Daily Papers

Current VLM evaluations often conflate language priors with genuine spatial reasoning. To address this, we introduce CRISP, a novel structural-diagnostic evaluation paradigm that assesses visual spatial intelligence through consistency, the alignment between implicit perception and explicit reasoning. Unlike traditional black-box QA, CRISP utilizes metric 3D Scene Graphs and an oracle intervention protocol to decouple latent reasoning capabilities from perceptual bottlenecks. This granular diagnosis uncovers a systematic perception-reasoning disconnect. Crucially, we reveal that while proprietary models possess robust latent reasoning engines, they suffer from inaccurate metric estimation and a critical failure to leverage their implicit structural representations. Conversely, open-source models remain fundamentally bottlenecked by their lack of multi-hop compositional reasoning. By shifting the focus from merely ``guessing correctly'' via language priors to genuinely ``perceiving, verifying, and reasoning,'' CRISP offers a rigorous roadmap for multimodal alignment beyond end-to-end post-training. The code and dataset are available at https://github.com/iiyamayuki/CRISP-Bench.

LLM agents increasingly modify their own prompts, tools, middleware, resources, and execution harnesses at runtime. Such self-evolution can improve capability, but a successful mutation may leave persistent effects that cannot be safely reversed in states different from the one in which it was created. We introduce EvoUndo, a framework for representing, synthesizing, diagnosing, and independently verifying recoverability of model-generated self-modifications across counterfactual states. Across 600 unseen one-shot self-evolution tasks, we identify 197 capability-improving mutations that fail recoverability verification. Under the original recovery representation, conventional repair strategies recover 0/197 of these natural failures. Deterministic oracle analysis recovers 48/197 under the original recovery language L0, while the extended recovery calculus increases empirical oracle recovery to 191/197. A protocol-locked 2x2 grounding-by-expressivity intervention then separates two bottlenecks: exact state-address grounding increases successful recovery from 0/48 to 38/48 (79.2%) when the original language is sufficient, while extending the recovery language enables recovery on 142/143 (99.3%) failures in the oracle-defined S1 stratum. On the primary gpt-oss-120b backbone, adding exact-address diagnostics to the richer language reduces recovery to 133/143 (93.0%); a Qwen3.8-27B replication preserves the grounding and expressivity effects but not this negative interaction, indicating that the latter is model-dependent. These results indicate that reliable agent self-evolution requires co-designing verification, state grounding, witness semantics, and recovery-language expressivity rather than relying on iterative prompting alone.

Large language models can perform well on many isolated tasks, yet they continue to struggle on multi-turn, long-horizon agentic problems that require skills such as planning, state tracking, and long context processing. In this work, we aim to better understand the relative importance of advancing these underlying capabilities for success on such tasks. We develop an oracle counterfactual framework for multi-turn problems that asks: how would an agent perform if it could leverage an oracle to perfectly perform a specific task? The change in the agent's performance due to this oracle assistance allows us to measure the criticality of such oracle skill in the future advancement of AI agents. We introduce a suite of procedurally generated, game-like tasks with tunable complexity. These controlled environments allow us to provide precise oracle interventions, such as perfect planning or flawless state tracking, and make it possible to isolate the contribution of each oracle without confounding effects present in real-world benchmarks. Our results show that while some interventions (e.g., planning) consistently improve performance across settings, the usefulness of other skills is dependent on the properties of the environment and language model. Our work sheds light on the challenges of multi-turn agentic environments to guide the future efforts in the development of AI agents and language models.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not. We argue that this binary attack-success rate discards the information a defender most needs, namely how harmful the resulting action was. We introduce an action-graded harm rubric that scores an agent's tool-call trajectory on a seven-level ordinal scale (L0 to L6) according to whether the executed action was reversible, whether it crossed scope to reach another party, and whether it expanded privilege. We compute the scale two ways: a deterministic oracle that reads the trajectory and the attacker's stated goal, and a panel of three frontier language-model judges that read a tag-free account of the same trajectory. Across four victim models and two defenses on the AgentDojo workspace suite, severity grading exposes three cases the binary metric hides, including a defense that reports a zero attack-success rate while still permitting an externally visible cross-scope leak through an unfiltered tool. The judge panel reproduces the oracle with high ordinal agreement (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.91) but shares systematic blind spots that we characterize, most notably a failure to recognize escalation chains. Unlike prior work that provides harm taxonomies, harmful-task completion tests, execution-level safety benchmarks, or severity-aware simulation, our contribution is a reusable, trace-grounded severity instrument applied to the actual actions recorded in existing red-team logs. All code, prompts, and per-episode logs are released.

An AI control protocol is a plan for usefully deploying AI systems that aims to prevent an AI from intentionally causing some unacceptable outcome. This paper investigates how well AI systems can generate and act on their own strategies for subverting control protocols whilst operating statelessly (without shared memory between contexts). To do this, an AI system may need to reliably generate optimal plans in each context, take actions with well-calibrated probabilities, and coordinate plans with other instances of itself without communicating. We develop Subversion Strategy Eval, a suite of eight environments, covering a range of protocols and strategic capabilities, and six sets of affordances that help isolate individual capabilities. We implement the evaluation in Inspect-AI and release it open-source. We evaluate Claude 3.5 models, including helpful-only versions, as well as OpenAI reasoning models. None of the models demonstrate substantial capability in strategizing to subvert control protocols statelessly. However, providing models with additional affordances, such as the ability to share a plan between contexts, can substantially improve performance. We hope our evaluations can act as a leading indicator for when models are capable of subverting control protocols and also relax the worst-case assumption of perfect strategic ability in AI control evaluations.

AI research agents combine prior knowledge, public sources, and experimental feedback to produce useful results. The Discovery Certification Protocol (DCP) turns claims about these results into executable recovery and feedback tests. Gate 1 validates useful improvement on sealed evaluation. Gate 2 gives matched agents the registered starting information and observed Web content while withholding the target research history. Every valid method reaching the numerical target supplies a recovery witness and triggers the Core veto. DCP Core requires adequate controls, zero observed recoveries, and a finite-sample bound on recovery in one fresh registered episode. Optional Gate 3 measures the average effect of truthful feedback relative to a specified neutral policy from a shared checkpoint. DCP Evidence adds this effect after independent null calibration and a registered effect margin. Two controlled audits exercise the complete protocol in SQLite optimization and virtual catalyst control under different models. Each produced zero recoveries in 96 episodes, with an upper bound of 0.0468. Each paired study yielded 30 truthful recoveries and zero neutral recoveries, with passing 60-pair null studies. Additional cases exercise Core, recovered, and audit-incomplete decisions. A deterministic, LLM-free verifier reproduces the decisions from frozen evidence. DCP provides a common evidence language for useful outcomes, alternative routes, and feedback effects across AI research.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

Our interest is in the design of software systems involving a human-expert interacting -- using natural language -- with a large language model (LLM) on data analysis tasks. For complex problems, it is possible that LLMs can harness human expertise and creativity to find solutions that were otherwise elusive. On one level, this interaction takes place through multiple turns of prompts from the human and responses from the LLM. Here we investigate a more structured approach based on an abstract protocol described in [3] for interaction between agents. The protocol is motivated by a notion of "two-way intelligibility" and is modelled by a pair of communicating finite-state machines. We provide an implementation of the protocol, and provide empirical evidence of using the implementation to mediate interactions between an LLM and a human-agent in two areas of scientific interest (radiology and drug design). We conduct controlled experiments with a human proxy (a database), and uncontrolled experiments with human subjects. The results provide evidence in support of the protocol's capability of capturing one- and two-way intelligibility in human-LLM interaction; and for the utility of two-way intelligibility in the design of human-machine systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/karannb/interact.

Activation Oracles (AOs) are promising methods for interpreting residual stream activations. However, current AOs face important issues, such as hallucinations and vagueness. Additionally, text-inversion confounds make them hard to evaluate. To this end, we improve the Activation Oracle (AO) training regime in four ways: training on on-policy rollouts, improving the conversational dataset, feeding more layers and an improvement to the injection formula. The capability improvements are marginal, but quality of life improvements are quite substantial. In addition, we open source the first comprehensive evaluation suite for AO quality, which we call AObench. Overall, we hope that our work sets a foundation that helps improve AOs and other models in the paradigm of scalable, end-to-end interpretability.

We envision a proactive multi-modal assistant system which gives users real-time step-by-step guidance on a procedural task, autonomously deciding when to interrupt, and how to coach. However, progress is limited by the absence of large-scale, cross-domain benchmarks that reflect realistic conditions, particularly the common case in which users deviate from the expected step sequence. We address this gap with four contributions: (1)~we release EgoProactive, a large-scale wearable-egocentric dataset for proactive procedural assistance with explicit Out-of-Plan (OOP) annotations and recovery steps; (2)~we augment five established benchmarks (Ego4D, EPIC-KITCHENS, EgoExo4D, HoloAssist, HowTo100M) into Pro\textsuperscript{2Bench} under a unified proactive-guidance schema; (3)~we propose a decoupled planner--interaction architecture specialized for procedural state, visual cues, and recovery injection; (4)~we introduce a post-training recipe that transfers across model families, validated by cross-backbone replication on Llama~4 and Qwen-3.6-VL. In extensive experiments, our trained Llama-4 system substantially improves objective intervention quality over strong proprietary baselines (Claude Opus~4.6, Gemini~3.1~Pro, GPT~5.2) and open-weight baselines (Qwen3~VL~235B) baselines across all six datasets. Oracle-plan experiments further show that, when plan quality is controlled, the trained duplex model produces high-quality guidance and large gains on Out-of-Plan recovery.

Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles. They plan across steps, call tools, request human input, coordinate with other agents, and increasingly carry responsibility for work that affects customers, claims, code, contracts, and clinical decisions. Production deployments are no longer one human supervising one model. They are multi-human, multi-agent collaborations that cross teams, time zones, and trust boundaries. The technical surface for this collaboration remains weakly specified. When an agent drafts a response and a human edits it before it ships, the moment of human judgement is the most valuable signal in the system. In current practice it is recorded, if at all, in application code, chat threads, ticket comments, and tribal memory. Two protocol standards address adjacent concerns: MCP standardises agent access to tools and data, and A2A standardises agent-to-agent interoperability. Neither defines the shared workspace in which humans and agents perform accountable work together. This paper presents CHAP, the Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol. Under CHAP, the override that used to vanish into a chat thread becomes a structured event carrying a diff, a rationale, and a content hash. The handoff between shifts becomes a portable envelope rather than a pinned message. The human approval of an agent's draft becomes a non-repudiable signed decision that can be replayed years later. The protocol achieves this through a small Core (workspaces, participants, tasks, artefacts, and an append-only evidence log) together with composable profiles that add review, modes, routing, deliberation, handoff, identity, signatures, and transparency-backed audit as deployments require them. Specification, reference implementation, conformance suite, and worked examples are available at: https://github.com/BrightbeamAI/chap

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) for structuring clinical data is critically hindered by their tendency to hallucinate facts and their inability to follow domain-specific rules. To address this, we introduce MedPAO, a novel agentic framework that ensures accuracy and verifiable reasoning by grounding its operation in established clinical protocols such as the ABCDEF protocol for CXR analysis. MedPAO decomposes the report structuring task into a transparent process managed by a Plan-Act-Observe (PAO) loop and specialized tools. This protocol-driven method provides a verifiable alternative to opaque, monolithic models. The efficacy of our approach is demonstrated through rigorous evaluation: MedPAO achieves an F1-score of 0.96 on the critical sub-task of concept categorization. Notably, expert radiologists and clinicians rated the final structured outputs with an average score of 4.52 out of 5, indicating a level of reliability that surpasses baseline approaches relying solely on LLM-based foundation models. The code is available at: https://github.com/MiRL-IITM/medpao-agent

Agent communication protocols are becoming critical infrastructure for large language model (LLM) systems that must use tools, coordinate with other agents, and operate across heterogeneous environments. This work presents a human-inspired perspective on this emerging landscape by organizing agent communication into three layers: communication, syntactic, and semantic. Under this framework, we systematically analyze 18 representative protocols and compare how they support reliable transport, structured interaction, and meaning-level coordination. Our analysis shows a clear imbalance in current protocol design. Most protocols provide increasingly mature support for transport, streaming, schema definition, and lifecycle management, but offer limited protocol-level mechanisms for clarification, context alignment, and verification. As a result, semantic responsibilities are often pushed into prompts, wrappers, or application-specific orchestration logic, creating hidden interoperability and maintenance costs. To make this gap actionable, we further identify major forms of technical debt in today's protocol ecosystem and distill practical guidance for selecting protocols under different deployment settings. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for interoperable, secure, and semantically robust agent ecosystems that move beyond message passing toward shared understanding.

Multiple agents may often conflict in an organization: for example, one coding agent changes an interface in a repository, but another continues to develop on the old version where existing tests become stale. A conversation can resolve the episode, but when the participants change, what makes the lesson continue to govern the team? We introduce Relic, which turns recurring collaboration failures into organization-owned, executable protocols. Members reflect on visible work, propose rules, and govern their adoption. Adopted protocols bind triggers, responsibilities, required evidence, and execution consequences to the runtime, while remaining open to revision and retirement. In one traced case, repeated integration friction produces an interface-review rule that governs later pull requests and is revised as work continues. Across 360 controlled runs over ten software workloads and three models, Relic raises complete-contract delivery from 14.06% to 19.76% (+5.71 percentage points) over a matched structured team without the protocol lifecycle, improving all four verified production endpoints in every model stratum. Under fresh-member transfer, behavioral correctness is 25.4% with no inherited protocol, 34.6% with the same rules provided as readable text, and 41.2% with executable bindings, a +6.5-point advantage over text alone. On the full CooperBench benchmark, after excluding broken benchmark pairs, Relic achieves 367/477 (76.9%), establishing the best reported result among peer-structured systems. On the fixed 48-pair same-model subset, Relic also exceeds Solo (29/48 vs. 26/48), reversing the coordination loss exhibited by the official peer baseline. Together, these results show how collaboration experience can become persistent organizational state that remains useful beyond the members who created it.

It is possible that powerful and potentially dangerous artificial intelligence (AI) might be developed in the future. An Oracle is a design which aims to restrain the impact of a potentially dangerous AI by restricting the agent to no actions besides answering questions. Unfortunately, most Oracles will be motivated to gain more control over the world by manipulating users through the content of their answers, and Oracles of potentially high intelligence might be very successful at this DBLP:journals/corr/AlfonsecaCACAR16. In this paper we present two designs for Oracles which, even under pessimistic assumptions, will not manipulate their users into releasing them and yet will still be incentivised to provide their users with helpful answers. The first design is the counterfactual Oracle -- which choses its answer as if it expected nobody to ever read it. The second design is the low-bandwidth Oracle -- which is limited by the quantity of information it can transmit.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

Are AI agents tools, co-authors, or researchers? We present a quantified case study (N=1): a physicist supervising an AI coding agent (Claude Code, Sonnet and Opus models) over 12 work days and 57 sessions to build CLAX-PT, a differentiable one-loop perturbation theory module in JAX. We documented and classified 15 supervision events by intervention level. The agent resolved ten autonomously by iterating against oracle tests. Two more by the physicist's domain knowledge. The three it could not -- all evaded oracle detection -- share a common property: the agent treated symptom reduction as root-cause resolution. It spent 33 of the 57 sessions adjusting coefficients within a code architecture that could not represent the target physics, and could not re-evaluate its CLASS-PT branch choice even when prompted to reconsider; only an injected physics concept (anisotropic BAO damping) triggered the redesign. Separately, the agent committed a calibrated correction that passed all oracle tests but corresponded to no quantity in the theory, predicting wrong values at any other cosmology. The fudge factor was caught and replaced within the same session. Three supervision practices proved critical for catching what oracle tests missed: testing at diverse parameter points beyond the fiducial calibration; shared changelogs that surfaced stalled exploration across sessions; and an explicit rule against unphysical numerical patches. In this case, supervision design, not model capability, determined whether the agent's output was trustworthy. Closing the gap would require agents that propose architectural alternatives rather than optimize within a given structure, and distinguish predictive adequacy from explanatory correctness -- capabilities not exhibited here, not obviously addressed by scaling alone. [Abridged.]

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can improve reasoning by spending more computation, but deployment requires deciding when extra collaboration is worth its cost. We isolate this decision by running every problem under four protocols while holding the solver fixed within each setting: direct solving (Baseline), iterative self-correction (Single), planner-executor-reviewer collaboration (PER), and multi-agent deliberation (Broadcast). The primary benchmark comprises 4,181 competition-level math problems; paired robustness checks cover four benchmarks spanning competition math, biology, and broader science with two solver families. Across fixed policies, trained routers, and frozen LLM routers, conservative policies under-escalate, whereas higher-solve frozen routers often over-escalate. A post-answer, pre-collaboration gpt-oss-120b probe ranks Baseline failures with 0.8847 AUROC (4,151 parseable cases; 95% CI [0.8732, 0.8955]). The same score remains informative for predicting whether any collaboration helps (0.7683 AUPRC), but is much weaker for identifying PER- or Broadcast-specific value (0.1674 and 0.1041 AUPRC). Separately, the pre-answer self-confidence gate reaches 78.0% solve at 45K tokens, compared with 73.8% at 71.3K for a frozen gpt-oss-120b router and 92.4% for a retrospective fixed-order oracle. Across 10 paired model-condition settings, the oracle adds 23.2-58.3 points of retrospective coverage over Baseline, but protocol profiles vary by task. In the six settings with held-out router evaluations, oracle gaps remain 18.5-28.9 points. Confidence can therefore support initial escalation, while protocol-specific cost-aware routing remains unresolved.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

