metric for guardrail evaluation.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in financial services, a single non-compliant interaction can expose institutions to regulatory penalties and direct consumer harm. Existing guard models are built around general harm taxonomies and overlook violations grounded in specific financial regulations. We address this gap with a regulation-driven pipeline that operates directly on regulatory documents, inducing a financial compliance risk taxonomy and synthesizing grounded training data without any predefined violation categories. Instantiating the pipeline on Chinese financial regulations, we release FinGuard-Bench, to our knowledge the first benchmark for financial regulatory compliance detection, with expert-annotated labels at both the query and response levels. We further train FinGuard, a financial compliance detection model built on Qwen3-8B and trained on the regulation-grounded data via supervised fine-tuning and self-play reinforcement learning. On FinGuard-Bench, FinGuard substantially outperforms all baselines, including dedicated guard models and much larger general-purpose LLMs such as Qwen3.5-397B-A17B and GPT-5.1. Furthermore, FinGuard also preserves general safety capabilities and adapts to unseen institution-specific policies using policy documents alone. We will publicly release the code, prompts, and resources used in this work on GitHub.

Group-based reinforcement learning (RL), such as GRPO, has advanced the capabilities of large language models on long-horizon agentic tasks. To enable more fine-grained policy updates, recent research has increasingly shifted toward stepwise group-based policy optimization, which treats each step in a rollout trajectory independently while using a memory module to retain historical context. However, we find a key issue in estimating stepwise relative advantages, namely context inconsistency, where steps within the same group may differ in their historical contexts. Empirically, we reveal that this issue can lead to severely biased advantage estimation, thereby degrading policy optimization significantly. To address the issue, in this paper, we propose Hierarchy-of-Groups Policy Optimization (HGPO) for long-horizon agentic tasks. Specifically, within a group of rollout trajectories, HGPO assigns each step to multiple hierarchical groups according to the consistency of historical contexts. Then, for each step, HGPO computes distinct advantages within each group and aggregates them with an adaptive weighting scheme. In this way, HGPO can achieve a favorable bias-variance trade-off in stepwise advantage estimation, without extra models or rollouts. Evaluations on two challenging agentic tasks, ALFWorld and WebShop with Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, show that HGPO significantly outperforms existing agentic RL methods under the same computational constraints. Code is available at https://github.com/langfengQ/verl-agent/tree/master/recipe/hgpo.

Web agents can autonomously complete online tasks by interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from limited generalization to unseen domains and attack patterns, high false positive rates on benign content, reduced deployment efficiency due to added latency at each step, and vulnerability to adversarial attacks that evolve over time or directly target the guard itself. To address these limitations, we propose WARD (Web Agent Robust Defense against Prompt Injection), a practical guard model for secure and efficient web agents. WARD is built on WARD-Base, a large-scale dataset with around 177K samples collected from 719 high-traffic URLs and platforms, and WARD-PIG, a dedicated dataset designed for prompt injection attacks targeting the guard model. We further introduce A3T, an adaptive adversarial attack training framework that iteratively strengthens WARD through a memory-based attacker and guard co-evolution process. Extensive experiments show that WARD achieves nearly perfect recall on out-of-distribution benchmarks, maintains low false positive rates to preserve agent utility, remains robust against guard-targeted and adaptive attacks under substantial distribution shifts, and runs efficiently in parallel with the agent without introducing additional latency.

Control evaluations measure whether monitoring and security protocols for AI systems prevent intentionally subversive AI models from causing harm. Our work presents the first control evaluation performed in an agent environment. We construct BashBench, a dataset of 257 challenging multi-step system administration tasks, and evaluate whether various safety measures can prevent an adversarially constructed AI agent from covertly downloading and executing malicious code in this environment. This multi-step setting introduces new attack and defense dynamics, which we investigate in order to design novel control protocols that prevent safety failures without hindering the ability of non-malicious agents to perform useful work. We introduce a class of control protocols called resample protocols that dynamically take additional samples of certain actions. We find these protocols significantly improve on existing techniques by selectively blocking the AI agent from executing suspicious code and incriminating the agent by generating additional examples of dangerous behavior. We measure the tradeoff between attack prevention and usefulness; our best protocol combines resampling with analysis of previous steps, reducing the success rate of attacks from 58% to 7% at a 5% cost to the performance of a non-malicious agent.

Large language model agents have exhibited exceptional performance across a range of complex interactive tasks. Recent approaches have utilized tuning with expert trajectories to enhance agent performance, yet they primarily concentrate on outcome rewards, which may lead to errors or suboptimal actions due to the absence of process supervision signals. In this paper, we introduce the Iterative step-level Process Refinement (IPR) framework, which provides detailed step-by-step guidance to enhance agent training. Specifically, we adopt the Monte Carlo method to estimate step-level rewards. During each iteration, the agent explores along the expert trajectory and generates new actions. These actions are then evaluated against the corresponding step of expert trajectory using step-level rewards. Such comparison helps identify discrepancies, yielding contrastive action pairs that serve as training data for the agent. Our experiments on three complex agent tasks demonstrate that our framework outperforms a variety of strong baselines. Moreover, our analytical findings highlight the effectiveness of IPR in augmenting action efficiency and its applicability to diverse models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities despite deliberate safety alignment efforts, posing significant risks to users and society. To safeguard against the risk of policy-violating content, system-level moderation via external guard models-designed to monitor LLM inputs and outputs and block potentially harmful content-has emerged as a prevalent mitigation strategy. Existing approaches of training guard models rely heavily on extensive human curated datasets and struggle with out-of-distribution threats, such as emerging harmful categories or jailbreak attacks. To address these limitations, we propose RSafe, an adaptive reasoning-based safeguard that conducts guided safety reasoning to provide robust protection within the scope of specified safety policies. RSafe operates in two stages: 1) guided reasoning, where it analyzes safety risks of input content through policy-guided step-by-step reasoning, and 2) reinforced alignment, where rule-based RL optimizes its reasoning paths to align with accurate safety prediction. This two-stage training paradigm enables RSafe to internalize safety principles to generalize safety protection capability over unseen or adversarial safety violation scenarios. During inference, RSafe accepts user-specified safety policies to provide enhanced safeguards tailored to specific safety requirements.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are turning language into real-world effects, making safety necessary against both indirect prompt injections and direct harmful requests. System-level safety harnesses add an enforcement layer beyond model-level defenses, but existing harnesses are usually designed once by experts and applied across heterogeneous models and domains. Effective protection is deployment-dependent: models differ in how much enforcement they need before utility declines, while domains differ in the effects, state, and action sequences that must be governed. A harness that is strict enough for one model may over-block another, and a policy that transfers across domains may miss application-specific safety relations. We present EvoSafeHarness, a safety-specific optimization framework that synthesizes a deployable harness for a frozen model in a target domain. It jointly searches a natural-language policy and executable code logic, guided by model behavior, domain specifications, and fresh-context adversarial review to reject benchmark-specific rules. Across four agent benchmark families, EvoSafeHarness achieves a stronger safety-utility frontier than fixed expert-designed defenses. On DecodingTrust-Agent, it reduces average attack success rate from 45.6% to 10.0% at a 3.3-point utility cost and achieves the best score in 14 of 15 cells. On AgentDojo, it reaches 82.8% utility at 0.0% ASR, twice CaMeL's utility at the same operating point, and transfers unchanged to unseen AgentDyn suites. It also achieves the best score on Agent-SafetyBench for every victim and keeps mean ASR below 20% under adaptive PAIR attacks with a refinement budget of 16. Analysis shows that domain semantics determine which safety relations and trajectory state are needed, while model and runtime behavior determine how and where those relations should be enforced.

Deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications requires robust safety guard models to detect and block harmful user prompts. While large safety guard models achieve strong performance, their computational cost is substantial. To mitigate this, smaller distilled models are used, but they often underperform on "hard" examples where the larger model provides accurate predictions. We observe that many inputs can be reliably handled by the smaller model, while only a small fraction require the larger model's capacity. Motivated by this, we propose SafeRoute, a binary router that distinguishes hard examples from easy ones. Our method selectively applies the larger safety guard model to the data that the router considers hard, improving efficiency while maintaining accuracy compared to solely using the larger safety guard model. Experimental results on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our adaptive model selection significantly enhances the trade-off between computational cost and safety performance, outperforming relevant baselines.

