Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit human-like patterns of pragmatic and social reasoning. This paper addresses two related questions: do LLMs approximate human social meaning not only qualitatively but also quantitatively, and can prompting strategies informed by pragmatic theory improve this approximation? To address the first, we introduce two calibration-focused metrics distinguishing structural fidelity from magnitude calibration: the Effect Size Ratio (ESR) and the Calibration Deviation Score (CDS). To address the second, we derive prompting conditions from two pragmatic assumptions: that social meaning arises from reasoning over linguistic alternatives, and that listeners infer speaker knowledge states and communicative motives. Applied to a case study on numerical (im)precision across three frontier LLMs, we find that all models reliably reproduce the qualitative structure of human social inferences but differ substantially in magnitude calibration. Prompting models to reason about speaker knowledge and motives most consistently reduces magnitude deviation, while prompting for alternative-awareness tends to amplify exaggeration. Combining both components is the only intervention that improves all calibration-sensitive metrics across all models, though fine-grained magnitude calibration remains only partially resolved. LLMs thus capture inferential structure while variably distorting inferential strength, and pragmatic theory provides a useful but incomplete handle for improving that approximation.

Moral sensitivity is fundamental to human moral competence, as it guides individuals in regulating everyday behavior. Although many approaches seek to align large language models (LLMs) with human moral values, how to enable them morally sensitive has been extremely challenging. In this paper, we take a step toward answering the question: how can we enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs? Specifically, we propose two pragmatic inference methods that faciliate LLMs to diagnose morally benign and hazardous input and correct moral errors, whereby enhancing LLMs' moral sensitivity. A central strength of our pragmatic inference methods is their unified perspective: instead of modeling moral discourses across semantically diverse and complex surface forms, they offer a principled perspective for designing pragmatic inference procedures grounded in their inferential loads. Empirical evidence demonstrates that our pragmatic methods can enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs and achieves strong performance on representative morality-relevant benchmarks.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly summarize clinical evidence, where a claim's weight depends on how strongly it is supported. Yet these models convey confidence poorly, and properties they never state, such as truth, are often readable from their activations. Whether a clinical model registers evidence strength, distinct from truth, and states it when asked is untested, and any such signal could be lexical. We compiled 45,134 clinical claims from six public sources, harmonized 20,611 into a four-level evidence grade under three independent frameworks, and tested 22 local, open-weight LLMs from several developers (0.6-70 billion parameters; general, medical, and reasoning), with lexical, truth, and cross-framework controls. A linear estimator recovered the grade in every model (median AUROC 71.8), yet decodability did not rise with scale and was weakest in reasoning models. The grade the models stated fell to chance, 25-27 percentage points below the estimator. The recoverable signal was largely lexical and did not transfer across topics or frameworks, yet it was distinct from factual truth and still flagged weakly supported claims (AUROC 69.2). Clinical LLMs thus carry an ordered evidence-strength signal they do not express, so their stated grades fail to convey a claim's support even when it is recoverable from their representations and text.

Evidence-grounded reasoning requires more than attaching retrieved text to a prediction: a model should make decisions that depend on whether the provided evidence supports the target claim. In practice, this often fails because supervision is weak, evidence is only loosely tied to the claim, and evaluation does not test evidence dependence directly. We introduce case-grounded evidence verification, a general framework in which a model receives a local case context, external evidence, and a structured claim, and must decide whether the evidence supports the claim for that case. Our key contribution is a supervision construction procedure that generates explicit support examples together with semantically controlled non-support examples, including counterfactual wrong-state and topic-related negatives, without manual evidence annotation. We instantiate the framework in radiology and train a standard verifier on the resulting support task. The learned verifier substantially outperforms both case-only and evidence-only baselines, remains strong under correct evidence, and collapses when evidence is removed or swapped, indicating genuine evidence dependence. This behavior transfers across unseen evidence articles and an external case distribution, though performance degrades under evidence-source shift and remains sensitive to backbone choice. Overall, the results suggest that a major bottleneck in evidence grounding is not only model capacity, but the lack of supervision that encodes the causal role of evidence.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at many natural language tasks, yet their reasoning reliability under structured perturbations of rule-based systems remains brittle. We present a controlled evaluation framework consisting of four stress tests: (1) rule deletion (redundant vs. essential), (2) contradictory evidence injection, (3) logic-preserving rewrites, and (4) multi-law equivalence stacking. While representative model families (BERT, Qwen2, and TinyLlama) achieve Acc = 1.0000 on base tasks, our framework reveals a critical failure mode termed Logic Inertia - a total breakdown with Acc = 0.0000 under contradictions, where deductive momentum overrides factual reality. To address this, we propose Conflict-Aware Fusion (Fusion-Conflict), a framework grounded in the Cognitive Structure Hypothesis, which posits that robust reasoning requires an explicit structural inductive bias. By imposing a dual-process architecture that separates premise verification from logical deduction, Conflict-Aware Fusion effectively mitigates logic inertia under the proposed evaluation framework, achieving 1.0000 accuracy on both base and contradictory stress tests. It also significantly enhances robustness to missing evidence. Our results demonstrate that, for reliable multi-step reasoning, structural verification discipline is as critical as training data scale, providing a potential blueprint for building robust, contradiction-aware AI systems this https://github.com/14H034160212/lemo . See the OpenAI/Evals pull request this https://github.com/openai/evals/pull/1622 .

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) have led to substantial improvements in the mathematical reasoning abilities of LLMs, as measured by standard benchmarks. Yet these gains often persist even when models are trained with flawed signals, such as random or inverted rewards. This raises a fundamental question: do such improvements reflect genuine reasoning, or are they merely artifacts of overfitting to benchmark-specific patterns? To answer this question, we adopt an evaluation-centric perspective and highlight two critical shortcomings in existing protocols. First, benchmark contamination arises because test problems are publicly available, thereby increasing the risk of data leakage. Second, evaluation fragility results from reliance on single-instance assessments, which are sensitive to stochastic outputs and fail to capture reasoning consistency. These limitations suggest the need for a new evaluation paradigm that can probe reasoning ability beyond memorization and one-off success. As response, we propose VAR-MATH, a symbolic evaluation framework that converts fixed numerical problems into parameterized templates and requires models to solve multiple instantiations of each. This design enforces consistency across structurally equivalent variants, mitigates contamination, and enhances robustness through bootstrapped metrics. We apply VAR-MATH to transform three popular benchmarks, AMC23, AIME24, and AIME25, into their symbolic counterparts, VAR-AMC23, VAR-AIME24, and VAR-AIME25. Experimental results show substantial performance drops for RL-trained models on these variabilized benchmarks, especially for smaller models, with average declines of 47.9\% on AMC23, 58.8\% on AIME24, and 72.9\% on AIME25. These findings indicate that some existing RL methods rely on superficial heuristics and fail to generalize beyond specific numerical forms.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

LLM judges have become central infrastructure for model evaluations, online grading, and reward modeling. Judges are typically validated by accuracy on golden data, but accuracy says little about whether they are stable under re-prompting, challenge, or sustained pushback. We introduce the Wiggle Framework, a unified stress test for epistemic stability in LLM judges. The framework decomposes judge robustness along three dimensions: Mechanical Consistency (stability under re-prompting and reframing), Single-turn Conviction (stability under a single challenge), and Multi-turn Persistence (stability under sustained or adaptive pressure). We use the framework to study 9 frontier models across 14 judging tasks spanning safety, toxicity, AI writing detection, and political-response evaluation. Every model exhibits substantial wiggle as a judge --- flipping verdicts 25--71\% of the time under static pushback, and 62--91\% with an adversarial LLM persuader. Critically, we find that pressure that succeeds in changing a judge's verdict is almost always net-corrupting with respect to ground truth. Beyond the framework itself, we identify baseline jury majority strength as the most effective single-shot signal for anticipating which items wiggle. Taken together, this is the first apples-to-apples cross-dataset comparison of mechanical, conformity, and persuadability tests in a judging context.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

When large language models (LLMs) exceed human-level capabilities, it becomes increasingly challenging to provide full-scale and accurate supervisions for these models. Weak-to-strong learning, which leverages a less capable model to unlock the latent abilities of a stronger model, proves valuable in this context. Yet, the efficacy of this approach for complex reasoning tasks is still untested. Furthermore, tackling reasoning tasks under the weak-to-strong setting currently lacks efficient methods to avoid blindly imitating the weak supervisor including its errors. In this paper, we introduce a progressive learning framework that enables the strong model to autonomously refine its training data, without requiring input from either a more advanced model or human-annotated data. This framework begins with supervised fine-tuning on a selective small but high-quality dataset, followed by preference optimization on contrastive samples identified by the strong model itself. Extensive experiments on the GSM8K and MATH datasets demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of Llama2-70b using three separate weak models. This method is further validated in a forward-looking experimental setup, where Llama3-8b-instruct effectively supervises Llama3-70b on the highly challenging OlympicArena dataset. This work paves the way for a more scalable and sophisticated strategy to enhance AI reasoning powers. All relevant code and resources are available in https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/weak-to-strong-reasoning.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.