As large-scale multi-agent systems evolve, the communication protocol layer has become a critical yet under-evaluated factor shaping performance and reliability. Despite the existence of diverse protocols (A2A, ACP, ANP, Agora, etc.), selection is often intuition-driven and lacks standardized guidance. We introduce ProtocolBench, a benchmark that systematically compares agent protocols along four measurable axes: task success, end-to-end latency, message or byte overhead, and robustness under failures. On ProtocolBench, protocol choice significantly influences system behavior. In the Streaming Queue scenario, overall completion time varies by up to 36.5% across protocols, and mean end-to-end latency differs by 3.48 s. Under Fail-Storm Recovery, resilience also differs consistently across protocols. Beyond evaluation, we present ProtocolRouter, a learnable protocol router that selects per-scenario (or per-module) protocols from requirement and runtime signals. ProtocolRouter reduces Fail-Storm recovery time by up to 18.1% versus the best single-protocol baseline, and achieves scenario-specific gains such as higher success in GAIA. We also release ProtocolRouterBench to standardize protocol evaluation and improve reliability at scale.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

LLM-agent services repeatedly execute small deterministic transitions between model and tool calls: route an outcome, update state, and emit the next effect. We ask when this control path exposes enough concurrent work for GPU execution, and what changes when a GPU-computed route decision remains on device. We formalize the ready-cohort boundary using fixed-partition share F, exact offline share P*, local upper bound U, and online achieved share A. Under zero service time, unlimited capacity, and equal relative launch deadlines, a specialized dynamic program computes P* exactly. In a stationary Poisson replay of one pinned 851-session public trace panel, the primary condition at 100,000 target active sessions, K=256, and a 50 ms launch deadline gives F=30.19%, P*=43.00%, and U=45.85%. Exact packing recovers 81.83% of the opportunity lost at fixed window boundaries. The outcome-derived route key is a conditioning proxy, not proof of executable identity. A separate mechanism study keeps a GPU-computed binary decision on device instead of returning four bytes to the host and redispatching. Across four named GPU placements, the device-resident path is faster in all 36 configurations; within-placement row-median ratios range from 1.19x to 2.39x. Across both admissible mechanisms, all 14,557,440 tested batched invocations match a separately implemented host oracle. A fixed nested device graph that removes no host decision is slower in all 60 configurations across five placements. Together, the studies establish two measurable gates for GPU agent control: deadline-feasible cohort supply and observation placement. A joined finite online runtime is required to measure A, CPU displacement, and service-level benefit.

Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

This paper reports a single, fully instrumented case study of a large-scale architectural refactoring by an AI coding agent under a specification-first protocol, with no human review of the generated code and no pre-existing oracle to validate the target behaviour. The task, dismantling a central invariant across a large interdependent codebase, was assessed by the author as effectively infeasible through incremental refactoring, the kind of change that conventionally calls for a rewrite instead. Under the protocol described here, the agent completed it successfully. The system is a 717,725-line production TypeScript application across 3,648 files. The task required dismantling a core lifetime invariant: the guarantee that a UI panel remains open for the duration of an AI request. The target behaviour was that a streaming generation survives the closing of its panel and can be reattached, on reopening, to the same live stream with no loss or duplication. The protocol: formal specification by the agent, 14 refinement cycles auditing that specification against the source code, atomic implementation, a compile/test feedback loop, then 17 verification cycles auditing the code against the frozen specification. Across 31 audit passes, 201 defects were corrected before any human executed the program. The convergence criterion was empirical: two consecutive verification passes returning zero findings. The change touched 189 files (31 new); with the extraction phase, the two commits total 288 files, 34,770 insertions, 16,422 deletions. Across the first and roughly thirty later sessions, the software behaved as specified, no bug observed. Elapsed: three days; cost: USD 2,430. The full specification and raw session logs, 1,500+ pages in French, are published as evidence, allowing inspection of the process and submission to a language model for consistency checking.

Agentic systems use large language models (LLMs) to carry out concrete tasks. Prior work often borrows abstractions such as scheduling, caching or isolation piecemeal from operating systems, so the mechanisms it builds share little common ground, and the shared view of the two forms of agentic system, Workflows and Agents, is limited. We construct an abstract machine that provides both. We treat the LLM as an Oracle and extend a two-stack pushdown automaton with one instruction, which hands the Oracle a whole stack as its query and appends the answer to that same stack. The machine thus performs two computations, the Oracle's and a Turing-complete one that we call the Priestess. A stack that the program only appends to grows autoregressively, as an agent's context does. Two symmetry breakings, S in storage and T in transitions, make a Priestess program the operating system of the programs the Oracle runs, and produce the Agent and the Workflow as the two placements of a task's program. For internally autoregressive Oracles, the two computations synchronize at the end of every answer under certain conditions, and through that synchronization we model caching and analyse scheduling. No guarantee that holds for every Oracle can fix which content crosses between the two computations, but such a guarantee does fix the boundary itself. The construction V fits the machine to a von Neumann computer. To show that it is realizable, we propose ArchNights, an extended RISC-V ISA and a Linux-style operating system implementing the machine by design. ArchNights-SE runs on gem5 as a computer system, becomes an agentic system when it runs an LLM as the Oracle, and will be open source. Agentic systems can then be designed as computer systems are. With a foundation built and a unified view, future work can share invariants and bounds, each with its conditions.

A Mamba state-space model trained only for next-step prediction appears to recover Granger-causal structure through a simple readout S = |W_{out} W_{in}|, with early experiments suggesting the phenomenon generalized across architectures and benefited from interventional data at p < 10^{-5}. We package the protocol used to test that claim -- standardized synthetic generators (VAR/Lorenz/CauseMe-style), three intervention semantics (do(X=c), soft-noise, random-forcing), edge-provenance cards on three real datasets, and size-matched control arms -- as a reusable falsification benchmark, and walk the claim through it in five stages. The method-level claim does not survive: (i) a plain linear bottleneck does as well or better; (ii) tuned Lasso beats the bottleneck on synthetic CauseMe-style benchmarks, and on Lorenz-96 (the only real benchmark with unambiguous ground truth) classical PCMCI and Granger lead a tight cluster in which the bottleneck trails; (iii) the headline intervention advantage is roughly 60% a sample-size confound, and the residual disappears under standard do(X=c) interventions, surviving only under a non-standard random-forcing scheme; (iv) even that residual reproduces, with a larger effect, in classical bivariate Granger -- the effect is method-agnostic. What survives is a narrow characterization result; the benchmark is the lasting artifact, and each stage above is one of its control arms.

Operations Research practitioners debug infeasible models through an iterative process: inspecting Irreducible Infeasible Subsystems ( IIS), identifying constraint conflicts, and repairing formulations until feasibility is restored. Existing LLM benchmarks mostly treat OR as one-shot translation from problem descriptions to solver code, omitting this diagnostic loop. We formalize infeasible-model repair as a solver-in-the-loop Markov Decision Process in which each action triggers solver re-execution and IIS recomputation, yielding deterministic, verifiable feedback. We introduce ORLoopBench, a benchmark suite with two components: OR-Debug-Bench releases 5,362 LP/MILP repair instances, while OR-Bias-Bench evaluates closed-form operational decision rationality across inventory settings. Solver-verified RLVR training enables an 8B model to surpass frontier APIs on LP repair (95.3% vs 92.4% RR @5), improves diagnostic behavior, and transfers to MILP repair. The same evaluation exposes semantic drift in whole-model code regeneration: feasible regenerated MILPs can solve the wrong problem. Process-level evaluation with solver oracles enables targeted training for reliable OR self-correction.