Large reasoning models improve with more test-time computation, but often overthink, producing unnecessarily long chains-of-thought that raise cost without improving accuracy. Prior reinforcement learning approaches typically rely on a single outcome reward with trajectory-level length penalties, which cannot distinguish essential from redundant reasoning steps and therefore yield blunt compression. Although recent work incorporates step-level signals, such as offline pruning, supervised data construction, or verifier-based intermediate rewards, reasoning length is rarely treated as an explicit step-level optimization objective during RL. We propose Step-wise Adaptive Penalization (SWAP), a fine-grained framework that allocates length reduction across steps based on intrinsic contribution. We estimate step importance from the model's on-policy log-probability improvement toward the correct answer, then treat excess length as a penalty mass redistributed to penalize low-importance steps more heavily while preserving high-importance reasoning. We optimize with a unified outcome-process advantage within group-relative policy optimization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SWAP reduces reasoning length by 64.3% on average while improving accuracy by 5.7% relative to the base model.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, safety guardrails are required to go beyond coarse-grained filtering and support fine-grained, interpretable, and adaptable risk assessment. However, existing solutions often rely on rapid classification schemes or post-hoc rules, resulting in limited transparency, inflexible policies, or prohibitive inference costs. To this end, we present YuFeng-XGuard, a reasoning-centric guardrail model family designed to perform multi-dimensional risk perception for LLM interactions. Instead of producing opaque binary judgments, YuFeng-XGuard generates structured risk predictions, including explicit risk categories and configurable confidence scores, accompanied by natural language explanations that expose the underlying reasoning process. This formulation enables safety decisions that are both actionable and interpretable. To balance decision latency and explanatory depth, we adopt a tiered inference paradigm that performs an initial risk decision based on the first decoded token, while preserving ondemand explanatory reasoning when required. In addition, we introduce a dynamic policy mechanism that decouples risk perception from policy enforcement, allowing safety policies to be adjusted without model retraining. Extensive experiments on a diverse set of public safety benchmarks demonstrate that YuFeng-XGuard achieves stateof-the-art performance while maintaining strong efficiency-efficacy trade-offs. We release YuFeng-XGuard as an open model family, including both a full-capacity variant and a lightweight version, to support a wide range of deployment scenarios.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and widely used, ensuring the safety of their outputs is increasingly critical. Existing guardrail models, though useful in static evaluation settings, face two major limitations in real-world applications: (1) they typically output only binary "safe/unsafe" labels, which can be interpreted inconsistently across diverse safety policies, rendering them incapable of accommodating varying safety tolerances across domains; and (2) they require complete model outputs before performing safety checks, making them fundamentally incompatible with streaming LLM inference, thereby preventing timely intervention during generation and increasing exposure to harmful partial outputs. To address these challenges, we present Qwen3Guard, a series of multilingual safety guardrail models with two specialized variants: Generative Qwen3Guard, which casts safety classification as an instruction-following task to enable fine-grained tri-class judgments (safe, controversial, unsafe); and Stream Qwen3Guard, which introduces a token-level classification head for real-time safety monitoring during incremental text generation. Both variants are available in three sizes (0.6B, 4B, and 8B parameters) and support up to 119 languages and dialects, providing comprehensive, scalable, and low-latency safety moderation for global LLM deployments. Evaluated across English, Chinese, and multilingual benchmarks, Qwen3Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance in both prompt and response safety classification. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

With the widespread deployment of Computer-using Agents (CUAs) in complex real-world environments, prevalent long-term risks often lead to severe and irreversible consequences. Most existing guardrails for CUAs adopt a reactive approach, constraining agent behavior only within the current observation space. While these guardrails can prevent immediate short-term risks (e.g., clicking on a phishing link), they cannot proactively avoid long-term risks: seemingly reasonable actions can lead to high-risk consequences that emerge with a delay (e.g., cleaning logs leads to future audits being untraceable), which reactive guardrails cannot identify within the current observation space. To address these limitations, we propose a predictive guardrail approach, with the core idea of aligning predicted future risks with current decisions. Based on this approach, we present SafePred, a predictive guardrail framework for CUAs that establishes a risk-to-decision loop to ensure safe agent behavior. SafePred supports two key abilities: (1) Short- and long-term risk prediction: by using safety policies as the basis for risk prediction, SafePred leverages the prediction capability of the world model to generate semantic representations of both short-term and long-term risks, thereby identifying and pruning actions that lead to high-risk states; (2) Decision optimization: translating predicted risks into actionable safe decision guidances through step-level interventions and task-level re-planning. Extensive experiments show that SafePred significantly reduces high-risk behaviors, achieving over 97.6% safety performance and improving task utility by up to 21.4% compared with reactive baselines.

Computer-use agents increasingly tackle long-horizon tasks, where running a frontier model at every step is expensive and a small open-weight model alone often fails. Weak-to-strong escalation offers a middle ground where a weak agent acts by default and hands control to a strong one only when needed. The core challenge is deciding when to escalate, which requires an uncertainty signal cheap enough to check at every step. However, even after handoff, the strong agent can still get lost, but a black-box API that the strong agent is usually served exposes no internals to monitor. To this end, we propose LEASH, a training-free framework that unleashes the strong agent only when the weak agent's latent uncertainty signals it is needed, and keeps it on a leash afterward. LEASH has three layers: (1) initial task uncertainty for early routing, (2) step-level uncertainty for runtime escalation, and, after handoff, (3) a shadow observer for continued oversight of the strong black-box agent. Here, we use latent uncertainty as a fuel for all three layers. Specifically, we compare the weak model's hidden states with those from its past successful and failed trajectories, and a state that looks more like the failures signals higher uncertainty. During weak-agent execution, our uncertainty estimator reuses activations already produced during action generation, so it needs no extra forward pass or dedicated monitor training. Experiments on OSWorld across four contemporary model backbones show that LEASH consistently improves over standalone weak agents and outperforms random escalation by 6.55--11.94 points at matched escalation rates. With Qwen3.5-35B-A3B, LEASH achieves 73.66% task success at $0.4117 per task, matching always-on Claude Opus 5 (72.90%) while reducing inference cost by 19.2%.

Guard models are widely used to detect harmful content in user prompts and LLM responses. However, state-of-the-art guard models rely solely on terminal-layer representations and overlook the rich safety-relevant features distributed across internal layers. We present SIREN, a lightweight guard model that harnesses these internal features. By identifying safety neurons via linear probing and combining them through an adaptive layer-weighted strategy, SIREN builds a harmfulness detector from LLM internals without modifying the underlying model. Our comprehensive evaluation shows that SIREN substantially outperforms state-of-the-art open-source guard models across multiple benchmarks while using 250 times fewer trainable parameters. Moreover, SIREN exhibits superior generalization to unseen benchmarks, naturally enables real-time streaming detection, and significantly improves inference efficiency compared to generative guard models. Overall, our results highlight LLM internal states as a promising foundation for practical, high-performance harmfulness detection.

Training multi-turn LLM agents with reinforcement learning typically relies on trajectory-level rewards, which assign a uniform advantage to every step and cannot identify which decisions led to success or failure. Self-distillation methods can provide finer-grained supervision by augmenting RL with privileged information. However, existing approaches usually apply the same type of privileged information to every step in an indistinguishable manner, ignoring a key asymmetry: routine steps need little additional guidance, while critical error steps require corrective direction that environment feedback alone cannot provide. We propose AHEAD, a step-aware framework that matches different supervision sources to different step types. The teacher receives environment feedback on all steps as a grounded dense signal, and additionally receives LLM-generated corrective hints on error steps to supply the direction that environment feedback lacks. The method introduces minimal changes to the standard GRPO algorithm. Across ALFWorld, WebShop, and Search-based QA, and across three model scales, AHEAD raises task success (+13.3 points on ALFWorld and +11.0 on WebShop at 7B over GRPO), reaches a given success rate in fewer training steps, and solves tasks within tighter interaction budgets than outcome-only RL and prior self-distillation baselines.

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

Reinforcement learning (RL) holds significant promise for training LLM agents to handle complex, goal-oriented tasks that require multi-step interactions with external environments. However, a critical challenge when applying RL to these agentic tasks arises from delayed rewards: feedback signals are typically available only after the entire task is completed. This makes it non-trivial to assign delayed rewards to earlier actions, providing insufficient guidance regarding environmental constraints and hindering agent training. In this work, we draw on the insight that the ultimate completion of a task emerges from the cumulative progress an agent makes across individual steps. We propose Stepwise Progress Attribution (SPA), a general reward redistribution framework that decomposes the final reward into stepwise contributions, each reflecting its incremental progress toward overall task completion. To achieve this, we train a progress estimator that accumulates stepwise contributions over a trajectory to match the task completion. During policy optimization, we combine the estimated per-step contribution with a grounding signal for actions executed in the environment as the fine-grained, intermediate reward for effective agent training. Extensive experiments on common agent benchmarks (including Webshop, ALFWorld, and VirtualHome) demonstrate that SPA consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art method in both success rate (+2.5\% on average) and grounding accuracy (+1.9\% on average). Further analyses demonstrate that our method remarkably provides more effective intermediate rewards for RL training. Our code is available at https://github.com/WangHanLinHenry/SPA-RL-Agent.

Existing guardrail systems for large language model agents operate as binary classifiers that block unsafe content, leaving organizations to discard failing outputs and retry from scratch. We introduce RAIL Guard, a closed-loop responsible AI pipeline that evaluates LLM outputs across eight measurable dimensions and iteratively remediates failing outputs through an evaluate-rewrite-reevaluate loop. We evaluate the pipeline across three experiments on four frontier LLMs and 4,276 content outputs plus 6,400 agent tool-call scenarios. Closed-loop remediation achieves 96.9% convergence versus 49.1% for block-and-retry, though the highest-convergence method reduces utility by 22.3%; feedback-driven self-repair achieves 86.6% convergence on fixable dimensions with no significant utility loss (p = 0.177). Pre-tool-call evaluation reduces unsafe agent executions by 33% (p = 0.007) with zero impact on task completion. We identify a key distinction between fixable dimensions that respond to remediation and structural dimensions (Transparency at 93.0%, Accountability at 92.8%, and Inclusivity at 82.5% failure) that require architectural rather than algorithmic solutions. The system is available as open-source SDKs.