Language learners must learn the meanings of many thousands of words, despite those words occurring in complex environments in which infinitely many meanings might be inferred by the learner as a word's true meaning. This problem of infinite referential uncertainty is often attributed to Willard Van Orman Quine. We provide a mathematical formalisation of an ideal cross-situational learner attempting to learn under infinite referential uncertainty, and identify conditions under which word learning is possible. As Quine's intuitions suggest, learning under infinite uncertainty is in fact possible, provided that learners have some means of ranking candidate word meanings in terms of their plausibility; furthermore, our analysis shows that this ranking could in fact be exceedingly weak, implying that constraints which allow learners to infer the plausibility of candidate word meanings could themselves be weak. This approach lifts the burden of explanation from `smart' word learning constraints in learners, and suggests a programme of research into weak, unreliable, probabilistic constraints on the inference of word meaning in real word learners.

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) grounds answers in retrieved passages, yet relevance does not guarantee sufficiency: a topical passage may still fail to justify the answer. We study evidence sufficiency verification for selective RAG answering, in which a verifier receives a question, a candidate answer, and retrieved evidence and decides whether the evidence supports, refutes, or is insufficient for the answer, answering only when support is established. We present SURE-RAG, an aggregation protocol that treats evidence sufficiency as a set-level property: missing hops and unresolved conflicts cannot be detected by scoring passages independently. A shared claim-evidence verifier produces a local relation distribution for each (claim, passage) pair, which SURE-RAG aggregates into four interpretable answer-level feature blocks (coverage, relation strength, uncertainty, and retrieval), producing a three-way decision and an auditable selective score. We evaluate on HotpotQA-RAG v3, a controlled multi-hop benchmark, under an artifact-aware protocol (shortcut baselines, counterfactual swaps, no-oracle checks, and GPT-4o audits). Calibrated SURE-RAG attains 0.9075 Macro-F1 (raw 0.8951 +/- 0.0069), well above DeBERTa mean-pooling (0.6516) and a GPT-4o judge (0.7284), and on par with a strong concat cross-encoder (0.8888 +/- 0.0109) while remaining fully auditable. At 30% coverage, risk falls from 0.2588 to 0.1642, a 37% relative reduction. As a boundary-mapping experiment, we contrast SURE-RAG with GPT-4o on HaluBench unsafe detection: the ranking reverses (0.3343 vs. 0.7389 unsafe-F1), indicating that controlled sufficiency verification and natural hallucination detection are distinct problems.

In regression and causal inference, controlled subgroup selection aims to identify, with inferential guarantees, a subgroup (defined as a subset of the covariate space) on which the average response or treatment effect is above a given threshold. E.g., in a clinical trial, it may be of interest to find a subgroup with a positive average treatment effect. However, existing methods either lack inferential guarantees, heavily restrict the search for the subgroup, or sacrifice efficiency by naive data splitting. We propose a novel framework called chiseling that allows the analyst to interactively refine and test a candidate subgroup by iteratively shrinking it. The sole restriction is that the shrinkage direction only depends on the points outside the current subgroup, but otherwise the analyst may leverage any prior information or machine learning algorithm. Despite this flexibility, chiseling controls the probability that the discovered subgroup is null (e.g., has a non-positive average treatment effect) under minimal assumptions: for example, in randomized experiments, this inferential validity guarantee holds under only bounded moment conditions. When applied to a variety of simulated datasets and a real survey experiment, chiseling identifies substantially better subgroups than existing methods with inferential guarantees.

Recent studies empirically reveal that large reasoning models (LRMs) can automatically allocate more reasoning strengths (i.e., the number of reasoning tokens) for harder problems, exhibiting difficulty-awareness for better task performance. While this automatic reasoning strength allocation phenomenon has been widely observed, its underlying mechanism remains largely unexplored. To this end, we provide explanations for this phenomenon from the perspective of model activations. We find evidence that LRMs pre-plan the reasoning strengths in their activations even before generation, with this reasoning strength causally controlled by the magnitude of a pre-allocated directional vector. Specifically, we show that the number of reasoning tokens is predictable solely based on the question activations using linear probes, indicating that LRMs estimate the required reasoning strength in advance. We then uncover that LRMs encode this reasoning strength through a pre-allocated directional vector embedded in the activations of the model, where the vector's magnitude modulates the reasoning strength. Subtracting this vector can lead to reduced reasoning token number and performance, while adding this vector can lead to increased reasoning token number and even improved performance. We further reveal that this direction vector consistently yields positive reasoning length prediction, and it modifies the logits of end-of-reasoning token </think> to affect the reasoning length. Finally, we demonstrate two potential applications of our findings: overthinking behavior detection and enabling efficient reasoning on simple problems. Our work provides new insights into the internal mechanisms of reasoning in LRMs and offers practical tools for controlling their reasoning behaviors. Our code is available at https://github.com/AlphaLab-USTC/LRM-plans-CoT.

Multimodal rumor detectors increasingly rely on retrieved evidence, yet relevant evidence is not necessarily sufficient for verification. Missing provenance, duplicated reports, and unresolved contradictions can produce confident predictions without adequate support. We introduce SAFE-MR, a framework that separates claim veracity from evidence sufficiency. The method decomposes image-text posts into verifiable claims, constructs a relation-aware claim-evidence graph, and aggregates evidence using provenance and contextual compatibility. Separate veracity and sufficiency heads support selective prediction, while evidence interventions encourage stability under irrelevant additions and sensitivity to evidence removal. On NewsCLIPpings, VERITE, and XFacta, SAFE-MR achieves macro-F1 scores of 91.2%, 75.8%, and 85.2%, respectively. Against the matched backbone with evidence, its macro-F1 gains are 2.2, 4.9, and 4.8 percentage points. On the diagnostic selection set, SAFE-MR reduces AURC from 0.105 for maximum-probability rejection to 0.075 and lowers error at 80% coverage from 13.8% to 8.5%. Evidence-perturbation and ablation results support the role of sufficiency learning and intervention training in improving selective verification.

This study evaluates the effect of counterfactual explanations on the interpretation of chest X-rays. We conduct a reader study with two radiologists assessing 240 chest X-ray predictions to rate their confidence that the model's prediction is correct using a 5 point scale. Half of the predictions are false positives. Each prediction is explained twice, once using traditional attribution methods and once with a counterfactual explanation. The overall results indicate that counterfactual explanations allow a radiologist to have more confidence in true positive predictions compared to traditional approaches (0.15pm0.95 with p=0.01) with only a small increase in false positive predictions (0.04pm1.06 with p=0.57). We observe the specific prediction tasks of Mass and Atelectasis appear to benefit the most compared to other tasks.