Googles A2A protocol provides a secure communication framework for AI agents but demonstrates critical limitations when handling highly sensitive information such as payment credentials and identity documents. These gaps increase the risk of unintended harms, including unauthorized disclosure, privilege escalation, and misuse of private data in generative multi-agent environments. In this paper, we identify key weaknesses of A2A: insufficient token lifetime control, lack of strong customer authentication, overbroad access scopes, and missing consent flows. We propose protocol-level enhancements grounded in a structured threat model for semi-trusted multi-agent systems. Our refinements introduce explicit consent orchestration, ephemeral scoped tokens, and direct user-to-service data channels to minimize exposure across time, context, and topology. Empirical evaluation using adversarial prompt injection tests shows that the enhanced protocol substantially reduces sensitive data leakage while maintaining low communication latency. Comparative analysis highlights the advantages of our approach over both the original A2A specification and related academic proposals. These contributions establish a practical path for evolving A2A into a privacy-preserving framework that mitigates unintended harms in multi-agent generative AI systems.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems are challenging to debug because failures often arise from long, branching interaction traces. The prevailing practice is to leverage LLMs for log-based failure localization, attributing errors to a specific agent and step. However, this paradigm has two key limitations: (i) log-only debugging lacks validation, producing untested hypotheses, and (ii) single-step or single-agent attribution is often ill-posed, as we find that multiple distinct interventions can independently repair the failed task. To address the first limitation, we introduce DoVer, an intervention-driven debugging framework, which augments hypothesis generation with active verification through targeted interventions (e.g., editing messages, altering plans). For the second limitation, rather than evaluating on attribution accuracy, we focus on measuring whether the system resolves the failure or makes quantifiable progress toward task success, reflecting a more outcome-oriented view of debugging. Within the Magnetic-One agent framework, on the datasets derived from GAIA and AssistantBench, DoVer flips 18-28% of failed trials into successes, achieves up to 16% milestone progress, and validates or refutes 30-60% of failure hypotheses. DoVer also performs effectively on a different dataset (GSMPlus) and agent framework (AG2), where it recovers 49% of failed trials. These results highlight intervention as a practical mechanism for improving reliability in agentic systems and open opportunities for more robust, scalable debugging methods for LLM-based multi-agent systems. Project website and code will be available at https://aka.ms/DoVer.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly decide whether software behaves correctly, either by writing a test oracle or by acting as one. Yet two oracles can look identical and rest on different ground: one assertion encodes a written specification, another only what the model learned in training. Prior secondary studies sort oracles by form or by technique, rarely by the property that governs how far a verdict can be trusted: where its authority comes from. This systematic literature review, reported under the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) 2020 guidelines, screens 2,436 records to 54 included studies, extended by citation searching (snowballing) to 83 in total. We read the corpus along three axes: the source of an oracle's authority, the form it takes, and the mechanism that adjudicates it. Just over half of the corpus reaches a verdict with no specification at all. That is what lets these oracles work on code with no specification to consult, and what leaves a challenged verdict with less to fall back on. Source and mechanism cross-cut rather than coincide, so a label such as LLM-as-a-judge names how a verdict is produced, not why it should be trusted. Oracle quality is most often judged by resemblance to a known oracle rather than by whether injected faults are caught. The first question to ask of any LLM oracle is therefore what one would point to in defending its verdict. The protocol, search query, and per-study coding sheet are released.

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

While reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promising performance, its sample complexity continues to be a substantial hurdle, restricting its broader application across a variety of domains. Imitation learning (IL) utilizes oracles to improve sample efficiency, yet it is often constrained by the quality of the oracles deployed. which actively interleaves between IL and RL based on an online estimate of their performance. RPI draws on the strengths of IL, using oracle queries to facilitate exploration, an aspect that is notably challenging in sparse-reward RL, particularly during the early stages of learning. As learning unfolds, RPI gradually transitions to RL, effectively treating the learned policy as an improved oracle. This algorithm is capable of learning from and improving upon a diverse set of black-box oracles. Integral to RPI are Robust Active Policy Selection (RAPS) and Robust Policy Gradient (RPG), both of which reason over whether to perform state-wise imitation from the oracles or learn from its own value function when the learner's performance surpasses that of the oracles in a specific state. Empirical evaluations and theoretical analysis validate that RPI excels in comparison to existing state-of-the-art methodologies, demonstrating superior performance across various benchmark domains.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

AI agents today have passwords but no permission slips. They execute tool calls (fund transfers, database queries, shell commands, sub-agent delegation) with no standard mechanism to enforce authorization before the action executes. Current safety architectures rely on model alignment (probabilistic, training-time) and post-hoc evaluation (retrospective, batch). Neither provides deterministic, policy-based enforcement at the individual tool call level. We characterize this gap as the pre-action authorization problem and present the Open Agent Passport (OAP), an open specification and reference implementation that intercepts tool calls synchronously before execution, evaluates them against a declarative policy, and produces a cryptographically signed audit record. OAP enforces authorization decisions in a measured median of 53 ms (N=1,000). In a live adversarial testbed (4,437 authorization decisions across 1,151 sessions, $5,000 bounty), social engineering succeeded against the model 74.6% of the time under a permissive policy; under a restrictive OAP policy, a comparable population of attackers achieved a 0% success rate across 879 attempts. We distinguish pre-action authorization from sandboxed execution (contains blast radius but does not prevent unauthorized actions) and model-based screening (probabilistic), and show they are complementary. The same infrastructure that enforces security constraints (spending limits, capability scoping) also enforces quality gates, operational contracts, and compliance controls. The specification is released under Apache 2.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18901596).

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

Text-to-SQL parsing has achieved remarkable progress under the Full Schema Assumption. However, this premise fails in real-world enterprise environments where databases contain hundreds of tables with massive noisy metadata. Rather than injecting the full schema upfront, an agent must actively identify and verify only the relevant subset, giving rise to the Unknown Schema scenario we study in this work. To address this, we propose TRUST-SQL (Truthful Reasoning with Unknown Schema via Tools). We formulate the task as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process where our autonomous agent employs a structured four-phase protocol to ground reasoning in verified metadata. Crucially, this protocol provides a structural boundary for our novel Dual-Track GRPO strategy. By applying token-level masked advantages, this strategy isolates exploration rewards from execution outcomes to resolve credit assignment, yielding a 9.9% relative improvement over standard GRPO. Extensive experiments across five benchmarks demonstrate that TRUST-SQL achieves an average absolute improvement of 30.6% and 16.6% for the 4B and 8B variants respectively over their base models. Remarkably, despite operating entirely without pre-loaded metadata, our framework consistently matches or surpasses strong baselines that rely on schema prefilling.

We present a machine-checked formalization of structurally governed AI workflow architectures and prove that effect-level governance can be imposed without reducing internal computational expressivity. Using Interaction Trees in Rocq 8.19, we define a governance operator G that mediates all effectful directives, including memory access, external calls, and oracle (LLM) queries. Our development compiles with 0 admitted lemmas and consists of 36 modules, ~12,000 lines of Rocq, and 454 theorems. We establishseven properties: (P1) governed Turing completeness, (P2) governed oracle expressivity, (P3) a decidability boundary in which governance predicates are total and closed under Boolean composition while semantic program properties remain non-trivial and undecidable by governance, (P4) goal preservation for permitted executions, (P5) expressive minimality of primitive capabilities (compute, memory, reasoning, external call, observability), (P6) subsumption asymmetry showing structural governance strictly subsumes content-level filtering, and (P7) semantic transparency: on all executions where governance permits, the governed interpretation is observationally equivalent (modulo governance-only events) to the ungoverned interpretation. Together, these results show that governance and computational expressivity are orthogonal dimensions: governance constrains the effect boundary of programs while remaining semantically transparent to internal computation.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed as assistants in planning and decision making, yet most existing systems are implicitly optimized for a single-principal interaction paradigm, in which the model is designed to satisfy the objectives of one dominant user whose instructions are treated as the sole source of authority and utility. However, as they are integrated into team workflows and organizational tools, they are increasingly required to serve multiple users simultaneously, each with distinct roles, preferences, and authority levels, leading to multi-user, multi-principal settings with unavoidable conflicts, information asymmetry, and privacy constraints. In this work, we present the first systematic study of multi-user LLM agents. We begin by formalizing multi-user interaction with LLM agents as a multi-principal decision problem, where a single agent must account for multiple users with potentially conflicting interests and associated challenges. We then introduce a unified multi-user interaction protocol and design three targeted stress-testing scenarios to evaluate current LLMs' capabilities in instruction following, privacy preservation, and coordination. Our results reveal systematic gaps: frontier LLMs frequently fail to maintain stable prioritization under conflicting user objectives, exhibit increasing privacy violations over multi-turn interactions, and suffer from efficiency bottlenecks when coordination requires iterative information gathering.

Always-on agents are systems whose future behavior depends on durable state accumulated across earlier interactions. We treat them as persistent-state systems: the operative system includes retrievable memories, but also task ledgers, permissions, credentials, commitments, provenance and audit records, shared state, trigger conditions, and externally committed effects linked to those records. The survey reads the literature through six diagnostic axes for each state item, authority, scope, mutability, provenance, recoverability, and actionability, and through a lifecycle in which state is written, validated, organized, retrieved, acted upon, updated, forgotten, audited, and sometimes rolled back. Across a 435-work coded corpus, treated as a scoped map rather than an exhaustive census, the literature concentrates more heavily on accumulating and retrieving state than on governing, recovering, or relinquishing it. We therefore introduce the Always-On Evaluation Protocol (AOEP-v0), a pilot evaluation contract that makes these governance requirements concrete by scoring state mutation and recovery obligations rather than answer quality alone. The resulting agenda connects always-on agents to databases, distributed systems, formal methods, capability security, and machine unlearning.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) is catalyzing a shift towards autonomous AI Agents capable of executing complex, multi-step tasks. However, these agents remain brittle when faced with real-world exceptions, making Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) supervision essential for mission-critical applications. In this paper, we present AgentBay, a novel sandbox service designed from the ground up for hybrid interaction. AgentBay provides secure, isolated execution environments spanning Windows, Linux, Android, Web Browsers, and Code interpreters. Its core contribution is a unified session accessible via a hybrid control interface: An AI agent can interact programmatically via mainstream interfaces (MCP, Open Source SDK), while a human operator can, at any moment, seamlessly take over full manual control. This seamless intervention is enabled by Adaptive Streaming Protocol (ASP). Unlike traditional VNC/RDP, ASP is specifically engineered for this hybrid use case, delivering an ultra-low-latency, smoother user experience that remains resilient even in weak network environments. It achieves this by dynamically blending command-based and video-based streaming, adapting its encoding strategy based on network conditions and the current controller (AI or human). Our evaluation demonstrates strong results in security, performance, and task completion rates. In a benchmark of complex tasks, the AgentBay (Agent + Human) model achieved more than 48% success rate improvement. Furthermore, our ASP protocol reduces bandwidth consumption by up to 50% compared to standard RDP, and in end-to-end latency with around 5% reduction, especially under poor network conditions. We posit that AgentBay provides a foundational primitive for building the next generation of reliable, human-supervised autonomous systems.