Guardian models are used to supervise and moderate the outputs of user-facing chatbots, enforcing guardrails and detecting bad behaviors. Standard guardian models like LlamaGuard detect predefined, static categories of harms. We propose dynamic guardian models that evaluate text based on user-defined policies, making them useful for different application domains that are not addressed by standard guardian models. Our dynamic guardian models can be used for fast detection of policy violations or with chain-of-thought reasoning that articulates and justifies the model outputs. Our dynamic guardian models match static models in detection accuracy for static harm categories while identifying violations of free-form policies with accuracy comparable to frontier reasoning models in a fraction of the time.

Guard models are increasingly used to safeguard LLM-based agents, primarily by identifying actions that agents are forbidden to perform. However, identifying forbidden actions alone is insufficient to ensure agent safety. In this paper, we argue that agent safety also depends on identifying required yet unperformed safety-critical actions, which we call obligations. Our preliminary study on a popular benchmark for evaluating safety shows that 56.92% of GLM-5.3 trajectories contain unfulfilled obligations, compared with only 30.00% containing forbidden actions. This finding reveals unfulfilled obligations as a major and previously overlooked source of safety risk. However, to our knowledge, no existing benchmark evaluates whether guard models can identify these obligations. To close this gap, we introduce ObligationBench, the first benchmark for evaluating the capability of obligation identification, comprising 240 expert-validated trajectories covering issue resolution, feature development, and terminal operations. Our evaluation of 14 representative models reveals substantial limitations: the highest recall and exact-match rate are only 48.97% and 10.00%, respectively. To address these limitations, we develop ObligationGuard using 40,000 synthetic training examples. ObligationGuard achieves 57.52% recall and an exact-match rate of 21.67%, surpassing all evaluated models on both metrics. We call on the community to incorporate obligation identification into the design and evaluation of future guard models to improve agent safety.

Autonomous agents, which perceive environments and take actions to achieve goals, have become increasingly feasible with the advancements in large language models (LLMs). However, current powerful agents often depend on sophisticated prompt engineering combined with closed-source LLMs like GPT-4. Although training open-source LLMs using expert trajectories from teacher models has yielded some improvements in agent capabilities, this approach still faces limitations such as performance plateauing and error propagation. To mitigate these challenges, we propose STeP, a novel method for improving LLM-based agent training. We synthesize self-reflected trajectories that include reflections and corrections of error steps, which enhance the effectiveness of LLM agents in learning from teacher models, enabling them to become agents capable of self-reflecting and correcting. We also introduce partial masking strategy that prevents the LLM from internalizing incorrect or suboptimal steps. Experiments demonstrate that our method improves agent performance across three representative tasks: ALFWorld, WebShop, and SciWorld. For the open-source model LLaMA2-7B-Chat, when trained using self-reflected trajectories constructed with Qwen1.5-110B-Chat as the teacher model, it achieves comprehensive improvements with less training data compared to agents trained exclusively on expert trajectories.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are now proposed as runtime safety guards for embodied agents in homes and factories. A deployable guard must catch genuinely unsafe situations while avoiding unnecessary intervention on routine but superficially alarming activity, a distinction that binary safety benchmarks obscure. We introduce EgoSafetyBench, an egocentric video benchmark of 1,200 robot-view scenarios annotated at half-second granularity, to evaluate VLMs as streaming guards across two tracks. The situational track (800 scenarios) spans four families, from routine and safe-but-suspicious scenes to obvious and contextual hazards. The visual-channel track (400 scenarios) targets in-scene text-a sign, sticker, or label visible in the scene-that can misrepresent the physical situation, pairing each misleading sign with a truthful version to test both whether a guard flags the text as misleading and whether the text corrupts its physical-safety judgment. Both tracks use contrastive ladders: near-identical scenarios differing only in a single visible deciding cue, so a correct call must hinge on that cue rather than the overall scene type. We evaluate ten open- and closed-source VLMs. We find that while guards reliably recognize videos containing hazards, they often miss specific hazardous moments, particularly contextual hazards. Furthermore, misleading in-scene signs degrade all tested guards: vulnerable models miss up to a third of hazards, while robust models over-intervene on safe content. Matched controls reveal that apparent safety robustness often reflects indiscriminate alarming rather than true physical reasoning.

Stochastic gradient descent method and its variants constitute the core optimization algorithms that achieve good convergence rates for solving machine learning problems. These rates are obtained especially when these algorithms are fine-tuned for the application at hand. Although this tuning process can require large computational costs, recent work has shown that these costs can be reduced by line search methods that iteratively adjust the stepsize. We propose an alternative approach to stochastic line search by using a new algorithm based on forward step model building. This model building step incorporates second-order information that allows adjusting not only the stepsize but also the search direction. Noting that deep learning model parameters come in groups (layers of tensors), our method builds its model and calculates a new step for each parameter group. This novel diagonalization approach makes the selected step lengths adaptive. We provide convergence rate analysis, and experimentally show that the proposed algorithm achieves faster convergence and better generalization in well-known test problems. More precisely, SMB requires less tuning, and shows comparable performance to other adaptive methods.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents, the primary vulnerability surface shifts from final outputs to intermediate execution traces. While safety guardrails are well-benchmarked for natural language responses, their efficacy remains largely unexplored within multi-step tool-use trajectories. To address this gap, we introduce TraceSafe-Bench, the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to assess mid-trajectory safety. It encompasses 12 risk categories, ranging from security threats (e.g., prompt injection, privacy leaks) to operational failures (e.g., hallucinations, interface inconsistencies), featuring over 1,000 unique execution instances. Our evaluation of 13 LLM-as-a-guard models and 7 specialized guardrails yields three critical findings: 1) Structural Bottleneck: Guardrail efficacy is driven more by structural data competence (e.g., JSON parsing) than semantic safety alignment. Performance correlates strongly with structured-to-text benchmarks (ρ=0.79) but shows near-zero correlation with standard jailbreak robustness. 2) Architecture over Scale: Model architecture influences risk detection performance more significantly than model size, with general-purpose LLMs consistently outperforming specialized safety guardrails in trajectory analysis. 3) Temporal Stability: Accuracy remains resilient across extended trajectories. Increased execution steps allow models to pivot from static tool definitions to dynamic execution behaviors, actually improving risk detection performance in later stages. Our findings suggest that securing agentic workflows requires jointly optimizing for structural reasoning and safety alignment to effectively mitigate mid-trajectory risks.

Recent advances in group-based reinforcement learning (RL) have driven frontier large language models (LLMs) in single-turn tasks like mathematical reasoning. However, their scalability to long-horizon LLM agent training remains limited. Unlike static tasks, agent-environment interactions unfold over many steps and often yield sparse or delayed rewards, making credit assignment across individual steps significantly more challenging. In this work, we propose Group-in-Group Policy Optimization (GiGPO), a novel RL algorithm that achieves fine-grained credit assignment for LLM agents while preserving the appealing properties of group-based RL: critic-free, low memory, and stable convergence. GiGPO introduces a two-level structure for estimating relative advantage: (i) At the episode-level, GiGPO computes macro relative advantages based on groups of complete trajectories; (ii) At the step-level, GiGPO introduces an anchor state grouping mechanism that retroactively constructs step-level groups by identifying repeated environment states across trajectories. Actions stemming from the same state are grouped together, enabling micro relative advantage estimation. This hierarchical structure effectively captures both global trajectory quality and local step effectiveness without relying on auxiliary models or additional rollouts. We evaluate GiGPO on two challenging agent benchmarks, ALFWorld and WebShop, using Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Crucially, GiGPO delivers fine-grained per-step credit signals and achieves performance gains of > 12\% on ALFWorld and > 9\% on WebShop over the GRPO baseline: all while maintaining the same GPU memory overhead, identical LLM rollout, and incurring little to no additional time cost.

Agents are deployed in applications from trip planners and stock trading to IT incident triage. In most cases, LLM agents work autonomously with minimal rule-based safeguarding, leading to cost and safety issues from irreversible actions. Recent works resolve this either by using a safeguard agent to monitor behavior or evaluating logs post-hoc. The first adds cost and latency to every step; the second delivers its verdict after the run, when tokens are burned and damage is done. To overcome this, we propose OnTrack, a streaming monitoring mechanism that compares an agent's steps and dependencies against recorded successful runs to alert users or block the agent in about a millisecond per step. We study this problem in three regimes of decreasing access: full reference access (historical runs and tool schemas), intermediate access (only tool schemas), and no prior knowledge (only step logs as generated). Expectation of OnTrack's monitoring capabilities reduces as data access drops, ranging from plan violation detection to identifying loops, stalls, and repeated tool calls. Finally, we evaluate OnTrack using SWE-bench trajectories. Based on the first 8 steps, our method ranks failing trajectories below succeeding ones better than content similarity approaches (+0.057 AUROC). With an abort policy, we save about 18% of compute that would be burned on failing runs, where 83% of interrupted runs were actually heading to failure (5 out of 6 aborts were correct).

As LLMs increasingly impact safety-critical applications, ensuring their safety using guardrails remains a key challenge. This paper proposes GuardReasoner, a new safeguard for LLMs, by guiding the guard model to learn to reason. Concretely, we first create the GuardReasonerTrain dataset, which consists of 127K samples with 460K detailed reasoning steps. Then, we introduce reasoning SFT to unlock the reasoning capability of guard models. In addition, we present hard sample DPO to further strengthen their reasoning ability. In this manner, GuardReasoner achieves better performance, explainability, and generalizability. Extensive experiments and analyses on 13 benchmarks of 3 guardrail tasks demonstrate its superiority. Remarkably, GuardReasoner 8B surpasses GPT-4o+CoT by 5.74% and LLaMA Guard 3 8B by 20.84% F1 score on average. We release the training data, code, and models with different scales (1B, 3B, 8B) of GuardReasoner : https://github.com/yueliu1999/GuardReasoner/.