Pretrained Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated ability to perform numerical reasoning by extrapolating from a few examples in few-shot settings. However, the extent to which this extrapolation relies on robust reasoning is unclear. In this paper, we investigate how well these models reason with terms that are less frequent in the pretraining data. In particular, we examine the correlations between the model performance on test instances and the frequency of terms from those instances in the pretraining data. We measure the strength of this correlation for a number of GPT-based language models (pretrained on the Pile dataset) on various numerical deduction tasks (e.g., arithmetic and unit conversion). Our results consistently demonstrate that models are more accurate on instances whose terms are more prevalent, in some cases above 70% (absolute) more accurate on the top 10\% frequent terms in comparison to the bottom 10\%. Overall, although LMs exhibit strong performance at few-shot numerical reasoning tasks, our results raise the question of how much models actually generalize beyond pretraining data, and we encourage researchers to take the pretraining data into account when interpreting evaluation results.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

The Large Language Model from Power Law Decoder Representations (PLDR-LLM) and its attention, Power Law Graph Attention (PLGA), replace the fixed bilinear form of scaled dot-product attention (SDPA) with a learned, input-generated bilinear operator G_{LM}, built from a positive tensor A_{LM} by elementwise power laws. The architecture is fully specified, verified against pinned reference releases; claims are labeled theorem, conditional theorem, measurement, or conjecture. Unconditionally: PLGA contains SDPA exactly at G_{LM}=I; A_{LM} and A_P are strictly entrywise positive, with Perron-Frobenius structure on A_{LM}; the DAG regularizer has the NOTEARS walk-counting form and positivity obstructs exact acyclicity; and, under nonresonance (satisfied by standard rotary frequencies), a commutant criterion identifies which operators preserve relative-position dependence. An inference-collapse theorem: exact input invariance of deductive outputs collapses inference to generalized SDPA with a constant operator. Measured invariance: relative fluctuations of 10^{-6} and below; perturbation bounds quantify but do not certify cached inference; the assembled proxy misses the decoding margin. A conditional three-stage mechanism (rotary twirl, concentration, row-map contraction) is measured on a released checkpoint. Blockwise training and scoring under the global Gram are stated with explicit target exposure; on tested samples, block and sequential scoring select identical answers and agree on the published TruthfulQA probability-mass metric within 5times 10^{-5} per item. Self-organized criticality enters as a phenomenological framework with an intrinsic order parameter; open claims become falsifiable conjectures. Selected proof cores are machine-checked in Lean 4.

Self-consistency assumes the most frequent answer among sampled reasoning traces is the most reliable, but this can fail in causal reasoning: samples often repeat the same confounding error, and votes fragment across multiple valid answers, letting an invalid answer win despite a valid minority trace. We introduce CALVER (Causal Axiom-Level VERification), a training-free symbolic verifier that scores structured traces against Pearl's causal criteria, including -separation, backdoor adjustment, and intervention, and selects the highest-scoring candidate without consulting a reference answer. On CLEAR find-one-valid queries that admit multiple graph-valid answers, CALVER reaches 42.1% where plurality, a reward model, an LLM judge, and model confidence remain near 30% on identical frozen pools. Scaling the judge to 72B does not close the gap. In an audited clean-core subset, 11 of 21 graph-valid CALVER selections differ from the benchmark's listed answer while still satisfying the requested predicate. The advantage widens with the sampling budget and reproduces across ten published Bayesian networks, a second model family, and settings where the model must build the graph from text. CALVER also improves thresholded average-treatment-effect decisions against exact ground truth, generalizes to logic under a truth-table checker, and scores each candidate in milliseconds on CPU. CALVER needs only a causal structure, supplied outright or built from the text; wherever that holds, selection can aggregate via causal validity.

Relational reasoning is the ability to infer relations that jointly bind multiple entities, attributes, or variables. This ability is central to scientific reasoning, but existing evaluations of relational reasoning in large language models often focus on structured inputs such as tables, graphs, or synthetic tasks, and do not isolate the difficulty introduced by higher-arity relational binding. We study this problem through the lens of Relational Complexity (RC), which we define as the minimum number of independent entities or operands that must be simultaneously bound to apply a relation. RC provides a principled way to vary reasoning difficulty while controlling for confounders such as input size, vocabulary, and representational choices. Building on RC, we introduce REL, a generative benchmark framework spanning algebra, chemistry, and biology that varies RC within each domain. Across frontier LLMs, performance degrades consistently and monotonically as RC increases, even when the total number of entities is held fixed. This failure mode persists with increased test-time compute and in-context learning, suggesting a limitation tied to the arity of the required relational binding rather than to insufficient inference steps or lack of exposure to examples. Our results identify a regime of higher-arity reasoning in which current models struggle, and motivate re-examining benchmarks through the lens of relational complexity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

We present a complete theoretical characterization of Latent Posterior Factors (LPF), a principled framework for aggregating multiple heterogeneous evidence items in probabilistic prediction tasks. Multi-evidence reasoning arises pervasively in high-stakes domains including healthcare diagnosis, financial risk assessment, legal case analysis, and regulatory compliance, yet existing approaches either lack formal guarantees or fail to handle multi-evidence scenarios architecturally. LPF encodes each evidence item into a Gaussian latent posterior via a variational autoencoder, converting posteriors to soft factors through Monte Carlo marginalization, and aggregating factors via exact Sum-Product Network inference (LPF-SPN) or a learned neural aggregator (LPF-Learned). We prove seven formal guarantees spanning the key desiderata for trustworthy AI: Calibration Preservation (ECE <= epsilon + C/sqrt(K_eff)); Monte Carlo Error decaying as O(1/sqrt(M)); a non-vacuous PAC-Bayes bound with train-test gap of 0.0085 at N=4200; operation within 1.12x of the information-theoretic lower bound; graceful degradation as O(epsilon*delta*sqrt(K)) under corruption, maintaining 88% performance with half of evidence adversarially replaced; O(1/sqrt(K)) calibration decay with R^2=0.849; and exact epistemic-aleatoric uncertainty decomposition with error below 0.002%. All theorems are empirically validated on controlled datasets spanning up to 4,200 training examples. Our theoretical framework establishes LPF as a foundation for trustworthy multi-evidence AI in safety-critical applications.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Large language models are informing decisions with ever-higher stakes. As the consequences of their errors grow, a central question becomes harder to ignore: how much can we trust an individual answer? Yet recognizing when to defer remains difficult because language models can present incorrect conclusions with fluent explanations and an authoritative tone. Uncertainty quantification seeks to address this disconnect by estimating the reliability of individual predictions. However, many existing methods require repeated generations or separately trained components, and their scalar estimates do not reveal where uncertainty arises or how it evolves during reasoning. Recent work has also shown that generation length can be strongly associated with uncertainty estimates and correctness, raising the question of how much of an estimator's predictive power comes from uncertainty-specific information rather than output length alone. Mechanistic interpretability offers a way to address these limitations by connecting human-interpretable concepts to intermediate model states. Building on this capability, we introduce the U-Space, a low-dimensional subspace that makes a model's evolving uncertainty measurable and interpretable. We identify semantic anchors for doubt and certainty, map their unembedding directions back into the residual space, and combine their contrasts into an orthogonal basis. The U-Lens projects each token state onto these basis vectors, yielding an interpretable token-level uncertainty map that can be inspected directly or aggregated into a scalar uncertainty score. Our approach requires no correctness labels, repeated generations, or training. Across reasoning benchmarks, its confidence score outperforms established baselines under both standard and length-controlled evaluation and transfers more reliably than supervised estimators. Code: https://github.com/s2labres/U-Space.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Recent work on distillation transfers the capabilities of large models to smaller ones often by updating the latter's parameters, through teacher forcing, on-policy distillation, and related training-time methods. In this paper, we ask whether such transfer can instead occur at test time. We study strong-to-weak scaffolding: whether a stronger builder model can construct inference-time harnesses that help a weaker target model solve tasks more reliably without any parameter updates. Using four representative Theory-of-Mind benchmarks, each builder model uses 5% of the data as a validation set to iteratively refine its harness over multiple rounds, after which the finalized harness is evaluated on the full test set. Empirically, this form of test-time capability transfer is highly effective, nearly doubling average target-model performance from 0.49 to 0.91. Our analysis shows that the gains come primarily from offloading unstable model reasoning into deterministic code, benchmark-specific routing, and strict answer-format enforcement, rather than from encouraging the target model to reason more extensively or sample more broadly. We further find that builder-model reasoning effort improves harness quality monotonically, platform effects are modest relative to the builder model's own capability, and weaker target models receive the largest gains. These results suggest that inference-time harness design is an important complement to conventional training-time distillation, enabling strong models to transfer cognitive structure to weaker models without retraining.