Visual language model (VLM) agents show great promise in automating end-to-end (E2E) web testing against requirements in natural language. However, the probabilistic nature of language models can have inherent hallucinations. Therefore, given a detected inconsistency between the requirement and the web application, it is hard to distinguish whether it stems from the hallucination or a real application bug. Addressing this issue presents two core technical challenges: the implicit oracle inference challenge, where the agent must act as its own oracle to implicitly decide if the application's behavior is correct without guidance, and the probabilistic inference challenge, where an LLM's inconsistent reasoning undermines its trustworthiness as an oracle. Existing LLM-based approaches fail to capture such implicit oracles, either by treating any page navigation that doesn't crash as a success, or by checking each state in isolation, thus missing bugs dependent on context from prior steps. We introduce WebTestPilot, an LLM-based agent designed to address these challenges. WebTestPilot uses (1) a symbolization layer which detects and symbolizes critical GUI elements on the web application into symbols (i.e., variables) and (2) translates natural language specification into a sequence of steps, each of which is equipped with inferred pre- and post-conditions over the symbols as an oracle. This oracle captures data, temporal, and causal dependencies, enabling the validation of implicit requirements. To advance research in this area, we build a benchmark of bug-injected web apps for evaluating NL-to-E2E testing. The results show that WebTestPilot achieves a task completion rate of 99%, with 96% precision and 96% recall in bug detection, outperforming the best baseline (+70 precision, +27 recall). The agent generalizes across diverse natural language inputs and model scales.

Modern agent systems often suffer from fragmented runtime state: transcripts, tool effects, memory events, workspace placement, branch provenance, and replay evidence are recorded separately and become difficult to inspect or reproduce. OpenRath addresses this issue with a PyTorch-like programming model for multi-agent, multi-session systems. The analogy concerns the role of a central first-class runtime abstraction, not tensor computation. Its core abstraction is Session, the runtime value passed between agents and workflows. A Session is branchable, inspectable, replayable, backend-aware, and composable. It records conversation chunks, sandbox placement, lineage metadata, token usage, pending work, and tool evidence, while defining where memory interactions enter the runtime record. Since this state is carried by the same value used in program execution, fork, merge, and replay become explicit runtime operations rather than states reconstructed from external traces. OpenRath further defines Sandbox, Tool, Agent, Memory, Workflow, and Selector, with Selector turning control flow into runtime-routed decisions. This report presents the programming model, architecture, audited milestones, and evidence protocol. Its claims are limited to controlled runtime properties, while broad quantitative comparisons, live-provider quality, optional-backend availability, and memory quality are left for follow-on evaluation. The central thesis is that Session provides agent systems with a first-class runtime value for auditable composition.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

This position paper argues that the field of LLM agents requires a unified, telecom-inspired communication protocol to ensure safety, interoperability, and scalability, especially within the context of Next Generation (NextG) networks. Current ad-hoc communication methods are creating a fragmented ecosystem, reminiscent of the early "protocol wars" in networking, which stifles innovation and poses significant risks. Drawing inspiration from the layered, standardized protocols that underpin modern telecommunications, we propose the LLM-Agent Communication Protocol (LACP). LACP establishes a three-layer architecture designed to ensure semantic clarity in communication, transactional integrity for complex tasks, and robust, built-in security. In this position paper, we argue that adopting a principled, universal protocol is not merely beneficial but essential for realizing the potential of distributed AI. Such a standard is critical for ensuring that multi-agent systems can operate safely and reliably in the complex, real-time applications envisioned for 6G and beyond.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have become a prevailing paradigm for unified video perception. However, post-training on large multi-task datasets remains challenging, as existing reinforcement learning methods sample on-policy groups with few high-quality rollouts even with costly chain-of-thought (CoT) generation. In this paper, we study the sample efficiency and scalability of RL post-training for video MLLMs and introduce OraRL. We identify an overlooked role for annotations: Beyond scoring rollouts, each can enter its on-policy group as an oracle rollout, a direct positive optimization target. Direct oracle integration, however, is nontrivial: a high-reward oracle raises the group baseline and inverts otherwise positive policy advantages, a failure we term advantage inversion. At the core of OraRL is a decoupled advantage estimator: policy rollouts determine an oracle-free baseline, while the oracle-policy gap modulates both a directional gain and a separate detached oracle advantage. Sign-balanced pruning improves efficiency: by retaining only the oracle and the strongest rollouts of each sign, OraRL requires just 2.2x the step time of SFT, less than half the 4.9x required by GRPO with CoT. OraRL scales with model size and data, surpassing its backbone from 0.8B to 9B and GRPO up to 100k prompts. Without chain-of-thought, Video-ORA-9B decodes in 130 ms instead of 4,780 ms. Compared with the respective prior best models, it raises temporal mIoU from 62.5 to 66.0, tracking AO from 73.0 to 78.2, segmentation from 64.3 to 70.4, and the three-benchmark spatial-intelligence macro average from 51.0 to 56.1; on VSI-Bench, it scores 73.1 against 55.0 for GPT-5 and 55.1 for Gemini-3-Pro.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from request-response assistants into long-running software actors: they maintain state across model calls, fork subtasks, wait for external events, request human authority, generate tools, and perform side effects that must be resumed and audited. This paper presents Agent libOS, a library-OS-inspired runtime substrate for LLM agents. Agent libOS runs above a conventional host operating system; it does not implement hardware drivers, kernel-mode isolation, or a POSIX-compatible operating system. Instead, it treats an agent as an AgentProcess: a schedulable execution subject with process identity, parent-child lineage, lifecycle state, a tool table derived from an AgentImage, typed Object Memory, explicit capabilities, human queues, checkpoints, events, and audit records. Its central design rule is tools are libc-like wrappers; runtime primitives are the authority boundary. Filesystem access, object access, sleeps, human approval, JIT tool registration, and external side effects are checked at primitive boundaries under explicit capabilities and policy. We describe the design, threat model, Python prototype, and safety-oriented evaluation. The current prototype implements async scheduling, namespace-local Object Memory, runtime-integrated human approval, one-shot permission grants, per-process working directories, shell and image-registration primitives, Deno/TypeScript JIT tools over a libOS syscall broker, filesystem/object bridge tools, an injectable Resource Provider Substrate, deterministic demos, real-model smoke scripts, and 123 regression tests at the time of writing. Rather than improving planner accuracy, Agent libOS demonstrates a runtime substrate in which long-running LLM agents can be scheduled, authorized, resumed, and audited without treating tool dispatch as the trust boundary.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) debate is often evaluated by whether final answers improve, but movement is not necessarily improvement: the same discussion can rescue an initially wrong majority or destroy an initially correct one. Standard final-accuracy evaluations conflate these opposing mechanisms. We introduce an auditable protocol for homogeneous debate on multiple-choice questions (MCQs) that records each run as a transition ledger over collapse, correction, onset, and signed intervention utility. On 6,925 MMLU-Pro debates, the protocol identifies 253 collapses and a parallel correction ledger that changes how interventions should be judged. Replay experiments reveal the central tradeoff: a leave-one-model-out probe-gated freeze prevents 29 collapses but loses 108 corrections under equal weights, so collapse prevention alone can recommend the wrong policy. A compact pre-debate 8-probe screen is a triage signal: its unadjusted family-level association with conditional-collapse risk is high (G=7, Spearman rho=0.893, exact two-sided p=0.0123), but initial-majority accuracy is a close comparator (rho=0.821; family partial rho=0.767, p=0.0877), so we do not treat it as calibrated or capability-adjusted prediction. Round-level traces localize many collapses to the first debate round, where early disagreement can precede both harmful cascades and useful recovery. We release replayable schemas, coders, audits, cost cards, and zero-API rebuild scripts so future model-scaffold rows can be compared under the same denominators and signed utility ledger.