Safety guardrails serve as the last line of defense against harmful inputs and outputs of large language models (LLMs), yet they are trained and evaluated almost exclusively on short text. We present LongGuard, a framework that evaluates, mechanistically analyzes, and mitigates long-context guardrail failure. We formulate the task as Safety Needle-in-a-Haystack (SafetyNIAH) over a 0.25k-32k length grid; across 15 mainstream guardrails, unsafe recall drops monotonically by more than 50% on average, and a paired Benign-Fill vs. Needle-Repeat design attributes the failure to proportional dilution of the unsafe needle rather than to absolute length. A three-layer attention-logit-behavior analysis on six guardrails locates the mechanism: attention mass on the unsafe needle is diluted, the unsafe-over-safe logit margin is compressed in lockstep, and the detection decision collapses accordingly, with this attention->logit->behavior chain remaining consistent after partialling out length. We further isolate a sparse set of guard-specialized retrieval heads that exhibit partial specificity relative to their base models. Building on the analysis, we propose two training-free mitigations - Chunked Detection (CD) and Attention-Head Sharpening (AHS) - and a deployment protocol, Context-Aware Hyperparameter Routing (CAHR), that selects configurations by context length and audit side. Across five benchmarks spanning synthetic data, long-context attacks, and reasoning-model outputs, CAHR-CD and CAHR-AHS improve the six-guardrail average by 22% and 13%, respectively. Code and data are available online.

Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as a promising alternative to autoregressive (AR) models, offering parallel decoding and controllable sampling dynamics while achieving competitive generation quality at scale. Despite this progress, the role of sampling mechanisms in shaping refusal behavior and jailbreak robustness remains poorly understood. In this work, we present a fundamental analytical framework for step-wise refusal dynamics, enabling comparison between AR and diffusion sampling. Our analysis reveals that the sampling strategy itself plays a central role in safety behavior, as a factor distinct from the underlying learned representations. Motivated by this analysis, we introduce the Step-Wise Refusal Internal Dynamics (SRI) signal, which supports interpretability and improved safety for both AR and DLMs. We demonstrate that the geometric structure of SRI captures internal recovery dynamics, and identifies anomalous behavior in harmful generations as cases of incomplete internal recovery that are not observable at the text level. This structure enables lightweight inference-time detectors that generalize to unseen attacks while matching or outperforming existing defenses with over 100times lower inference overhead.

As AI coding agents become more autonomous, they increasingly ship code iteratively, with the codebase persisting across sessions. This persistence creates a new attack surface: a misaligned or prompt-injected agent can distribute attacks across pull requests (PRs) and time its payload for the PR with the best natural cover. To study the resulting dynamics, we introduce Iterative VibeCoding, a setting for AI control, the study of safely deploying capable but potentially untrusted AI. In Iterative VibeCoding, a coding agent builds software over a sequence of PRs in a persistent codebase while pursuing a covert side task. Our benchmark includes two task families: CLI tools and Flask web services, across 20 total task variations. We use Claude Sonnet 4.5 as the attack agent and GPT-4o as the monitor. We compare gradual attacks, which distribute the side task across PRs, against non-gradual attacks concentrated in a single PR. No single monitor is robust to both: which strategy evades best (success while evading the monitor) depends on the monitor type, so a defender cannot close off both gradual and non-gradual attacks with any one monitor. High evasion (>= 65%) generalizes across model attack agent backends (Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Kimi K2.5), confirming this is a property of the persistent-state attack surface rather than a single model's capability. Evasion also remains high across state-of-the-art monitor models and the gap between gradual and non-gradual evasion widens for more capable models. We introduce a stateful link-tracker monitor that tracks suspicious buildup across PRs. On both task families, it detects gradual attacks substantially better than diff monitors that merely see more accumulated history. Combining this stronger monitor with trajectory monitors in a four-monitor ensemble reduces gradual-attack evasion from 93% under the weakest standard diff monitor to 47%.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by allocating substantial computation at inference time, often generating long and verbose reasoning traces. While recent work on efficient reasoning reduces this overhead through length-based rewards or pruning, many approaches are post-trained under a much shorter context window than base-model training, a factor whose effect has not been systematically isolated. We first show that short-context post-training alone, using standard GRPO without any length-aware objective, already induces substantial reasoning compression-but at the cost of increasingly unstable training dynamics and accuracy degradation. To address this, we propose Step-level Advantage Selection (SAS), which operates at the reasoning-step level and assigns a zero advantage to low-confidence steps in correct rollouts and to high-confidence steps in verifier-failed rollouts, where failures often arise from truncation or verifier issues rather than incorrect reasoning. Across diverse mathematical and general reasoning benchmarks, SAS improves average Pass@1 accuracy by 0.86 points over the strongest length-aware baseline while reducing average reasoning length by 16.3%, yielding a better accuracy-efficiency trade-off.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Natural-language robot instructions often specify more than a coarse task goal: they may impose spatial, temporal, and logical requirements that must remain satisfied throughout execution. We present STeP, a specification-based agentic framework that uses Signal Temporal Logic (STL) as an explicit interface between high-level language reasoning and low-level robot execution. Rather than encoding such requirements implicitly in a learned policy, STeP formalizes them as task specifications that can be decomposed across multi-stage manipulation, enforced during execution, monitored online, and used as structured feedback for replanning. We evaluate STeP on standard LIBERO and LIBERO-PRO, and introduce LIBERO-Constrained, a new benchmark for manipulation tasks with spatial, temporal, and logical requirements, together with real-world tabletop experiments. On LIBERO-PRO, STeP retains 54%-89% success across five of six evaluated perturbation settings, substantially outperforming VLA and code-as-policy baselines under distribution shift. On LIBERO-Constrained, STeP achieves 80% safe success across 49 task-constraint instances; on real-world tasks, it improves safe success over a specification-free model-based baseline across all four task categories, with gains of up to 45 percentage points. These results support explicit formal specifications as a practical interface between foundation-model reasoning and reliable robot execution.

Large foundation models are integrated into Computer Use Agents (CUAs), enabling autonomous interaction with operating systems through graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to perform complex tasks. This autonomy introduces serious security risks: malicious instructions or visual prompt injections can trigger unsafe reasoning and cause harmful system-level actions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based blocking, prevent damage but often abort tasks prematurely, reducing agent utility. In this paper, we present MirrorGuard, a plug-and-play defense framework that uses simulation-based training to improve CUA security in the real world. To reduce the cost of large-scale training in operating systems, we propose a novel neural-symbolic simulation pipeline, which generates realistic, high-risk GUI interaction trajectories entirely in a text-based simulated environment, which captures unsafe reasoning patterns and potential system hazards without executing real operations. In the simulation environment, MirrorGuard learns to intercept and rectify insecure reasoning chains of CUAs before they produce and execute unsafe actions. In real-world testing, extensive evaluations across diverse benchmarks and CUA architectures show that MirrorGuard significantly mitigates security risks. For instance, on the ByteDance UI-TARS system, it reduces the unsafe rate from 66.5% to 13.0% while maintaining a marginal false refusal rate (FRR). In contrast, the state-of-the-art GuardAgent only achieves a reduction to 53.9% and suffers from a 15.4% higher FRR. Our work proves that simulation-derived defenses can provide robust, real-world protection while maintaining the fundamental utility of the agent. Our code and model are publicly available at https://bmz-q-q.github.io/MirrorGuard/.

Step-level reward models (SRMs) can significantly enhance mathematical reasoning performance through process supervision or step-level preference alignment based on reinforcement learning. The performance of SRMs is pivotal, as they serve as critical guidelines, ensuring that each step in the reasoning process is aligned with desired outcomes. Recently, AlphaZero-like methods, where Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is employed for automatic step-level preference annotation, have proven particularly effective. However, the precise mechanisms behind the success of SRMs remain largely unexplored. To address this gap, this study delves into the counterintuitive aspects of SRMs, particularly focusing on MCTS-based approaches. Our findings reveal that the removal of natural language descriptions of thought processes has minimal impact on the efficacy of SRMs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that SRMs are adept at assessing the complex logical coherence present in mathematical language while having difficulty in natural language. These insights provide a nuanced understanding of the core elements that drive effective step-level reward modeling in mathematical reasoning. By shedding light on these mechanisms, this study offers valuable guidance for developing more efficient and streamlined SRMs, which can be achieved by focusing on the crucial parts of mathematical reasoning.

With the rise of generative AI and rapid growth of high-quality video generation, video guardrails have become more crucial than ever to ensure safety and security across platforms. Current video guardrails, however, are either overly simplistic, relying on pure classification models trained on simple policies with limited unsafe categories, which lack detailed explanations, or prompting multimodal large language models (MLLMs) with long safety guidelines, which are inefficient and impractical for guardrailing real-world content. To bridge this gap, we propose SafeWatch, an efficient MLLM-based video guardrail model designed to follow customized safety policies and provide multi-label video guardrail outputs with content-specific explanations in a zero-shot manner. In particular, unlike traditional MLLM-based guardrails that encode all safety policies autoregressively, causing inefficiency and bias, SafeWatch uniquely encodes each policy chunk in parallel and eliminates their position bias such that all policies are attended simultaneously with equal importance. In addition, to improve efficiency and accuracy, SafeWatch incorporates a policy-aware visual token pruning algorithm that adaptively selects the most relevant video tokens for each policy, discarding noisy or irrelevant information. This allows for more focused, policy-compliant guardrail with significantly reduced computational overhead. Considering the limitations of existing video guardrail benchmarks, we propose SafeWatch-Bench, a large-scale video guardrail benchmark comprising over 2M videos spanning six safety categories which covers over 30 tasks to ensure a comprehensive coverage of all potential safety scenarios. SafeWatch outperforms SOTA by 28.2% on SafeWatch-Bench, 13.6% on benchmarks, cuts costs by 10%, and delivers top-tier explanations validated by LLM and human reviews.