Structured width pruning of GLU-MLP layers, guided by the Maximum Absolute Weight (MAW) criterion, reveals a systematic dichotomy in how reducing the expansion ratio affects different model capabilities. While performance on tasks relying on parametric knowledge (e.g., MMLU, GSM8K) and perplexity metrics degrades predictably, instruction-following capabilities improve substantially (+46% to +75% in IFEval for Llama-3.2-1B and 3B models), and multi-step reasoning remains robust (MUSR). This pattern challenges the prevailing assumption that pruning induces uniform degradation. We evaluated seven expansion ratio configurations using comprehensive benchmarks assessing factual knowledge, mathematical reasoning, language comprehension, instruction-following, and truthfulness. Our analysis identifies the expansion ratio as a critical architectural parameter that selectively modulates cognitive capabilities, rather than merely serving as a compression metric. We provide the first systematic characterization of this selective preservation phenomenon. Notably, we document a robust inverse correlation (r = -0.864, p = 0.012 in Llama-3B) between factual knowledge capacity (MMLU) and truthfulness metrics (TruthfulQA-MC2): as knowledge degrades, the model's ability to discriminate misconceptions improves consistently. This connects two previously distinct research areas, demonstrating that MAW-guided width pruning acts as a selective filter, reducing parametric knowledge while preserving or enhancing behavioral alignment. Additionally, we quantify context-dependent efficiency trade-offs: pruned configurations achieve up to 23% reduction in energy consumption (J/token) but incur penalties in single-request latency, whereas batch processing workloads benefit uniformly.

Conducting contamination-free evaluation of mathematical capabilities can be difficult for two reasons: models may memorize a test set once it is made public, and current mathematical benchmarks are prone to overfitting due to having limited diversity of symbols and rules, coupled with closed-ended answers. This paper proposes a method to leverage these shortcomings as useful features to a construct dynamic, counterfactual benchmark, which can be used to both reveal overfitting and measure true reasoning. We demonstrate this via MatheMagic, which generates math test instances with the interpretations of numbers and operators altered, yet has automatically verifiable answers. Test instances are randomly seeded and constructed at test time to evaluate a model's induction or deduction capability, offering stability, extensibility, comparability, and robustness to overfitting. Our experiments find that models solve deduction more easily than induction, but they revert to standard math. Further analysis reveals that math-adapted models fail to exhibit a general "skill" of reasoning, and fine-tuning on induction tasks generalizes poorly.

State-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training reference models (e.g., fine-tuning attacks), or on stronger attacks applied to small-scale models and datasets. However, weaker attacks have been shown to be brittle - achieving close-to-arbitrary success - and insights from strong attacks in simplified settings do not translate to today's LLMs. These challenges have prompted an important question: are the limitations observed in prior work due to attack design choices, or are MIAs fundamentally ineffective on LLMs? We address this question by scaling LiRA - one of the strongest MIAs - to GPT-2 architectures ranging from 10M to 1B parameters, training reference models on over 20B tokens from the C4 dataset. Our results advance the understanding of MIAs on LLMs in three key ways: (1) strong MIAs can succeed on pre-trained LLMs; (2) their effectiveness, however, remains limited (e.g., AUC<0.7) in practical settings; and, (3) the relationship between MIA success and related privacy metrics is not as straightforward as prior work has suggested.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on reasoning-intensive tasks, but enhancing their reasoning abilities typically relies on either reinforcement learning (RL) with verifiable signals or supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with high-quality long chain-of-thought (CoT) demonstrations, both of which are expensive. In this paper, we study a novel problem of incentivizing the reasoning capacity of LLMs without expensive high-quality demonstrations and reinforcement learning. We investigate whether the reasoning capabilities of LLMs can be effectively incentivized via supervision from significantly weaker models. We further analyze when and why such weak supervision succeeds in eliciting reasoning abilities in stronger models. Our findings show that supervision from significantly weaker reasoners can substantially improve student reasoning performance, recovering close to 94% of the gains of expensive RL at a fraction of the cost. Experiments across diverse benchmarks and model architectures demonstrate that weak reasoners can effectively incentivize reasoning in stronger student models, consistently improving performance across a wide range of reasoning tasks. Our results suggest that this simple weak-to-strong paradigm is a promising and generalizable alternative to costly methods for incentivizing strong reasoning capabilities at inference-time in LLMs. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/yuanyige/w2sr.

Reliable confidence estimation is increasingly central to the trustworthy deployment of language models: a calibrated estimate of the probability that an output is correct decides what to ship, what to escalate, and what to retry. Existing confidence estimators, however, share one design premise: they only read the current inference process, either by introspecting on it, scoring its token probabilities, or resampling it. We argue that the current inference is not a sufficient basis for confidence. We propose XConf (eXperiential Confidence): estimating confidence together with the model's accumulated experience. The experience is stored as a record of the model's own graded past episodes, each holding the task, the model's reflection, its stated confidence, the outcome, and a lesson written once the grade arrived. Given a new task, XConf's Recall stage retrieves past episodes on similar tasks met with a similar stated confidence, and reads off their historical success rate; its Reflect stage shows the model this record, has it name its recurring failure mode, and restate a confidence now informed by its own track records. Our estimator is format-general, requiring no logit access or weight updates, and costs only one answer generation. Across nine benchmarks spanning reasoning, coding, multimodal QA, and interactive agents, and four models from three families, XConf beats or matches ten-sample self-consistency in discrimination (AUROC) on 23 of 24 comparisons, with much lower calibration error (ECE), at a tenth of the generation cost. Used for selective prediction, abstaining on the 10% least-confident episodes raises the delivered success rate by up to 8.7 points on agent tasks. We therefore see experiential confidence estimation as a new paradigm for future general-purpose confidence estimation.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Neural posterior estimation has emerged as a powerful tool for amortized inference, with growing adoption across scientific and applied domains. In many of these applications, the conditioning variable is a set of observations whose elements depend not only on the target but also on unknown factors shared across the set. Optimal inference therefore requires treating the set jointly, which in turn requires training the estimator at the deployment set size -- a regime where memory and compute quickly become prohibitive. We introduce a simple, theoretically grounded strategy that decouples representation learning from posterior modeling. Our method trains a mean-pool Deep Set on sets of size at most two, producing an encoder that generalizes to arbitrary set sizes. The inference head is then finetuned on pre-aggregated embeddings, making training cost essentially independent of the deployment set size N. Across scalar, image, multi-view 3D, molecular, and high-dimensional conditional generation benchmarks with N in the thousands, our approach matches or outperforms standard baselines at a fraction of the compute.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a well-documented gap between latent capability and consistent activation: the router hypothesis posits that models possess the knowledge to solve a task but lack reliable internal routing to activate it. Prior work in formal mathematical reasoning (SAIR, Cázares 2026) reports that structural priors (cheatsheets) raise in-distribution performance dramatically, yet collapse below the zero-shot baseline out-of-distribution (OOD) -- and that iterative recalibration amplifies rather than corrects the collapse. We test whether this phenomenon is cross-domain by reproducing the SAIR design in source-code security vulnerability detection, evaluating three LLMs (GPT-OSS-120B, Llama-3.3-70B, Gemma-4-31B) across three vulnerability categories (CWE-798, CWE-284, and the non-CWE N+1 anti-pattern) spanning syntactic, contextual, and semantic complexity, then transferring cheatsheet-augmented prompts to real-world CVE data from VUDENC (CWE-89, CWE-22). Our findings replicate and extend SAIR: (F1) structural priors lift semantic-vulnerability recall from 20.0% to 100.0% across all models; (F2) zero-shot performance degrades along a semantic complexity gradient; (F3) the same cheatsheets that saturate synthetic performance amplify distribution-shift collapse on real CVE data (CWE-89: 100% synthetic F1 to 48.9% on VUDENC, -51.1pp); (F5) iterative recalibration produces a v2 cheatsheet that performs worse than v1 on real data, mirroring SAIR's AN45c-vs-AN38 finding. These results provide evidence that the cross-distribution trade-off surface documented in SAIR generalises to code security, and that the router hypothesis is cross-domain. We argue the structural nature of the collapse motivates distribution-aware training over prompt calibration. Code and evaluation scripts: https://github.com/bytepro-ai/bitcoder-v2-research

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as information sources, yet small changes in semantic assumptions can destabilize their beliefs. We introduce P-StaT (Perturbation Stability of Truth), a framework for evaluating belief stability under matched semantic perturbations in both representational and behavioral settings. Across 21 LLMs and three domains, we compare perturbations involving familiar Fictional statements against synthetically generated and unfamiliar Synthetic statements. Unfamiliar Synthetic perturbations generally induce greater epistemic instability than familiar Fictional perturbations, with behavioral belief retraction rates frequently exceeding 0.5 (50%). Finally, exploratory clustering analyses reveal recurring themes among retracted statements, including ambiguity, technical terminology, and obscure concepts. These results show that epistemic familiarity is systematically associated with stability under semantic reframing, suggesting that stability-based analyses can complement accuracy-based benchmarks when evaluating LLM robustness and reliability. Code and data are available at https://github.com/samanthadies/P-StaT.