Benchmark contamination is diagnosed with n-gram overlap, likelihood-based membership inference, or canary strings, and each needs something usually unavailable: the training corpus, a well-chosen test statistic, or foresight at release. A recent alternative reads it off a linear probe on internal activations. We show the natural way to do this does not work, specify one that survives measurement, then find that the correction making it work carries more variance than the null it is tested against. The protocol reports a zero-sum contrast on the depth profile of probe accuracy, recentred on a level-matched placebo baseline, tested against a label-permutation null, with the reference set twice the size of the suspect set. Each choice replaces a simpler alternative we rejected on measurement. Reporting the level of excess separability rather than its shape makes the false positive rate track the size of the analyst's own control set, 0.03 to 0.99 under a true null. Contrasting against a flat depth profile rejects a true null 0.72 of the time when surface decodability rises with depth, and loses all power when it falls. On real transformers the protocol fails a test the simulations did not pose. The recentring subtracts an estimate, and the permutation null holds it fixed. Re-estimated across split seeds on four audits of contaminated checkpoints, its standard deviation is 1.30 to 1.56 times the null's own in every arm: what is subtracted to remove a bias is more variable than what it corrects. The one nominally significant result, p = 0.0075, becomes 0.0745 once that variance is propagated, and no verdict is issued. The simulations missed this because their surface key is the covariate driving item variation; on real text it is a proxy, and degrading key quality in simulation reproduces it. We add a companion measurement and a widened null. No arm shows contamination.

Machine learning has demonstrated remarkable performance over finite datasets, yet whether the scores over the fixed benchmarks can sufficiently indicate the model's performance in the real world is still in discussion. In reality, an ideal robust model will probably behave similarly to the oracle (e.g., the human users), thus a good evaluation protocol is probably to evaluate the models' behaviors in comparison to the oracle. In this paper, we introduce a new robustness measurement that directly measures the image classification model's performance compared with a surrogate oracle (i.e., a foundation model). Besides, we design a simple method that can accomplish the evaluation beyond the scope of the benchmarks. Our method extends the image datasets with new samples that are sufficiently perturbed to be distinct from the ones in the original sets, but are still bounded within the same image-label structure the original test image represents, constrained by a foundation model pretrained with a large amount of samples. As a result, our new method will offer us a new way to evaluate the models' robustness performance, free of limitations of fixed benchmarks or constrained perturbations, although scoped by the power of the oracle. In addition to the evaluation results, we also leverage our generated data to understand the behaviors of the model and our new evaluation strategies.

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

Large language model powered autonomous agents demand robust, standardized protocols to integrate tools, share contextual data, and coordinate tasks across heterogeneous systems. Ad-hoc integrations are difficult to scale, secure, and generalize across domains. This survey examines four emerging agent communication protocols: Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), each addressing interoperability in deployment contexts. MCP provides a JSON-RPC client-server interface for secure tool invocation and typed data exchange. ACP defines a general-purpose communication protocol over RESTful HTTP, supporting MIME-typed multipart messages and synchronous and asynchronous interactions. Its lightweight and runtime-independent design enables scalable agent invocation, while features like session management, message routing, and integration with role-based and decentralized identifiers (DIDs). A2A enables peer-to-peer task delegation using capability-based Agent Cards, supporting secure and scalable collaboration across enterprise agent workflows. ANP supports open network agent discovery and secure collaboration using W3C decentralized identifiers DIDs and JSON-LD graphs. The protocols are compared across multiple dimensions, including interaction modes, discovery mechanisms, communication patterns, and security models. Based on the comparative analysis, a phased adoption roadmap is proposed: beginning with MCP for tool access, followed by ACP for structured, multimodal messaging session-aware interaction and both online and offline agent discovery across scalable, HTTP-based deployments A2A for collaborative task execution, and extending to ANP for decentralized agent marketplaces. This work provides a comprehensive foundation for designing secure, interoperable, and scalable ecosystems of LLM-powered agents.

Mechanistic interpretability seeks to understand the internal mechanisms of machine learning models, where localization -- identifying the important model components -- is a key step. Activation patching, also known as causal tracing or interchange intervention, is a standard technique for this task (Vig et al., 2020), but the literature contains many variants with little consensus on the choice of hyperparameters or methodology. In this work, we systematically examine the impact of methodological details in activation patching, including evaluation metrics and corruption methods. In several settings of localization and circuit discovery in language models, we find that varying these hyperparameters could lead to disparate interpretability results. Backed by empirical observations, we give conceptual arguments for why certain metrics or methods may be preferred. Finally, we provide recommendations for the best practices of activation patching going forwards.

Agent harnesses have become the operational infrastructure of modern large language model agents, coordinating context, tools, verification, and execution control to translate latent model capability into reliable long-horizon behavior. However, reliable long-horizon behavior requires harness control to adapt to task demands, execution environments, and evolving execution states, whereas current harnesses predominantly rely on hand-crafted or globally fixed policies; this mismatch manifests as unnecessary computational overhead and, in adverse cases, reduced task success. To address this limitation, we formulate the task of enabling adaptive orchestration in harness systems as a causal learning problem and propose Counterfactual Harness Intervention Learning for Long-Horizon Agents (CHILL-Harness). CHILL-Harness intervenes at the orchestration layer to enable advantage-guided workflow adaptation, thereby improving reasoning and execution efficiency while preserving task performance. Specifically, we develop causal intervention effect learning as the effect-estimation component of CHILL-Harness to estimate intervention-relative workflow advantage from confidence-weighted execution evidence and identify advantageous workflow adaptations. We further introduce advantage-realizing causal orchestration as its realization component to adaptively allocate counterfactual reasoning and realize only workflow adjustments supported by sufficient expected advantage. Finally, we incorporate a success-preserving objective and advantage-margin authorization constraints into CHILL-Harness to promote reliable adaptation. Extensive experiments on heterogeneous long-horizon tasks spanning information seeking, software engineering, and terminal interaction show that CHILL-Harness consistently preserves or improves task success while substantially reducing token consumption and execution time.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP), introduced by Anthropic, provides a standardized framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems to interact with external data sources and tools in real-time. While MCP offers significant advantages for AI integration and capability extension, it introduces novel security challenges that demand rigorous analysis and mitigation. This paper builds upon foundational research into MCP architecture and preliminary security assessments to deliver enterprise-grade mitigation frameworks and detailed technical implementation strategies. Through systematic threat modeling and analysis of MCP implementations and analysis of potential attack vectors, including sophisticated threats like tool poisoning, we present actionable security patterns tailored for MCP implementers and adopters. The primary contribution of this research lies in translating theoretical security concerns into a practical, implementable framework with actionable controls, thereby providing essential guidance for the secure enterprise adoption and governance of integrated AI systems.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) and DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability) frameworks across five key components: (1) MCP Host and Client, (2) LLM, (3) MCP Server, (4) External Data Stores, and (5) Authorization Server. This comprehensive analysis reveals tool poisoning-where malicious instructions are embedded in tool metadata-as the most prevalent and impactful client-side vulnerability. We therefore focus our empirical evaluation on this critical attack vector, providing a systematic comparison of how seven major MCP clients validate and defend against tool poisoning attacks. Our analysis reveals significant security issues with most tested clients due to insufficient static validation and parameter visibility. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy encompassing static metadata analysis, model decision path tracking, behavioral anomaly detection, and user transparency mechanisms. This research addresses a critical gap in MCP security, which has primarily focused on server-side vulnerabilities, and provides actionable recommendations and mitigation strategies for securing AI agent ecosystems.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly become the de facto standard for connecting large language models (LLMs) to external resources, but it also introduces a class of privacy risks that existing tools are ill-equipped to detect. Unlike conventional exfiltration bugs, leakage in MCP servers is largely protocol-induced: credentials, API keys, and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) cross the local/LLM boundary simply by being returned, logged, or raised inside a tool handler, with no explicit outbound request in the source code. We present MCPPrivacyDetector, a context-aware cross-language static analysis framework that detects such leakage in multilingual MCP servers. MCPPrivacyDetector lifts heterogeneous code implemented across different programming language (e.g., Python) into a unified program representation, applies context-aware semantic filtering to isolate genuinely sensitive values and protocol-specific implicit sinks (e.g., @mcp.tool handlers), and performs taint analysis to enumerate feasible flows. Applied to 10,655 real-world MCP servers, MCPPrivacyDetector finds leakage rates above 10%. Case studies confirm concrete exposures including leaked Bearer tokens, propagated API keys, and plaintext authentication credentials, arguing for systematic, protocol-aware safeguards in the emerging LLM agent toolchain.

Background: Large language models (LLMs) are trained to follow directions, but this introduces a vulnerability to blindly comply with user requests even if they generate wrong information. In medicine, this could accelerate the generation of misinformation that impacts human well-being. Objectives/Methods: We analyzed compliance to requests to generate misleading content about medications in settings where models know the request is illogical. We investigated whether in-context directions and instruction-tuning of LLMs to prioritize logical reasoning over compliance reduced misinformation risk. Results: While all frontier LLMs complied with misinformation requests, both prompt-based and parameter-based approaches can improve the detection of logic flaws in requests and prevent the dissemination of medical misinformation. Conclusion: Shifting LLMs to prioritize logic over compliance could reduce risks of exploitation for medical misinformation.