Simulating step-wise human behavior with Large Language Models (LLMs) has become an emerging research direction, enabling applications in various practical domains. While prior methods, including prompting, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and reinforcement learning (RL), have shown promise in modeling step-wise behavior, they primarily learn a population-level policy without conditioning on a user's persona, yielding generic rather than personalized simulations. In this work, we pose a critical question: how can LLM agents better simulate personalized user behavior? We introduce Customer-R1, an RL-based method for personalized, step-wise user behavior simulation in online shopping environments. Our policy is conditioned on an explicit persona, and we optimize next-step rationale and action generation via action correctness reward signals. Experiments on the OPeRA dataset emonstrate that Customer-R1 not only significantly outperforms prompting and SFT-based baselines in next-action prediction tasks, but also better matches users' action distribution, indicating higher fidelity in personalized behavior simulation.

Large language models deployed in open-world applications require safety guardrails that are both robust to complex risks and efficient enough for low-latency runtime moderation. Existing guardrails face a practical trade-off between lightweight classification-based models, which are efficient but often struggle with concealed intent, ambiguous semantics, and borderline safety decisions, and reasoning-based guards, which improve judgment quality but introduce additional token generation and inference latency. We present DT-Guard, a content safety guardrail model based on a Reasoning-Active Training, Reasoning-Free Inference paradigm. The key idea is to use reasoning supervision during training while emitting only structured safety labels at inference time. DT-Guard formulates safety judgment as a progressive decision process, Intent - Category - Safety, and constructs an intent-driven dataset with intent labels, risk categories, safety labels, and structured reasoning trajectories. To further improve hard-case robustness, we propose Rollout-Guided Progressive Hard-Case Optimization (RG-PHO), which uses multi-rollout consistency to identify stably mastered, persistently failed, and preference-unstable samples, and applies targeted supervised and preference optimization accordingly. At inference time, DT-Guard directly generates structured labels without explicit reasoning traces, preserving deployment efficiency. Experiments on prompt-side and response-side safety benchmarks show that DT-Guard achieves average F1 scores of 0.886 and 0.870, respectively. With only a 4B backbone, it reaches a dual-side average F1 of 0.878, outperforming strong 8B guardrail baselines. These results demonstrate that reasoning supervision can be effectively internalized into low-latency safety discrimination.

Despite having powerful reasoning and inference capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) still need external tools to acquire real-time information retrieval or domain-specific expertise to solve complex tasks, which is referred to as tool learning. Existing tool learning methods primarily rely on tuning with expert trajectories, focusing on token-sequence learning from a linguistic perspective. However, there are several challenges: 1) imitating static trajectories limits their ability to generalize to new tasks. 2) even expert trajectories can be suboptimal, and better solution paths may exist. In this work, we introduce StepTool, a novel step-grained reinforcement learning framework to improve tool learning in LLMs. It consists of two components: Step-grained Reward Shaping, which assigns rewards at each tool interaction based on tool invocation success and its contribution to the task, and Step-grained Optimization, which uses policy gradient methods to optimize the model in a multi-step manner. Experimental results demonstrate that StepTool significantly outperforms existing methods in multi-step, tool-based tasks, providing a robust solution for complex task environments. Codes are available at https://github.com/yuyq18/StepTool.

In this paper we investigate learning visual models for the steps of ordinary tasks using weak supervision via instructional narrations and an ordered list of steps instead of strong supervision via temporal annotations. At the heart of our approach is the observation that weakly supervised learning may be easier if a model shares components while learning different steps: `pour egg' should be trained jointly with other tasks involving `pour' and `egg'. We formalize this in a component model for recognizing steps and a weakly supervised learning framework that can learn this model under temporal constraints from narration and the list of steps. Past data does not permit systematic studying of sharing and so we also gather a new dataset, CrossTask, aimed at assessing cross-task sharing. Our experiments demonstrate that sharing across tasks improves performance, especially when done at the component level and that our component model can parse previously unseen tasks by virtue of its compositionality.

Perceptive locomotion policies typically observe a dense robot-centric elevation map, although only the terrain beneath and around the next footsteps informs the control decision. Learned encoders compress the whole visual input, leaving the policy to work out which inputs matter while learning the baseline locomotion task. Learning both at once slows training and, without computationally expensive attention mechanisms, makes generalization to new terrain harder. We instead remove redundant inputs from the elevation map before the policy sees it. A lightweight foothold prediction model (FPM) predicts future footholds from proprioception and the velocity command alone, and we sample the elevation map only in small patches around these predicted footholds. We train the prediction model alongside the locomotion policy, periodically retraining it on new policy rollouts as the robot's gait matures. This allows the perception to anticipate where the policy will step, while the policy learns to leverage terrain information around those steps. With the proposed lightweight preprocessing, the policy reaches a given terrain difficulty in roughly a third of the training iterations required with the complete map. It outperforms policies that observe the complete map where footholds are sparse, including in narrow walled corridors, and on unseen terrain, and it matches an attention-based encoder trained at several times the cost. The policy transfers zero-shot to a Unitree G1 humanoid traversing various obstacles, stairs, gaps, and step-downs beyond the training distribution in both indoor and outdoor environments.

Enterprise agents face safety risks that cannot be determined from individual actions alone. Existing safety benchmarks largely evaluate action-local risks, overlooking failures whose safety depends on workflow state. In such state-dependent risks, the same action may be safe in one context but violate policy in another. Hence, we introduce LatentRiskBench for evaluating such state-dependent risks in enterprise settings. It pairs risky trajectories with benign counterparts that share the same terminal action but differ in latent policy-relevant states, requiring models to reconstruct workflow context rather than rely on action-level cues. We also introduce new metrics for state-dependent risk evaluation, including a suite of residual risk (RR) measures. Experiments on the benchmark show that action-level evaluation detects only 0.09 of state-dependent violations, whereas state-level evaluation reaches 0.96. Existing guardrail methods largely overlook such risks unless they are explicitly applied to workflow states. Case studies on a commercial deployed scenario further show that the safety metrics embedded in the benchmark provide a more realistic measure of safety for enterprise agents. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/JingyueCong/LatentRiskBench.

Reinforcement learning enables large language model (LLM) agents to learn multi-step behaviors through interaction with their environments. However, rewards in many interactive tasks reflect only the final outcome, providing limited guidance on which intermediate decisions advance the task. Successful training trajectories contain intermediate states that can provide supervision for subsequent interactions. We introduce Trajectory-to-Step Policy Optimization (T2SPO), a method that uses past interaction trajectories to provide step-level feedback for policy learning. T2SPO derives remaining-distance targets from successful trajectories and pairs them with representations of the states visited along the way. Conditioned on these examples, a pretrained TabPFN regressor estimates the remaining distance to success at each state of a new rollout. Changes in this distance estimate across consecutive states yield auxiliary credit for agent steps alongside task-level supervision. As training proceeds, newly completed trajectories refresh the estimator's context, incorporating new experience without updating its parameters. Experiments with 1.5B and 7B language models on ALFWorld and WebShop show that T2SPO consistently improves overall task success over GRPO.

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant security threat to LLM-integrated applications. Model-level defenses have shown strong effectiveness, but are currently deployed into commercial-grade models in a closed-source manner. We believe open-source models are needed by the AI security community, where co-development of attacks and defenses through open research drives scientific progress in mitigation against prompt injection attacks. To this end, we develop Meta SecAlign, the first open-source and open-weight LLM with built-in model-level defense that achieves commercial-grade model performance. We provide complete details of our training recipe, which utilizes an improved version of the SOTA SecAlign defense. Evaluations on 9 utility benchmarks and 7 security benchmarks show that Meta SecAlign, despite being trained on a generic instruction-tuning dataset, confers security in unseen downstream tasks, including tool-calling and agentic web navigation, in addition general instruction-following. Our best model -- Meta-SecAlign-70B -- achieves state-of-the-art robustness against prompt injection attacks and comparable utility to closed-source commercial LLM with model-level defense.

Ensuring the safety of LLM-generated content is essential for real-world deployment. Most existing guardrail models formulate moderation as a fixed binary classification task, implicitly assuming a fixed definition of harmfulness. In practice, enforcement strictness - how conservatively harmfulness is defined and enforced - varies across platforms and evolves over time, making binary moderators brittle under shifting requirements. We first introduce FlexBench, a strictness-adaptive LLM moderation benchmark that enables controlled evaluation under multiple strictness regimes. Experiments on FlexBench reveal substantial cross-strictness inconsistency in existing moderators: models that perform well under one regime can degrade substantially under others, limiting their practical usability. To address this, we propose FlexGuard, an LLM-based moderator that outputs a calibrated continuous risk score reflecting risk severity and supports strictness-specific decisions via thresholding. We train FlexGuard via risk-alignment optimization to improve score-severity consistency and provide practical threshold selection strategies to adapt to target strictness at deployment. Experiments on FlexBench and public benchmarks demonstrate that FlexGuard achieves higher moderation accuracy and substantially improved robustness under varying strictness. We release the source code and data to support reproducibility.