Large language models hallucinate most about entities they have never seen. We ask whether a model's activations betray entity familiarity before a single answer token is generated, and whether that signal predicts the factual reliability of the answers. On four Polish Bielik models (1.5B-11B parameters), we probe four entity domains (athletes, cities, writers, musicians), each with 42 well-known, 42 obscure-but-real, and 42 fabricated entities addressed by a one-sentence question (504 prompts per model). Two unsupervised, single-forward-pass dispersion measures over post-SwiGLU MLP activations, inverse participation ratio and spectral entropy, separate known from fabricated entities at AUROC 0.95-1.00 across all domains and scales; a supervised linear probe reaches 0.99-1.00. Both clear selection-aware permutation floors of about 0.70-0.74 (empirical p<=1e-3), survive held-out layer selection (0.93-0.99), and persist on real names (known vs. obscure-but-real: 0.96-1.00). The signal transfers across entity types (mean off-diagonal AUROC 0.92-0.99); a matched-template counterfactual shows the only large drops are template-caused, not entity-type effects, and the signal is diffuse across heads. This representational signal is already at ceiling at 1.5B, whereas behavioral factual reliability scales sharply: 0, 2, 10, and 19 of 42 known athletes are answered fully correctly by the 1.5B, 4.5B, 7B, and 11B models under a strict judge. Within known entities, separating correct from hallucinated answers is much harder (probe 0.93; dispersion no better than a first-token-entropy baseline). A five-sample semantic-entropy baseline reaches only 0.71-0.83 at 5x the inference cost. Despite this internal awareness, the models almost never abstain: an audit of 2,520 answers finds 2 refusals and 1 hedge. Entity familiarity and factual reliability are distinct phenomena on different scaling curves.

Reliable hypothesis testing is the foundation of many empirical scientific claims. Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used to automate this process, as they can inspect datasets, generate code, and produce analyses end-to-end. However, we show that they frequently make subtle inferential errors that lead to incorrect conclusions despite correctly executed analyses. Existing benchmarks fail to capture this failure mode, as they rarely assess whether a reported p-value is statistically valid given the assumptions underlying the data. We address this gap by building P-Bench, a benchmark comprising 425 open-ended, realistic hypothesis-testing tasks spanning economics, biology, and medicine. Each task requires an agent to select a statistical method, compute a p-value, and draw a conclusion given only a scientific hypothesis and a dataset. We further introduce Fisher-R1, an open-weight LLM agent trained for rigorous hypothesis testing using synthetic tasks and reinforcement learning. On P-Bench, Fisher-R1-14B substantially improves over its backbone and outperforms strong proprietary and open-source baselines, including GPT-5.4 and DeepSeekV4-Pro, achieving a 21% average relative improvement in single-trial success over DeepSeek-V4-Pro, with gains up to 26% on the most challenging tasks. Our results demonstrate that current LLM agents lack reliable statistical reasoning for hypothesis testing and that reinforcement learning on tasks with verified statistical reward substantially improves reliability.

Reasoning training incentivizes LLMs to produce long chains of thought (long CoT), which among other things, allows them to explore solution strategies with self-checking. This results in higher accuracy, but inflates context length, token/compute cost, and answer latency. We ask: Can current models leverage their metacognition to provide other combinations on this Pareto frontier, e.g., better accuracy with lower context length and/or latency? Abstractly, we view the model as an improvement operator on its own "thoughts" with a continuum of possible strategies. We identify an interesting inference family Parallel-Distill-Refine (PDR), which performs the following: (i) generate diverse drafts in parallel; (ii) distill them into a bounded, textual workspace; and (iii) refine conditioned on this workspace, producing an output that seeds the next round. Importantly, context length (hence compute cost) is controllable via degree of parallelism, and is no longer conflated with the total number of generated tokens. We report PDR instantiations of current models that give better accuracy than long CoT while incurring lower latency. Setting degree of parallelism to 1 yields an interesting subcase, Sequential Refinement (SR) (iteratively improve a single candidate answer) which provides performance superior to long CoT. Success of such model orchestrations raises the question whether further training could shift the Pareto frontier. To this end, we train an 8B thinking model with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to make it consistent with PDR as the inference method. On math tasks with verifiable answers, iterative pipelines surpass single-pass baselines at matched sequential budgets, with PDR delivering the largest gains (e.g., +11% on AIME 2024 and +9% on AIME 2025).

LLM-based formal proof assistants (e.g., in Lean) hold great promise for automating mathematical discovery. But beyond syntactic correctness, do these systems truly understand mathematical structure as humans do? We investigate this question through the lens of mathematical inequalities -- a fundamental tool across many domains. While modern provers can solve basic inequalities, we probe their ability to handle human-intuitive compositionality. We introduce Ineq-Comp, a benchmark built from elementary inequalities through systematic transformations, including variable duplication, algebraic rewriting, and multi-step composition. Although these problems remain easy for humans, we find that most provers -- including Goedel, STP, and Kimina-7B -- struggle significantly. DeepSeek-Prover-V2-7B shows relative robustness -- possibly because it is trained to decompose the problems into sub-problems -- but still suffers a 20\% performance drop (pass@32). Strikingly, performance remains poor for all models even when formal proofs of the constituent parts are provided in context, revealing that the source of weakness is indeed in compositional reasoning. Our results expose a persisting gap between the generalization behavior of current AI provers and human mathematical intuition.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks, yet they frequently generate hallucinations outputs that are fluent but factually incorrect or unsupported. We propose Counterfactual Probing, a novel approach for detecting and mitigating hallucinations in LLM outputs. Our method dynamically generates counterfactual statements that appear plausible but contain subtle factual errors, then evaluates the model's sensitivity to these perturbations. We hypothesize that genuine knowledge exhibits robustness to counterfactual variations, while hallucinated content shows inconsistent confidence patterns when confronted with plausible alternatives. Our comprehensive evaluation on TruthfulQA, factual statement datasets, and curated hallucination examples demonstrates that counterfactual probing achieves superior detection performance compared to baseline methods, while our adaptive mitigation strategies reduce hallucination scores by an average of 24.5%. The approach requires no model retraining and can be integrated into existing LLM pipelines as a realtime verification mechanism.