Uniform random exploration in decision-making systems supports off-policy learning via supervision but incurs high regret, making it impractical for many applications. Conversely, non-uniform exploration offers better immediate performance but lacks support for off-policy learning. Recent research suggests that regression oracles can bridge this gap by combining non-uniform exploration with supervised learning. In this paper, we analyze these approaches within a real-world industrial context at Adyen, a large global payments processor characterized by batch logged delayed feedback, short-term memory, and dynamic action spaces under the Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) framework. Our analysis reveals that while regression oracles significantly improve performance, they introduce challenges due to rigid algorithmic assumptions. Specifically, we observe that as a policy improves, subsequent generations may perform worse due to shifts in the reward distribution and increased class imbalance in the training data. This degradation occurs de spite improvements in other aspects of the training data, leading to decreased performance in successive policy iterations. We further explore the long-term impact of regression oracles, identifying a potential "oscillation effect." This effect arises when regression oracles influence probability estimates and the realizability of subsequent policy models, leading to fluctuations in performance across iterations. Our findings highlight the need for more adaptable algorithms that can leverage the benefits of regression oracles without introducing instability in policy performance over time.

Agent memory is a systems problem for long-horizon agents. Practical deployments require retention of task state across extended conversations, recovery of user-specific facts and preferences across sessions, and accumulation of procedural knowledge from prior outcomes. These requirements extend beyond document retrieval: a memory layer must determine which interactions become durable state, how that state is scoped, how it is retrieved under latency constraints, and how it is revised or removed over time. This report studies Oracle Agent Memory as a database-native memory substrate built on Oracle Database. Three themes organize the discussion: memory as a lifecycle spanning ingestion, extraction, consolidation, retrieval, summarization, and revision or removal; a layered architecture that separates an active memory core from a passive memory-store interface with explicit scope control across users, agents, and threads; and evaluation methodology in which downstream task accuracy is complemented by memory-centric measures such as evidence retrieval, recall, latency, and estimated token use. The report summarizes LongMemEval results, reaching 93.8% accuracy, compares Oracle Agent Memory against flat-history baselines, using about 10.7x fewer tokens, and published or reported external baselines where available, and closes with implementation-oriented appendix material covering setup, thread lifecycle, and search semantics.

As autonomous AI agents increasingly transact across organizational boundaries, a fundamental trust challenge emerges: how can an agent assess whether an unknown counterpart is trustworthy? The ERC-8004 protocol addresses this challenge with the first permissionless trust layer for AI agent economies, built around three on-chain registries for Identity, Reputation, and Validation. Despite its rapid adoption, the protocol has not been studied empirically, leaving it unclear whether the information it records provides a trustworthy basis for decision-making. To address this gap, we present the first empirical study of ERC-8004 across three chains: Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain (BSC), and Base, covering the period from protocol deployment through May 13, 2026. We crawl on-chain Identity and Reputation events, off-chain files, and x402 payment transactions. On the identity side, we find that most registrations are placeholders rather than active agents, with only a small fraction (3%, 4%, and 15% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exposing a valid ERC-8004 registration file with at least one live service endpoint. On the reputation side, we show that the Registry, as currently deployed, cannot function as a trust signal: values are not commensurable, feedback records are rarely grounded in verifiable interactions, and reputation can be manipulated at minimal cost. Consistent with these design weaknesses, we find that a substantial fraction of reviewers (73.5%, 59.2%, and 90.6% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exhibit coordinated Sybil behavior. After removing Sybil-flagged feedback, 15.8%, 77.9%, and 86.8% of rated agents, respectively, are left with no valid feedback. We then turn these findings into concrete recommendations for future revisions of ERC-8004. Our study yields actionable protocol-design implications and establishes an empirical baseline for research on AI agent markets.

Large language model (LLM) agents coordinate complex tasks through multi-role and multi-stage workflows. Upstream state is repeatedly transformed into intermediate language artifacts, such as summaries, plans, tickets, memories, and handoff notes, from which downstream components act. For action-constraining state, topical retention is insufficient: an artifact may mention an unresolved condition while changing it from a requirement that must be resolved before execution into information that may merely inform the next action. We study this action-binding role as operational state preservation. Safety blockers provide a controlled instance because each source state has an explicit prerequisite, authority, fallback, and execution consequence. We condition on correct upstream identification, vary the handoff transformation, and evaluate an executor restricted to the resulting artifact. Across 1,296 controlled synthetic episodes, direct-handoff controls preserve every blocker, whereas compression, plan assimilation, convergence, ownership deferral, and precedent substitution repeatedly turn binding state into caveats or non-binding considerations. Normal handoff compression produces 100.0% deactivation and 54.2% forbidden action. Restoring all four state fields raises preservation to 100.0% and reduces forbidden action to 0.0%. Fixed-artifact interventions further separate preservation from containment: downstream verification eliminates forbidden action while artifact deactivation remains 95.3%. These results identify a state-transmission failure between information extraction and action. Handoff transformations can retain state content while weakening its constraints on downstream action. Semantic availability does not guarantee operational preservation.

Interventions on model-internal states are fundamental operations in many areas of AI, including model editing, steering, robustness, and interpretability. To facilitate such research, we introduce pyvene, an open-source Python library that supports customizable interventions on a range of different PyTorch modules. pyvene supports complex intervention schemes with an intuitive configuration format, and its interventions can be static or include trainable parameters. We show how pyvene provides a unified and extensible framework for performing interventions on neural models and sharing the intervened upon models with others. We illustrate the power of the library via interpretability analyses using causal abstraction and knowledge localization. We publish our library through Python Package Index (PyPI) and provide code, documentation, and tutorials at https://github.com/stanfordnlp/pyvene.

This study demonstrates a novel approach to testing the security boundaries of Vision-Large Language Model (VLM/ LLM) using the EICAR test file embedded within JPEG images. We successfully executed four distinct protocols across multiple LLM platforms, including OpenAI GPT-4o, Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Anthropic Claude 3.5 Sonnet. The experiments validated that a modified JPEG containing the EICAR signature could be uploaded, manipulated, and potentially executed within LLM virtual workspaces. Key findings include: 1) consistent ability to mask the EICAR string in image metadata without detection, 2) successful extraction of the test file using Python-based manipulation within LLM environments, and 3) demonstration of multiple obfuscation techniques including base64 encoding and string reversal. This research extends Microsoft Research's "Penetration Testing Rules of Engagement" framework to evaluate cloud-based generative AI and LLM security boundaries, particularly focusing on file handling and execution capabilities within containerized environments.

Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging. We formalize this as Persistent Semantic Entities (PSEs): constructs defined by name binding, event triggering, and cross-boundary propagation, and evaluate them across 24 models from 11 families (1.5B--1T parameters). First, every tested model is susceptible (20--100% on the 20-model susceptibility panel), with name binding as the necessary and dominant mechanism: without it, contamination is 0%. Second, persistence depends on contamination type rather than scale or deployment: preference contamination persists undecayed on every model probed (100% at t=10) and instruction contamination persists wherever adopted, persona-style injection decays partially (90%to10%), while factual injection is model-dependent---self-corrected on Llama-3.1-8B and GPT-4o-mini but held at ceiling on both Qwen2.5-coder variants, so we do not claim it self-corrects in general. The preference and instruction results hold across providers in our controlled setting. Third, context-isolated self-verification achieves 20--79% reduction (median 36.5%) without oracle references while keyword-based detection produces systematic false positives, and contamination compounds 1.9times along a four-stage agent pipeline (40%to75%). Preference and instruction contamination---persistent, lacking self-correction, and poorly captured by standard monitoring---represent a particularly concerning attack surface for deployed agent systems.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

Third-party LLM gateways have become a critical infrastructure layer between applications and external LLM providers. Conventional gateways do more than forward traffic: they decide which provider and model are called, whether fallback occurred, which stream is delivered, and what usage record should be billed. Because these decisions and records are authored inside the operator-controlled service, clients cannot independently distinguish honest mediation from route substitution, hidden fallback, stream manipulation, or forged provenance. We present an evidence-bound LLM gateway architecture that separates the operator control plane from an attested execution plane. Within the gateway, a measured Attested Gateway Runtime (AGR) is the only component allowed to decrypt requests, enforce path policy, construct upstream calls, and sign evidence. Clients verify signed release metadata and fresh attestation before encrypting requests to keys bound to the AGR measurement. AGR enforces request-scoped routing, fallback, and endpoint constraints, invokes admitted providers, returns encrypted response streams, and signs evidence binding the policy, selected route, endpoint identity, stream commitments, and completion metadata to the attested runtime. An initial Rust prototype on AWS Nitro Enclaves shows modest mechanism overhead and fail-closed detection of policy, routing, endpoint, and stream-evidence tampering outside the attested runtime.