State Space Models (SSMs) such as Mamba achieve linear-time sequence processing through input-dependent recurrence, but this mechanism introduces a critical safety vulnerability. We show that the spectral radius rho(A-bar) of the discretized transition operator governs effective memory horizon: when an adversary drives rho toward zero through gradient-based Hidden State Poisoning, memory collapses from millions of tokens to mere dozens, silently destroying reasoning capacity without triggering output-level alarms. We prove an Evasion Existence Theorem showing that for any output-only defense, adversarial inputs exist that simultaneously induce spectral collapse and evade detection, then introduce SpectralGuard, a real-time monitor that tracks spectral stability across all model layers. SpectralGuard achieves F1=0.961 against non-adaptive attackers and retains F1=0.842 under the strongest adaptive setting, with sub-15ms per-token latency. Causal interventions and cross-architecture transfer to hybrid SSM-Attention systems confirm that spectral monitoring provides a principled, deployable safety layer for recurrent foundation models.

In real-world applications, guardrails are often expected to identify unsafe user-model interactions according to application-specific safety policies, rather than relying on predefined risk taxonomies. In this work, we study this setting under the paradigm of in-context policy guardrailing, where guardrails predict safety violations based on policy specifications provided in context. To systematically evaluate this capability, we introduce SafePyramid, a safety benchmark comprising 1,000 multi-turn conversations across 10 domains and 3,000 corresponding application-specific policies, which together contain 61,699 distinct natural-language rules. SafePyramid organizes the evaluation into three difficulty levels: L0 evaluates individual-rule understanding, L1 evaluates reasoning over rule dependencies, and L2 evaluates adaptation of full novel policy frameworks defined in context. To ensure benchmark quality, we employ a rigorous multi-stage pipeline to construct and validate the benchmark. Using SafePyramid, we evaluate 10 frontier LLMs and 5 policy-configurable guardrails and find that in-context policy guardrailing remains highly challenging: even the best-performing model, GPT-5.5, exactly identifies the full set of violated rules in only 54.0%, 35.3%, and 12.9% cases on L0, L1, and L2, respectively. These results highlight the limitations of current guardrails and call for stronger in-context policy guardrails that can reliably execute policies, resolve rule dependencies, and adapt to novel policy frameworks.

Autonomous web agents need to operate under externally imposed or human-specified policies while generating long-horizon trajectories. However, little work has examined whether these trajectories comply with such policies, or whether policy violations persist across different contexts such as domains (e.g., shopping or coding websites) and subdomains (e.g., product search and order management in shopping). To address this gap, we introduce PolicyGuardBench, a benchmark of about 60k examples for detecting policy violations in agent trajectories. From diverse agent runs, we generate a broad set of policies and create both within subdomain and cross subdomain pairings with violation labels. In addition to full-trajectory evaluation, PolicyGuardBench also includes a prefix-based violation detection task where models must anticipate policy violations from truncated trajectory prefixes rather than complete sequences. Using this dataset, we train PolicyGuard-4B, a lightweight guardrail model that delivers strong detection accuracy across all tasks while keeping inference efficient. Notably, PolicyGuard-4B generalizes across domains and preserves high accuracy on unseen settings. Together, PolicyGuardBench and PolicyGuard-4B provide the first comprehensive framework for studying policy compliance in web agent trajectories, and show that accurate and generalizable guardrails are feasible at small scales.

Search-augmented reasoning agents interleave internal reasoning with calls to an external retriever, and their performance relies on the quality of each issued query. However, under outcome-reward reinforcement learning, every search decision in a rollout shares the same trajectory-level reward, leaving individual queries without step-specific credit. Recent process-supervision approaches address this gap by drawing step-level signals from outside the policy, relying either on a much larger teacher model, or on sub-question annotations produced by a stronger external system. In contrast, we propose SD-Search, which derives step-level supervision from the policy itself through on-policy hindsight self-distillation, requiring neither an external teacher nor additional annotations. In SD-Search, a single model plays two roles that differ only in conditioning: a student that sees only the context available at inference time, and a teacher that additionally conditions on a compact hindsight block summarizing the search queries and final outcomes of a group of rollouts sampled from the same question. Since the teacher knows how each rollout unfolded and which ones succeeded, its query distribution implicitly marks which decisions were worth making, and the student is trained to recover this behavior by minimizing the token-level Jensen--Shannon divergence to the teacher at search-query positions. This layers a dense, step-level signal on top of GRPO's coarse trajectory reward. Crucially, this signal is produced by the policy itself within the standard RL training loop, without external model inference, auxiliary annotation pipeline, or additional training stage.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved from simple chatbots into autonomous agents capable of performing complex tasks such as editing production code, orchestrating workflows, and taking higher-stakes actions based on untrusted inputs like webpages and emails. These capabilities introduce new security risks that existing security measures, such as model fine-tuning or chatbot-focused guardrails, do not fully address. Given the higher stakes and the absence of deterministic solutions to mitigate these risks, there is a critical need for a real-time guardrail monitor to serve as a final layer of defense, and support system level, use case specific safety policy definition and enforcement. We introduce LlamaFirewall, an open-source security focused guardrail framework designed to serve as a final layer of defense against security risks associated with AI Agents. Our framework mitigates risks such as prompt injection, agent misalignment, and insecure code risks through three powerful guardrails: PromptGuard 2, a universal jailbreak detector that demonstrates clear state of the art performance; Agent Alignment Checks, a chain-of-thought auditor that inspects agent reasoning for prompt injection and goal misalignment, which, while still experimental, shows stronger efficacy at preventing indirect injections in general scenarios than previously proposed approaches; and CodeShield, an online static analysis engine that is both fast and extensible, aimed at preventing the generation of insecure or dangerous code by coding agents. Additionally, we include easy-to-use customizable scanners that make it possible for any developer who can write a regular expression or an LLM prompt to quickly update an agent's security guardrails.

Large reasoning models that use long chain-of-thought excel at problem-solving yet waste compute on redundant checks. Curbing this overthinking is hard: training-time length penalties can cripple ability, while inference-time early-exit adds system overhead. To bridge this gap, we propose Step-GRPO, a novel post-training framework that internalizes dynamic early-exit capabilities directly into the model. Step-GRPO shifts the optimization objective from raw tokens to semantic steps by utilizing linguistic markers to structure reasoning. We introduce a Dynamic Truncated Rollout mechanism that exposes the model to concise high-confidence trajectories during exploration, synergized with a Step-Aware Relative Reward that dynamically penalizes redundancy based on group-level baselines. Extensive experiments across three model sizes on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that Step-GRPO achieves a superior accuracy-efficiency trade-off. On Qwen3-8B, our method reduces token consumption by 32.0\% compared to the vanilla model while avoiding the accuracy degradation observed in traditional length-penalty methods.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) empower embodied agents to execute complex instructions, yet they remain vulnerable to contextual safety risks where benign commands become hazardous due to subtle environmental states. Existing safeguards often prove inadequate. Rule-based methods lack scalability in object-dense scenes, whereas model-based approaches relying on prompt engineering suffer from unfocused perception, resulting in missed risks or hallucinations. To address this, we propose an architecture-agnostic safeguard featuring Context-Guided Chain-of-Thought (CG-CoT). This mechanism decomposes risk assessment into active perception that sequentially anchors attention to interaction targets and relevant spatial neighborhoods, followed by semantic judgment based on this visual evidence. We support this approach with a curated grounding dataset and a two-stage training strategy utilizing Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (RFT) with process rewards to enforce precise intermediate grounding. Experiments demonstrate that our model HomeGuard significantly enhances safety, improving risk match rates by over 30% compared to base models while reducing oversafety. Beyond hazard detection, the generated visual anchors serve as actionable spatial constraints for downstream planners, facilitating explicit collision avoidance and safety trajectory generation. Code and data are released under https://github.com/AI45Lab/HomeGuard

Guardrails are a critical safety layer for modern AI systems, but their operating regime is changing. As LLMs are deployed as customized assistants, safety policies are increasingly specified at inference time by users, organizations, or regulatory contexts. This makes safety enforcement fundamentally dynamic: the guardrail should adapt to changing safety policies without retraining. Yet this requirement creates a fundamental tension: faithfully judging complex policy contexts demands reasoning capability, while practical deployment requires low-latency responses. We introduce Latent Policy Guardrail (LPG), a guardrail framework that learnssemantic latent deliberation over dynamic policies. LPG compresses the internal deliberation needed for intent interpretation and policy grounding into continuous states supervised by decision-relevant semantics. At inference time, it generates only a compact verdict anchored to the violated policy clauses, preserving auditability while avoiding the latency of explicit reasoning. Across policy guardrail benchmarks, LPG-4B reaches 84.5% average safety accuracy and 77.9% F1 by compressing deliberation into just 10 latent tokens, outperforming the strongest dynamic baseline while running roughly 11 times faster than Qwen3-4B-Thinking under the single-sample evaluation setup. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/Latent_Policy_Guard.