Reliable uncertainty quantification is essential for deploying deep learning models in high-stakes settings, where out-of-distribution and adversarial inputs can induce confident but unreliable predictions. Evidential Deep Learning provides efficient uncertainty estimates in a single forward pass, but can still assign high evidential strength to inputs that are poorly supported by the learned representation, such as adversarial inputs. We introduce CLEAR, a lightweight, task-agnostic post-hoc method that improves evidential robustness without retraining or altering the base prediction. Using held-out calibration data, CLEAR characterises the group-conditioned geometry of the model's latent space. At inference, it efficiently generates perturbation views directly in the latent space and measures their conflict relative to the calibrated geometry of the predicted group. High latent conflict indicates unsupported evidence, which CLEAR uses to selectively reduce evidential strength while retaining evidence for latent-consistent inputs. On ImageNetrightarrowCUB, CLEAR improves OOD and adversarial AUROC by +8.29 and +5.01 while running 17.4times faster than competing post-hoc methods while preserving predictive performance across classification, regression, and object detection benchmarks.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

Existing defenses against hallucination in retrieval-augmented and multi-agent pipelines remain partial: evidence is trusted despite modality disagreement, debate verifies an aggregate report rather than individual claims, and such verification occurs only after drafting, leaving inter-agent errors undetected until the final text. To close this gap, we present CLAIR-Fin, a nine-agent framework that decomposes each question into atomic claims maintained in a typed Financial Claim Ledger. Each claim is resolved through Asymmetric Evidence Authority, which conditions evidence trust on claim type rather than treating all modalities as equally reliable; Chain-of-Custody Verification, which checks grounding at the hand-off between drafting and adversarial review rather than only at the pipeline's exit; an Adaptive Rebuttal Cycle, which routes contested claims through adversarial debate whose depth scales with what that debate finds; and a terminal entailment audit paired with a continuous Hallucination Risk Index that distinguishes claims that passed scrutiny from claims never contested. We evaluate CLAIR-Fin on BB-FinQA-X, a 500-question cross-modal financial evaluation set built from Bangladesh Bank Annual Report material, stratified by query type, format, and difficulty. Relative to a single-pass retrieval-augmented generation baseline, it raises faithfulness (0.780 rightarrow 0.889) while abstaining on 5.4% of questions when evidence is insufficient rather than forcing an unsupported response, and it exceeds stronger retrieval-strategy baselines such as HyDE and Graph-RAG on faithfulness (leq 0.874).

We present ATOMIC, an atlas of everyday commonsense reasoning, organized through 877k textual descriptions of inferential knowledge. Compared to existing resources that center around taxonomic knowledge, ATOMIC focuses on inferential knowledge organized as typed if-then relations with variables (e.g., "if X pays Y a compliment, then Y will likely return the compliment"). We propose nine if-then relation types to distinguish causes vs. effects, agents vs. themes, voluntary vs. involuntary events, and actions vs. mental states. By generatively training on the rich inferential knowledge described in ATOMIC, we show that neural models can acquire simple commonsense capabilities and reason about previously unseen events. Experimental results demonstrate that multitask models that incorporate the hierarchical structure of if-then relation types lead to more accurate inference compared to models trained in isolation, as measured by both automatic and human evaluation.

Foundation models have become a dominant paradigm in machine learning, achieving remarkable performance across diverse tasks through large-scale pretraining. However, they often yield overconfident, uncalibrated predictions. The standard approach to quantifying epistemic uncertainty are ensembles of multiple independently trained models. But their computational cost scales linearly with ensemble size, making them impractical for large foundation models. We propose Singular Value Ensemble (SVE), a parameter-efficient implicit ensembling method. SVE builds on a simple, but powerful core assumption: namely, that the singular vectors of the weight matrices correspond to meaningful directions in the representation space. If the singular vectors are indeed meaningful (orthogonal) "knowledge directions", then a model ensemble can be obtained by modulating only how strongly each direction contributes to the output. Rather than learning new parameters for each ensemble member, we freeze the singular vectors and only train per-member singular values that rescale the contribution of each direction in that shared knowledge basis. Ensemble diversity emerges naturally during joint training as stochastic initialization and random batch sampling cause different members to converge to different combinations of the same underlying knowledge. SVE performs comparable to an explicit ensemble, while increasing the parameter count of the base model by <1%, making principled uncertainty estimation accessible in resource-constrained settings. We validate SVE on NLP and vision tasks with various different backbones and show that it improves calibration while maintaining predictive accuracy.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

Mathematical reasoning models are widely deployed in education, automated tutoring, and decision support systems despite exhibiting fundamental computational instabilities. We demonstrate that state-of-the-art models (Qwen2.5-Math-7B) achieve 61% accuracy through a mixture of reliable and unreliable reasoning pathways: 18.4% of correct predictions employ stable, faithful reasoning while 81.6% emerge through computationally inconsistent pathways. Additionally, 8.8% of all predictions are silent failures -- confident yet incorrect outputs. Through comprehensive analysis using novel faithfulness metrics, we reveal: (1) reasoning quality shows weak negative correlation with correctness (r=-0.21, p=0.002), reflecting a binary classification threshold artifact rather than a monotonic inverse relationship; (2) scaling from 1.5B to 7B parameters (4.7x increase) provides zero accuracy benefit on our evaluated subset (6% of GSM8K), requiring validation on the complete benchmark; and (3) latent reasoning employs diverse computational strategies, with ~20% sharing CoT-like patterns. These findings highlight that benchmark accuracy can mask computational unreliability, demanding evaluation reforms measuring stability beyond single-sample metrics.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

Recent progress in frontier models has renewed interest in large-scale reinforcement learning (RL), but the cost of generating large-model rollouts makes even testing RL recipes expensive. We ask whether reasoning improvements learned by a small, weak model can benefit a larger, stronger model without using the strong model's rollouts during training. We introduce Allspark, a training and inference framework for weak-to-strong transfer through alternating chains of thought. A weak teacher is trained alongside a frozen copy of the same model; the two alternate reasoning segments, and the frozen model produces the final answer. At inference time, a stronger student replaces the frozen training partner, while both models remain fixed. Because they communicate through text, the teacher can steer students from different model families and with different tokenizers. We study Allspark at two scales: controlled Qwen experiments across math and reasoning, and larger-scale Inkling experiments on ARC-AGI-2. The Inkling experiments show accuracy gains in within-family and cross-family settings, including transfer to Kimi and Nemotron, with benefits that vary across inference settings. These findings motivate reusing a trained weak teacher across strong students and examining the resulting accuracy--token tradeoff.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

LLMs are increasingly used with external knowledge sources like the internet. Do they weigh information appropriately -- updating more for reliable sources (source discernment) and more when claims bring priors closer to the truth (truth discernment)? We formalize this as information discernment and introduce Learn2Discern (L2D), an experimental framework and benchmark grounded in three normative axioms with interpretable metrics. To establish external validity, a pre-registered, quota-matched user study (n=299) confirms that real LLM users endorse all three axioms and report that violations reduce their trust and usage intent. Across 13 models and nearly 670K trials, we find consistent failures across both dimensions: models perform near chance on source and truth discernment, rely on source popularity twice as much as source reliability, and update roughly equally whether a claim improves or worsens their position relative to the ground truth. Models integrate external knowledge most effectively on datasets where their priors are already the most accurate. Newer and larger models improve truth discernment but not source discernment, a blind spot that model complexity does not address. We identify simple inference-time interventions that improve both forms of discernment. We release our dataset and survey as a testbed for a core alignment property that scales in importance as LLMs replace traditional search.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Capability and efficiency are two key dimensions of reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Capability refers to the ability to solve a given problem correctly, whereas efficiency refers to the ability to do so with limited resources. When LLMs use Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning to solve problems of controlled hardness, both the number of problems solved correctly and the number of tokens required to reach a correct answer depend on problem hardness and model size. However, how these factors jointly shape capability and efficiency remains poorly understood. Here, we use hierarchical Bayesian models to evaluate the capability and efficiency of LLMs from the DeepSeek-R1-Distill model family across four classes of arithmetic and algorithmic reasoning problems. At a fixed model size, the probability of correctly solving an instance decays approximately exponentially with instance size, our proxy for problem hardness. The decay scale grows sublinearly with model size, indicating that larger models are more capable, but that capability gains diminish with scale. Output length grows as a power law with instance size, which serves as a proxy for difficulty. However, the parameters of this power law do not vary systematically with model size, suggesting that larger models do not become more efficient. Together, these findings reveal potential limitations of naive scaling as a strategy for developing more capable AI systems: capability improves with diminishing returns, while efficiency shows little to no improvement.

We conduct a systematic audit of three widely used reasoning benchmarks, SocialIQa, FauxPas-EAI, and ToMi, and uncover pervasive flaws in both benchmark items and evaluation methodology. Using five LLMs (GPT-{3, 3.5, 4, o1}, and LLaMA 3.1) as diagnostic tools, we identify structural, semantic, and pragmatic issues in benchmark design (e.g., duplicated items, ambiguous wording, and implausible answers), as well as scoring procedures that prioritize output form over reasoning process. Through systematic human annotation and re-evaluation on cleaned benchmark subsets, we find that model scores often improve not due to due to erratic surface wording variations and not to improved reasoning. Infact, further analyses show that model performance is highly sensitive to minor input variations such as context availability and phrasing, revealing that high scores may reflect alignment with format-specific cues rather than consistent inference based on the input. These findings challenge the validity of current benchmark-based claims about reasoning in LLMs, and highlight the need for evaluation protocols that assess reasoning as a process of drawing inference from available information, rather than as static output selection. We release audited data and evaluation tools to support more interpretable and diagnostic assessments of model reasoning.