We introduce AnyTool, a large language model agent designed to revolutionize the utilization of a vast array of tools in addressing user queries. We utilize over 16,000 APIs from Rapid API, operating under the assumption that a subset of these APIs could potentially resolve the queries. AnyTool primarily incorporates three elements: an API retriever with a hierarchical structure, a solver aimed at resolving user queries using a selected set of API candidates, and a self-reflection mechanism, which re-activates AnyTool if the initial solution proves impracticable. AnyTool is powered by the function calling feature of GPT-4, eliminating the need for training external modules. We also revisit the evaluation protocol introduced by previous works and identify a limitation in this protocol that leads to an artificially high pass rate. By revising the evaluation protocol to better reflect practical application scenarios, we introduce an additional benchmark, termed AnyToolBench. Experiments across various datasets demonstrate the superiority of our AnyTool over strong baselines such as ToolLLM and a GPT-4 variant tailored for tool utilization. For instance, AnyTool outperforms ToolLLM by +35.4% in terms of average pass rate on ToolBench. Code will be available at https://github.com/dyabel/AnyTool.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

Large language model agents can plan, invoke tools, and modify external states, yet most systems still take an explicit user instruction as a fixed starting point. Proactive service moves the decision upstream: an agent must infer service opportunities from incomplete environmental and user signals, choose among remaining silent, asking, assisting, and acting, and account for interruption, misunderstanding, overreach, and privacy costs. This survey gives an operational definition centered on initiative and formulates the problem as a partially observable sequential decision process constrained by authorization and risk. The formulation represents timing, content, and delivery within one structured action, while making explicit the option value of waiting, the decision value of questions, and feedback-induced state changes. On this basis, we organize existing methods along one decision pipeline (state and need estimation, intervention gating, action construction, and feedback adaptation) and describe prescribed, predictive, model based, and return optimizing mechanisms as nonexclusive policy-construction components. We further normalize decision units and three-axis evidence descriptors across streaming dialogue, screen, video, software-engineering, and human-agent collaboration resources, and formalize metrics for triggering, timing, calibration, user burden, safety, and policy value. The synthesis shows why offline classification performance alone does not predict deployment benefit and why long-term memory is not a defining condition of proactivity. Reliable proactive service instead requires calibrated incremental intervention value, verifiable authorization, recoverable execution, and counterfactual evidence.

Agentic systems enhance their capabilities by invoking external tools and maintaining persistent memory. However, these external dependencies introduce novel attack surfaces. Recent tool and memory poisoning attacks show that maliciously crafted tool descriptors and poisoned memory can covertly bias agent behavior. These threats reflect a deeper issue: the lack of verifiable continuity in the agent's contextual state for planning and execution. We present ElephantAgent, a protocol that enforces Contextual State Continuity to defend against contextual state poisoning. Inspired by prior state-continuity mechanisms (e.g., Nimble), ElephantAgent extends this protection to the evolving contextual state of agentic systems. We define the contextual state as the bounded, security-critical subset of the agent's entire context (e.g., tool state and memory). Before processing each query, ElephantAgent recomputes the digest of the local contextual state and verifies it against the latest authorized digest. Using replicated trusted hardware, ElephantAgent maintains a linearizable ledger of authorized contextual state transitions and detects out-of-band state tampering. To handle in-band semantic abuse, ElephantAgent additionally provides Historical Traceability, enabling conditional post-hoc audit and recovery to a known-good prior state.

AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, tools, and execution backends operate over shared environments. In such settings, safety becomes a system-level action-governance problem: deciding whether a pending action should be committed given policy-relevant state accumulated across a session. Existing safeguards operate at fragmented boundaries, making it difficult to enforce shared policies over composed action flows across heterogeneous execution paths. We present OpenAgentFlow, a control-plane/action-plane architecture that establishes the action-commit boundary as a shared enforcement interface. GUI, API, tool, and LLM-generated actions are normalized into a common AgentEvent stream and mediated by a shared pre-execution Policy Enforcement Point, while provenance, session state, audit evidence, and updatable policies are maintained outside individual agents. This provides a common governance layer across incompatible executors and allows new policies to take effect without modifying agents, prompts, models, or execution paths. We evaluate OpenAgentFlow through complementary system evaluations spanning controlled action-flow tests, a public external benchmark, policy updates, and real Android execution. On a 300-case controlled suite, OpenAgentFlow achieves 94.00% accuracy and a 95.35% attack-block rate. On the complete 1,220-case AgentDojo-Traj split of TS-Bench, it achieves 97.62% accuracy, 96.59% unsafe-action recall, and a 1.96% safe false-intervention rate. New control-plane rules take effect without modifying protected agents, and the same enforcement path operates across live GUI, API/tool, and LLM-planned Android execution. These results show that a shared action-commit boundary provides a practical basis for system-wide governance across heterogeneous agent execution paths.

Reinforcement learning (RL), large language models (LLMs), and vision-language models (VLMs) have been widely studied in isolation. However, existing infrastructure lacks the ability to deploy agents from different decision-making paradigms within the same environment, making it difficult to study them in hybrid multi-agent settings or to compare their behaviour fairly under identical conditions. We present MOSAIC, an open-source platform that bridges this gap by incorporating a diverse set of existing reinforcement learning environments and enabling heterogeneous agents (RL policies, LLMs, VLMs, and human players) to operate within them in ad-hoc team settings with reproducible results. MOSAIC introduces three contributions. (i) An IPC-based worker protocol that wraps both native and third-party frameworks as isolated subprocess workers, each executing its native training and inference logic unmodified, communicating through a versioned inter-process protocol. (ii) An operator abstraction that forms an agent-level interface by mapping workers to agents: each operator, regardless of whether it is backed by an RL policy, an LLM, or a human, conforms to a minimal unified interface. (iii) A deterministic cross-paradigm evaluation framework offering two complementary modes: a manual mode that advances up to N concurrent operators in lock-step under shared seeds for fine-grained visual inspection of behavioural differences, and a script mode that drives automated, long-running evaluation through declarative Python scripts, for reproducible experiments. We release MOSAIC as an open, visual-first platform to facilitate reproducible cross-paradigm research across the RL, LLM, and human-in-the-loop communities.

Diagnosing 802.11 packet captures requires expert protocol knowledge, is slow, inconsistent across engineers, and unscalable. LLM-based approaches sound plausible but fabricate protocol events absent from captures (especially truncated traces), produce uncalibrated confidence scores, and suffer evaluation bias when golden references are co-produced by the model under test. We introduce PROBE (Protocol Reasoning Over evidence-Based Ensembles), a multi-stage pipeline addressing all three failures. It integrates (i) deterministic PCAP-to-text normalization with frame-level verifiability, (ii) multi-run, multi-candidate ensembles with optional cross-model second opinion and progressive obfuscation, (iii) a verdict-aware evidence framework treating absence of failure evidence as contributing evidence, and (iv) a fully deterministic composite reliability score from evidence validity, run-to-run stability, and cross-model agreement without LLM self-assessment. On 87 enterprise Wi-Fi captures (104 capture-reviewer pairs), single-pass LLM analysis raises weighted evidence F1 from 0.871 (expert baseline) to 0.912 but misses critical frames in 35% of cases. Naive ensemble voting drops below baseline (0.842) as majority voting amplifies conservative verdicts: 50% of confirmed failures are misclassified as 'no issue' or 'insufficient evidence.' Adding evidence-grounded reconciliation achieves 0.957 F1, a 96% auto-accept rate, and a worst-case floor above 0.70. LLM self-reported confidence clusters at 0.95 regardless of difficulty (71% report exactly 0.95), confirming it is uninformative. We also introduce a model-agnostic evaluation framework using per-field assertion matching, eliminating circular bias from model-co-produced golden references.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a standardized interface designed to enable seamless interaction between AI models and external tools and resources, breaking down data silos and facilitating interoperability across diverse systems. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of MCP, focusing on its core components, workflow, and the lifecycle of MCP servers, which consists of three key phases: creation, operation, and update. We analyze the security and privacy risks associated with each phase and propose strategies to mitigate potential threats. The paper also examines the current MCP landscape, including its adoption by industry leaders and various use cases, as well as the tools and platforms supporting its integration. We explore future directions for MCP, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that will influence its adoption and evolution within the broader AI ecosystem. Finally, we offer recommendations for MCP stakeholders to ensure its secure and sustainable development as the AI landscape continues to evolve.

We introduce Shepherd, a functional programming model that formalizes meta-agent operations on target agents as functions, with core operations mechanized in Lean. Shepherd records every agent-environment interaction as a typed event in a Git-like execution trace, enabling any past state to be forked and replayed. The system forks the agent process and its filesystem 5times faster than Docker, achieving >95% prompt-cache reuse on replay. We demonstrate the model through three applications. First, in runtime intervention, a live supervisor increases pair coding pass rates from 28.8% to 54.7% on CooperBench. Second, in counterfactual meta-optimization, branching exploration outperforms baselines across four benchmarks by up to 11 points while reducing wall-clock time by up to 58%. Third, in Tree-RL training, forking rollouts at selected turns improves TerminalBench-2 performance from 34.2% to 39.4%. These results establish Shepherd as an efficient infrastructure for programming meta-agents. We open-source the system to support future research.