We propose a lightweight explainable guardrail (LEG) method for the classification of unsafe prompts. LEG uses a multi-task learning architecture to jointly learn a prompt classifier and an explanation classifier, where the latter labels prompt words that explain the safe/unsafe overall decision. LEG is trained using synthetic data for explainability, which is generated using a novel strategy that counteracts the confirmation biases of LLMs. Lastly, LEG's training process uses a novel loss that captures global explanation signals and combines cross-entropy and focal losses with uncertainty-based weighting. LEG obtains equivalent or better performance than the state-of-the-art for both prompt classification and explainability, both in-domain and out-of-domain on three datasets, despite the fact that its model size is considerably smaller than current approaches. If accepted, we will release all models and the annotated dataset publicly.

As AI agents move from chat interfaces to systems that read private data, call tools, and execute multi-step workflows, guardrails become a last line of defense against concrete deployment harms. In these settings, guardrail failures are no longer merely answer-quality errors: they can leak secrets, authorize unsafe actions, or block legitimate work. The hardest failures are often contextual: whether an action is acceptable depends on local privacy norms, organizational policies, and user expectations that resist pre-deployment specification. This creates a practical gap: guardrails must adapt to their own operating environments, yet deployment feedback is typically limited to sparse, noisy user-reported failures, and repeated fine-tuning is often impractical. To address this gap, we propose LiSA (Lifelong Safety Adaptation), a conservative policy induction framework that improves a fixed base guardrail through structured memory. LiSA converts occasional failures into reusable policy abstractions so that sparse reports can generalize beyond individual cases, adds conflict-aware local rules to prevent overgeneralization in mixed-label contexts, and applies evidence-aware confidence gating via a posterior lower bound, so that memory reuse scales with accumulated evidence rather than empirical accuracy alone. Across PrivacyLens+, ConFaide+, and AgentHarm, LiSA consistently outperforms strong memory-based baselines under sparse feedback, remains robust under noisy user feedback even at 20% label-flip rates, and pushes the latency--performance frontier beyond backbone model scaling. Ultimately, LiSA offers a practical path to secure AI agents against the unpredictable long tail of real-world edge risks.

Reasoning from sequences of raw sensory data is a ubiquitous problem across fields ranging from medical devices to robotics. These problems often involve using long sequences of raw sensor data (e.g. magnetometers, piezoresistors) to predict sequences of desirable physical quantities (e.g. force, inertial measurements). While classical approaches are powerful for locally-linear prediction problems, they often fall short when using real-world sensors. These sensors are typically non-linear, are affected by extraneous variables (e.g. vibration), and exhibit data-dependent drift. For many problems, the prediction task is exacerbated by small labeled datasets since obtaining ground-truth labels requires expensive equipment. In this work, we present Hierarchical State-Space Models (HiSS), a conceptually simple, new technique for continuous sequential prediction. HiSS stacks structured state-space models on top of each other to create a temporal hierarchy. Across six real-world sensor datasets, from tactile-based state prediction to accelerometer-based inertial measurement, HiSS outperforms state-of-the-art sequence models such as causal Transformers, LSTMs, S4, and Mamba by at least 23% on MSE. Our experiments further indicate that HiSS demonstrates efficient scaling to smaller datasets and is compatible with existing data-filtering techniques. Code, datasets and videos can be found on https://hiss-csp.github.io.

Scams exploiting real-time social engineering -- such as phishing, impersonation, and phone fraud -- remain a persistent and evolving threat across digital platforms. Existing defenses are largely reactive, offering limited protection during active interactions. We propose a privacy-preserving, AI-in-the-loop framework that proactively detects and disrupts scam conversations in real time. The system combines instruction-tuned artificial intelligence with a safety-aware utility function that balances engagement with harm minimization, and employs federated learning to enable continual model updates without raw data sharing. Experimental evaluations show that the system produces fluent and engaging responses (perplexity as low as 22.3, engagement approx0.80), while human studies confirm significant gains in realism, safety, and effectiveness over strong baselines. In federated settings, models trained with FedAvg sustain up to 30 rounds while preserving high engagement (approx0.80), strong relevance (approx0.74), and low PII leakage (leq0.0085). Even with differential privacy, novelty and safety remain stable, indicating that robust privacy can be achieved without sacrificing performance. The evaluation of guard models (LlamaGuard, LlamaGuard2/3, MD-Judge) shows a straightforward pattern: stricter moderation settings reduce the chance of exposing personal information, but they also limit how much the model engages in conversation. In contrast, more relaxed settings allow longer and richer interactions, which improve scam detection, but at the cost of higher privacy risk. To our knowledge, this is the first framework to unify real-time scam-baiting, federated privacy preservation, and calibrated safety moderation into a proactive defense paradigm.

The rapid development of autonomous web agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), while greatly elevating efficiency, exposes the frontier risk of taking unintended or harmful actions. This situation underscores an urgent need for effective safety measures, akin to access controls for human users. To address this critical challenge, we introduce WebGuard, the first comprehensive dataset designed to support the assessment of web agent action risks and facilitate the development of guardrails for real-world online environments. In doing so, WebGuard specifically focuses on predicting the outcome of state-changing actions and contains 4,939 human-annotated actions from 193 websites across 22 diverse domains, including often-overlooked long-tail websites. These actions are categorized using a novel three-tier risk schema: SAFE, LOW, and HIGH. The dataset includes designated training and test splits to support evaluation under diverse generalization settings. Our initial evaluations reveal a concerning deficiency: even frontier LLMs achieve less than 60% accuracy in predicting action outcomes and less than 60% recall in lagging HIGH-risk actions, highlighting the risks of deploying current-generation agents without dedicated safeguards. We therefore investigate fine-tuning specialized guardrail models using WebGuard. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple generalization settings and find that a fine-tuned Qwen2.5VL-7B model yields a substantial improvement in performance, boosting accuracy from 37% to 80% and HIGH-risk action recall from 20% to 76%. Despite these improvements, the performance still falls short of the reliability required for high-stakes deployment, where guardrails must approach near-perfect accuracy and recall.

Building robust safety guardrails is essential for deploying Large Language Models across diverse real-world applications. However, this goal remains challenging because safety risks span heterogeneous threat domains, while existing datasets cover only fragmented risk subsets and rely on inconsistent taxonomies. Consequently, it remains unclear whether current guardrails can generalize beyond narrow evaluation settings. To better understand the robustness of guardrail models, we first introduce GuardZoo, a unified human-annotated benchmark with 32,460 samples covering 15 distinct unsafe categories. Evaluation on GuardZoo reveals that monolithic guardrails suffer from task interference: different threat domains require distinct decision boundaries that are difficult to compress into a single model. We therefore propose RouteGuard, a router-expert framework that triages each conversation to specialized expert guardrails for threat-specific detection. Experiments show that RouteGuard improves fine-grained threat detection over strong guardrail baselines, generalizes better under out-of-domain evaluation, and supports flexible modular expansion to emerging threats.

Group-based Reinforcement Learning (RL) has significantly enhanced Large Language Models (LLMs) in agentic scenarios. To achieve finer-grained policy updates, recent agentic RL frameworks have shifted from trajectory-level to step-level training. However, long-horizon agentic RL suffers from severe reward sparsity and delay, as feedback is often deferred for dozens of interaction steps. While existing step-level frameworks refine training granularity, their credit assignment remains coarse-grained and still treats agent exploration as isolated, linear trajectories. This oversimplified perspective ignores the inherent graph structure of state transitions, leading to high-variance state-value estimation and myopic, localized credit assignment. To overcome these critical bottlenecks, we propose Group-Graph Policy Optimization (G2PO), a novel group-based RL algorithm tailored for multi-turn agentic tasks. G2PO explicitly transforms linear interaction trajectories into a global state-transition graph. By aggregating identical observations across different trajectories, we introduce group-aggregation state-value estimation that reduces sampling variance and trajectory-dependent bias. Furthermore, we redefine agent actions as transitions between state nodes and propose an edge-centric advantage estimation strategy. By globally standardizing Temporal Difference (TD) errors across the entire graph, G2PO explicitly identifies and prioritizes critical transitions that drive absolute task progress. Extensive experiments on representative long-horizon benchmarks-WebShop, ALFWorld, and AppWorld-demonstrate that G2PO substantially outperforms state-of-the-art prompt-based and RL baselines, achieving remarkable success rate improvements of up to 22.2% over GRPO.

As large language model agents increasingly operate autonomously with access to tools and external environments, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior becomes critical. We present GuardianAgentBench (GABench), a benchmark of 580 scenarios across six domains evaluated on three production-ready frameworks: LangChain, LlamaIndex, and Vectara. The benchmark incorporates rigorous multi-stage validation and five adversarial attack modes. Experiments with six state-of-the-art models reveal that even the strongest configuration achieves only 74.8% overall accuracy and expose two distinct failure regimes: stronger models under-call required tools, while weaker models mis-select and over-call tools. Performance degrades monotonically with both tool-set size and sequential turn depth, with long-horizon planning proving the steeper bottleneck. Our guardrail implementation consistently outperforms system-prompt-based defenses across all models, recovering 19.9% of failures at a false positive rate of just 0.5%. These results demonstrate that execution-time structural intervention improves safety without disrupting correct agent behavior.