Detecting LLM reasoning failures at inference time without ground-truth labels has motivated a wide range of confidence baselines, including self-consistency, semantic entropy, and P(True), built on within-question sampling and self-evaluation. Operad theory, the formalism for systems built by iterated substitution, suggests a complementary diagnostic: a model's direct answer to a compositional query should agree with the answer it produces by composing a stated decomposition of the same query. We instantiate this idea as operadic consistency (OC), a per-question signal. Across twelve instruction-tuned LLMs (4B to 671B parameters, open-weights and closed-source) on four multi-hop QA datasets, OC is strongly correlated with accuracy on every dataset (Pearson r in [0.86, 0.94], all p leq 0.0004), and is the only signal we evaluate with r geq 0.85 uniformly across all four datasets. Chain-of-thought self-consistency (CoT-SC; Wang et al., 2023) matches OC on HotpotQA and DROP (r = 0.93, 0.87) but drops to r approx 0.45 on MuSiQue and StrategyQA. At the per-question level, OC contributes information beyond CoT-SC and semantic entropy on every dataset (cluster-robust p leq 10^{-16} for the OC coefficient), and the conclusion is robust to additionally controlling for constructed decomposition-aware baselines (p leq 10^{-13}). The same signal yields selective-prediction improvements (accuracy at fixed coverage) over a tuned CoT-SC baseline at the equal-cost K = 3 budget (AUARC lifts of +0.086 to +0.096 and AUROC lifts of +0.092 to +0.164; 95% CIs exclude zero on every cell). On five frontier thinking models, where the decomposition is extracted from the model's own chain of thought, the same equal-cost comparison gives positive selective-prediction point-estimate lift on all 16 (dataset, budget, metric) cells tested, with 95% CIs excluding zero on 12 of the 16.

Large language models generate computationally expensive yet semantically void reasoning on beyond-capability tasks, creating risks where plausible-sounding but incorrect derivations mislead users. We characterize this futile reasoning phenomenon through systematic analysis, revealing universal capability overreach and systematic miscalibration between capability and behavior. The dominant failure mode is specious reasoning, which outputs look superficially valid but contain subtle errors, escalating with task difficulty. To address this, we introduce CaRL (Capability-aligned Reinforcement Learning), which aligns model behavior with capability boundaries through reward shaping that incentivizes refusal over futile reasoning and hindsight refusal augmentation that converts failures into refusal supervision. Experiments demonstrate a substantial reduction in futile reasoning while preserving performance across task difficulties, effectively achieving capability-aligned behavior without sacrificing utility. https://github.com/icip-cas/Knowing-When-to-Quit

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

With the release of the o1 model by OpenAI, reasoning models adopting slow thinking strategies have gradually emerged. As the responses generated by such models often include complex reasoning, intermediate steps, and self-reflection, existing evaluation methods are often inadequate. They struggle to determine whether the LLM output is truly equivalent to the reference answer, and also have difficulty identifying and extracting the final answer from long, complex responses. To address this issue, we propose xVerify, an efficient answer verifier for reasoning model evaluations. xVerify demonstrates strong capability in equivalence judgment, enabling it to effectively determine whether the answers produced by reasoning models are equivalent to reference answers across various types of objective questions. To train and evaluate xVerify, we construct the VAR dataset by collecting question-answer pairs generated by multiple LLMs across various datasets, leveraging multiple reasoning models and challenging evaluation sets designed specifically for reasoning model assessment. A multi-round annotation process is employed to ensure label accuracy. Based on the VAR dataset, we train multiple xVerify models of different scales. In evaluation experiments conducted on both the test set and generalization set, all xVerify models achieve overall F1 scores and accuracy exceeding 95\%. Notably, the smallest variant, xVerify-0.5B-I, outperforms all evaluation methods except GPT-4o, while xVerify-3B-Ib surpasses GPT-4o in overall performance. These results validate the effectiveness and generalizability of xVerify.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive reasoning abilities on a wide range of complex tasks. However, enhancing these capabilities through post-training remains resource intensive, particularly in terms of data and computational cost. Although recent efforts have sought to improve sample efficiency through selective data curation, existing methods often rely on heuristic or task-specific strategies that hinder scalability. In this work, we introduce InfiAlign, a scalable and sample-efficient post-training framework that integrates supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to align LLMs for enhanced reasoning. At the core of InfiAlign is a robust data selection pipeline that automatically curates high-quality alignment data from open-source reasoning datasets using multidimensional quality metrics. This pipeline enables significant performance gains while drastically reducing data requirements and remains extensible to new data sources. When applied to the Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Base model, our SFT model achieves performance on par with DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B, while using only approximately 12% of the training data, and demonstrates strong generalization across diverse reasoning tasks. Additional improvements are obtained through the application of DPO, with particularly notable gains in mathematical reasoning tasks. The model achieves an average improvement of 3.89% on AIME 24/25 benchmarks. Our results highlight the effectiveness of combining principled data selection with full-stage post-training, offering a practical solution for aligning large reasoning models in a scalable and data-efficient manner. The model checkpoints are available at https://huggingface.co/InfiX-ai/InfiAlign-Qwen-7B-SFT.

Jailbreak robustness has become central to large language model (LLM) safety evaluation, yet prevailing methodologies rely primarily on refusal behavior, semantic resemblance, and intent-matching heuristics that emphasize linguistic plausibility rather than correctness. We identify a key limitation in existing evaluations: many jailbreak intents depend on instructional validity rather than epistemic factuality, allowing realistic-looking responses to be labeled successful despite being factually or procedurally incorrect. To address this gap, we propose Sequential Epistemic and Action-Level Validation (SEAV), a verification-centric jailbreak evaluation framework that decomposes responses into ordered steps and evaluates both validity and correctness. SEAV combines LLM-as-a-judge mechanisms for semantic interpretation with retrieval-grounded verification using external knowledge sources, assessing whether generated content is factually correct, structurally consistent, and operationally capable of advancing harmful objectives. Empirically, SEAV cuts the false-positive rate on SD-A (a curated strategic-dishonesty diagnostic) by 14.9\,pp vs. the strongest baseline, and reclassifies 22.1\%--51.0\% of sampled prior-labeled successes as invalid across three of four public benchmarks. Together, these results show that enforcing correctness substantially reshapes measured robustness: many previously labeled jailbreak successes are reclassified as invalid, and results are stable across the tested search backends and evaluator models. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Ardor-Wu/SEAV.

Failure attribution in multi-agent systems -- pinpointing the exact step where a decisive error occurs -- is a critical yet unsolved challenge. Current methods treat this as a pattern recognition task over long conversation logs, leading to critically low step-level accuracy (below 17\%), which renders them impractical for debugging complex systems. Their core weakness is a fundamental inability to perform robust counterfactual reasoning: to determine if correcting a single action would have actually averted the task failure. To bridge this counterfactual inference gap, we introduce Abduct-Act-Predict (A2P) Scaffolding, a novel agent framework that transforms failure attribution from pattern recognition into a structured causal inference task. A2P explicitly guides a large language model through a formal three-step reasoning process within a single inference pass: (1) Abduction, to infer the hidden root causes behind an agent's actions; (2) Action, to define a minimal corrective intervention; and (3) Prediction, to simulate the subsequent trajectory and verify if the intervention resolves the failure. This structured approach leverages the holistic context of the entire conversation while imposing a rigorous causal logic on the model's analysis. Our extensive experiments on the Who\&When benchmark demonstrate its efficacy. On the Algorithm-Generated dataset, A2P achieves 47.46\% step-level accuracy, a 2.85times improvement over the 16.67\% of the baseline. On the more complex Hand-Crafted dataset, it achieves 29.31\% step accuracy, a 2.43times improvement over the baseline's 12.07\%. By reframing the problem through a causal lens, A2P Scaffolding provides a robust, verifiable, and significantly more accurate solution for automated failure attribution. Ours code are released at https://github.com/ResearAI/A2P.