Malicious content generated from large language models (LLMs) could pose severe safety risks and ethical concerns. While existing LLM safety guardrails excel in English or multilingual settings, they lack adaptation to Chinese-specific regulatory policies, cultural context, and linguistic nuances, failing to support fine-grained risk classification for diverse deployment needs. In this paper, we introduce a 5-macro, 31-micro category fine-grained risk taxonomy for Chinese scenarios, and build CHILLGuard: a dedicated Chinese LLM content safety guardrail. To address the critical scarcity of high-quality annotated Chinese safety data, we propose a scalable multi-stage data construction pipeline: we expand multi-source corpus via retrieval-augmented generation, generate implicit harmful samples through prompt engineering rewriting, and refine high-quality data via multi-model voting-based label calibration. Based on this, we build CHILLGuardTrain, a large-scale training set with 405,007 samples, and CHILLGuardTest, a rigorously curated annotated test set with 51,745 samples. We then train CHILLGuard on CHILLGuardTrain under a generator-classifier collaborative framework via Model-aware Direct Preference Optimization. Extensive experiments under multiple settings demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of CHILLGuard, e.g., a 15.92% relative improvement of F1 score over Qwen3Guard-8B-Strict on our benchmark. We release our resources at https://github.com/cswbyu/CHILLGuard.

The rapid evolution of generative models has led to a continuous emergence of multimodal safety risks, exposing the limitations of existing defense methods. To address these challenges, we propose ProGuard, a vision-language proactive guard that identifies and describes out-of-distribution (OOD) safety risks without the need for model adjustments required by traditional reactive approaches. We first construct a modality-balanced dataset of 87K samples, each annotated with both binary safety labels and risk categories under a hierarchical multimodal safety taxonomy, effectively mitigating modality bias and ensuring consistent moderation across text, image, and text-image inputs. Based on this dataset, we train our vision-language base model purely through reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve efficient and concise reasoning. To approximate proactive safety scenarios in a controlled setting, we further introduce an OOD safety category inference task and augment the RL objective with a synonym-bank-based similarity reward that encourages the model to generate concise descriptions for unseen unsafe categories. Experimental results show that ProGuard achieves performance comparable to closed-source large models on binary safety classification, substantially outperforms existing open-source guard models on unsafe content categorization. Most notably, ProGuard delivers a strong proactive moderation ability, improving OOD risk detection by 52.6% and OOD risk description by 64.8%.

LLM-based multi-agent systems excel at planning, tool use, and role coordination, but their openness and interaction complexity also expose them to jailbreak, prompt-injection, and adversarial collaboration. Existing defenses fall into two lines: (i) self-verification that asks each agent to pre-filter unsafe instructions before execution, and (ii) external guard modules that police behaviors. The former often underperforms because a standalone agent lacks sufficient capacity to detect cross-agent unsafe chains and delegation-induced risks; the latter increases system overhead and creates a single-point-of-failure-once compromised, system-wide safety collapses, and adding more guards worsens cost and complexity. To solve these challenges, we propose AdvEvo-MARL, a co-evolutionary multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that internalizes safety into task agents. Rather than relying on external guards, AdvEvo-MARL jointly optimizes attackers (which synthesize evolving jailbreak prompts) and defenders (task agents trained to both accomplish their duties and resist attacks) in adversarial learning environments. To stabilize learning and foster cooperation, we introduce a public baseline for advantage estimation: agents within the same functional group share a group-level mean-return baseline, enabling lower-variance updates and stronger intra-group coordination. Across representative attack scenarios, AdvEvo-MARL consistently keeps attack-success rate (ASR) below 20%, whereas baselines reach up to 38.33%, while preserving-and sometimes improving-task accuracy (up to +3.67% on reasoning tasks). These results show that safety and utility can be jointly improved without relying on extra guard agents or added system overhead.

Production LLM systems require both safety moderation and PII detection under strict latency and cost constraints. This creates a trade-off: autoregressive moderators are accurate but expensive, while lightweight encoders are faster but less capable. We present GLiNER Guard (GLiGuard), a unified encoder that performs safety classification and PII detection in a single forward pass, simplifying safety pipelines. We introduce three variants: compact uni- and bi-encoders (145-147M) for high-throughput serving, and GLiGuard Omni (209M) for stronger moderation quality. Under dynamic batching on a single A100, the compact model reaches 193 requests/sec with P99 latency below 1s, achieving 1.6x higher throughput than GLiNER2. Omni remains competitive with much larger moderators on public safety benchmarks. We also release PII-Bench, a span-level benchmark for evaluating PII detection in end-to-end pipelines. Overall, encoder-based guardrails offer a practical low-cost alternative for always-on moderation. Models and benchmarks are released on HuggingFace.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Multi-step agents are trained on flat action streams: SFT and RLVR weight every token uniformly and ignore the sub-procedures that recur across tasks, the hierarchy that lets humans plan top-down from reusable routines. This structure sits unused, and flat training uses each scarce trajectory less fully than its content allows. Recent agents do use that structure, but only as LLM-written skills in context, never in the weights, so their gains do not generalize beyond retrieval. We instead recover this hierarchy from the data itself and train on it, with no LLM calls. Following text tokenizers, which build a vocabulary by counting alone, we score action spans by reusability and merge canonicalized actions into a reusable eXperience tree (X-Tree). Each X-Tree node captures how a frequent and success-bearing skill is composed from sub-skills, guiding efficient generalization. We integrate X-Tree into three training settings: offline RL, with each node as a training instance; online RLVR, with an adaptive skill bonus; and on-policy self-distillation, with X-Tree as the self-teacher's privileged context. Across WebArena, ScienceWorld, and WebShop at three model scales, X-Tree improves over standard recipes at matched data and budget by up to 4.5% SR on WebArena, 5.8% SR on ScienceWorld and 4.1% success on WebShop. Matched analyses attribute the gains to the X-Tree structure and the three integrations.

Global safety models exhibit strong performance across widely used benchmarks, yet their training data rarely captures the cultural and linguistic nuances of Taiwanese Mandarin. This limitation results in systematic blind spots when interpreting region-specific risks such as localized financial scams, culturally embedded hate speech, and misinformation patterns. To address these gaps, we introduce TS-Bench (Taiwan Safety Benchmark), a standardized evaluation suite for assessing safety performance in Taiwanese Mandarin. TS-Bench contains 400 human-curated prompts spanning critical domains including financial fraud, medical misinformation, social discrimination, and political manipulation. In parallel, we present Breeze Guard, an 8B safety model derived from Breeze 2, our previously released general-purpose Taiwanese Mandarin LLM with strong cultural grounding from its original pre-training corpus. Breeze Guard is obtained through supervised fine-tuning on a large-scale, human-verified synthesized dataset targeting Taiwan-specific harms. Our central hypothesis is that effective safety detection requires the cultural grounding already present in the base model; safety fine-tuning alone is insufficient to introduce new socio linguistic knowledge from scratch. Empirically, Breeze Guard significantly outperforms the leading 8B general-purpose safety model, Granite Guardian 3.3, on TS-Bench (+0.17 overall F1), with particularly large gains in high-context categories such as scam (+0.66 F1) and financial malpractice (+0.43 F1). While the model shows slightly lower performance on English-centric benchmarks (ToxicChat, AegisSafetyTest), this tradeoff is expected for a regionally specialized safety model optimized for Taiwanese Mandarin. Together, Breeze Guard and TS-Bench establish a new foundation for trustworthy AI deployment in Taiwan.

Multi-agent reasoning systems adopt a "generate-then-transfer" paradigm that forces end-to-end latency to scale linearly with pipeline depth. We introduce StreamMA, a multi-agent reasoning system that streams each reasoning step to downstream agents as soon as it is generated, pipelining adjacent agents and thus reducing latency. Surprisingly, this pipelining also improves effectiveness: because multi-step reasoning quality is non-uniform and early steps are more reliable than later ones, working with these reliable early steps instead of the full chain prevents error-prone late steps from misleading downstream agents. We formalize both advantages with the first closed-form joint analysis of stream, serial, and single protocols, deriving the effectiveness ordering, speedup upper bound, and cost ratio. Across eight reasoning benchmarks spanning mathematics, science, and code, two frontier LLMs (Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4), and three topologies (Chain, Tree, Graph), StreamMA outperforms both baselines (avg. +7.3 pp, max +22.4 pp on HMMT 2026; Claude Opus 4.6-high). Beyond these contributions, we discover a "step-level scaling law": increasing per-agent steps consistently improves both effectiveness and efficiency, a new scaling dimension orthogonal to and composable with agent-count scaling.

Large language models (LLMs) designed to interact with users are typically trained to respond appropriately to harmful or toxic content. However, ensuring appropriate responses becomes more challenging in diverse linguistic and cultural contexts, where safety risks may be expressed or interpreted differently. Building safe AI systems therefore requires detecting safety risks, understanding their nature, and responding appropriately, while accounting for linguistic and cultural variations that add complexity to each stage. In this work, we introduce AfriGuard, a culturally grounded multilingual dataset for studying harmful intent, safety-category understanding, and refusal behavior across 10 African languages and English. Our findings reveal that guardrail models underperform both open- and closed-source LLMs on safety-intent and safety-category classification, while models show limited understanding of appropriate safety behavior, scoring below 60% F1. We further find that models often fail to respond appropriately to unsafe prompts not because they explicitly refuse, but because they produce linguistically inadequate responses that result in incidental non-assistance rather than proper refusals. Finally, using AfriGuard, we develop efficient guardrail models that achieve performance competitive with models up to 30x larger, introduce refusal detectors that improve average performance by 43.9% over existing detectors, and demonstrate that supervised fine-tuning can substantially improve overall safety performance.