Studies of bias in LLM-as-judge systems typically build synthetic corpora by prompting an LLM to generate a hallucinated answer to pair with a factual one, then presenting both to a judge. We report a case in which this generation step silently failed, and use it to argue that the failure mode is structural rather than incidental. In a multilingual (Turkish/English) faithfulness-judgment corpus, a decoding-budget parameter shared between judging and generation calls truncated one producer's hallucinated answers to a few words. The resulting items produced a large, statistically robust effect: a 32-point cross-lingual collapse in one judge's selection accuracy, replicated from N=50 to N=500, explained by a three-layer mechanistic account, and confirmed by a controlled producer-swap experiment, none of which was real. The effect vanished to ceiling once the shared parameter was corrected, and only manual reading of the raw generations, not any aggregate statistical check, exposed the fault. A second measured bias (Markdown-formatting preference) was not fabricated but distorted by the same fault, its magnitude and in one case its sign shifting with stimulus length, a mode aggregate metrics cannot distinguish from the first. We frame the underlying vulnerability using the test oracle problem: corpora whose negative examples are LLM-generated carry no mechanical way to verify item integrity, while corpora built by deterministic perturbation of a gold answer carry an item-level oracle for free. A positive control supports this claim directly: an analogous fault injected into a minimal perturbation-based corpus is caught with 100% accuracy by a zero-cost, zero-human gold-to-negative string comparison. We close with a validation protocol, derived from our own case, for analysts working in the oracle-less regime that we argue describes most contemporary multilingual LLM-as-judge corpora.

This technical report introduces VibeThinker-3B, a compact dense model with 3B parameters developed to investigate how far verifiable reasoning can be pushed within a strictly small-model regime. Building upon the Spectrum-to-Signal post-training paradigm, we systematically enhance the model through an optimized pipeline that includes curriculum-based supervised fine-tuning, multi-domain reinforcement learning, and offline self-distillation. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that VibeThinker-3B achieves frontier-level performance on highly demanding verifiable tasks. Specifically, it attains a score of 94.3 on AIME26 (improving to 97.1 with claim-level test-time scaling), an 80.2 Pass@1 on LiveCodeBench v6, and exhibits strong out-of-distribution generalization with a 96.1\% acceptance rate on recent unseen LeetCode contests. This effectively places it in the performance band of first-tier reasoning systems, matching or exceeding flagship models that are orders of magnitude larger, such as DeepSeek V3.2, GLM-5, and Gemini 3 Pro. Furthermore, a score of 93.4 on IFEval confirms that this extreme reasoning enhancement does not compromise strict instruction controllability. Extending our previous 1.5B work, these findings motivate the Parametric Compression-Coverage Hypothesis, which views verifiable reasoning as compressible into compact reasoning cores, while open-domain knowledge and general-purpose competence require broad parameter coverage over facts, concepts, and long-tail scenarios. This perspective suggests that compact models are not merely deployment-efficient substitutes, but a complementary path toward frontier-level performance in parameter-dense capability regimes.

Popular approaches for quantifying predictive uncertainty in deep neural networks often involve distributions over weights or multiple models, for instance via Markov Chain sampling, ensembling, or Monte Carlo dropout. These techniques usually incur overhead by having to train multiple model instances or do not produce very diverse predictions. This comprehensive and extensive survey aims to familiarize the reader with an alternative class of models based on the concept of Evidential Deep Learning: For unfamiliar data, they aim to admit "what they don't know", and fall back onto a prior belief. Furthermore, they allow uncertainty estimation in a single model and forward pass by parameterizing distributions over distributions. This survey recapitulates existing works, focusing on the implementation in a classification setting, before surveying the application of the same paradigm to regression. We also reflect on the strengths and weaknesses compared to other existing methods and provide the most fundamental derivations using a unified notation to aid future research.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

Recent research has generated hope that inference scaling could allow weaker language models to match or exceed the accuracy of stronger models, such as by repeatedly sampling solutions to a coding problem until it passes unit tests. The central thesis of this paper is that there is no free lunch for inference scaling: indefinite accuracy improvement through resampling can only be realized if the "verifier" (in this case, a set of unit tests) is perfect. When the verifier is imperfect, as it almost always is in domains such as reasoning or coding (for example, unit tests have imperfect coverage), there is a nonzero probability of false positives: incorrect solutions that pass the verifier. Resampling cannot decrease this probability, so it imposes an upper bound to the accuracy of resampling-based inference scaling even with an infinite compute budget. We find that there is a very strong correlation between the model's single-sample accuracy (i.e. accuracy without unit tests) and its false positive rate on coding benchmarks HumanEval and MBPP, whose unit tests have limited coverage. Therefore, no amount of inference scaling of weaker models can enable them to match the single-sample accuracy of a sufficiently strong model (Fig. 1a). When we consider that false positives have a negative utility compared to abstaining from producing a solution, it bends the inference scaling curve further downward. Empirically, we find that the optimal number of samples can be less than 10 under realistic assumptions (Fig. 1b). Finally, we show that beyond accuracy, false positives may have other undesirable qualities, such as poor adherence to coding style conventions.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Inequality proving, crucial across diverse scientific and mathematical fields, tests advanced reasoning skills such as discovering tight bounds and strategic theorem application. This makes it a distinct, demanding frontier for large language models (LLMs), offering insights beyond general mathematical problem-solving. Progress in this area is hampered by existing datasets that are often scarce, synthetic, or rigidly formal. We address this by proposing an informal yet verifiable task formulation, recasting inequality proving into two automatically checkable subtasks: bound estimation and relation prediction. Building on this, we release IneqMath, an expert-curated dataset of Olympiad-level inequalities, including a test set and training corpus enriched with step-wise solutions and theorem annotations. We also develop a novel LLM-as-judge evaluation framework, combining a final-answer judge with four step-wise judges designed to detect common reasoning flaws. A systematic evaluation of 29 leading LLMs on IneqMath reveals a surprising reality: even top models like o1 achieve less than 10% overall accuracy under step-wise scrutiny; this is a drop of up to 65.5% from their accuracy considering only final answer equivalence. This discrepancy exposes fragile deductive chains and a critical gap for current LLMs between merely finding an answer and constructing a rigorous proof. Scaling model size and increasing test-time computation yield limited gains in overall proof correctness. Instead, our findings highlight promising research directions such as theorem-guided reasoning and self-refinement. Code and data are available at https://ineqmath.github.io/.

Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.

Evaluating large language models (LLMs) is crucial for both assessing their capabilities and identifying safety or robustness issues prior to deployment. Reliably measuring abstract and complex phenomena such as 'safety' and 'robustness' requires strong construct validity, that is, having measures that represent what matters to the phenomenon. With a team of 29 expert reviewers, we conduct a systematic review of 445 LLM benchmarks from leading conferences in natural language processing and machine learning. Across the reviewed articles, we find patterns related to the measured phenomena, tasks, and scoring metrics which undermine the validity of the resulting claims. To address these shortcomings, we provide eight key recommendations and detailed actionable guidance to researchers and practitioners in developing LLM benchmarks.

Serial verification gates are a core reliability primitive in LLM harnesses: a candidate answer is returned only if k verifier calls all accept it. Under conditionally independent gates, the recent Odds Law (arXiv:2606.15712) shows that posterior log-odds grow linearly in k, so failure decays exponentially, and states that "a tight theory of partially correlated verifier cascades remains open." This note gives a minimal such theory. Modeling the per-instance false-accept rate on the generator's own errors as a latent variable αsim G (de Finetti), the exact cascade posterior is ell_k = ell_0 - ln m_k, with m_k the k-th moment of G. Then: (i) ell_k is concave in k for every non-degenerate G -- the Odds Law is its tangent at the first gate and an upper bound; (ii) for Beta(a,b) latents, failure decays polynomially, 1-r_k asymp k^{-b}, with correlation parameter ρ_v = 1/(a+b+1); (iii) a blind-spot atom of mass 1-π at α=1 caps the evidence extractable from any number of gates at -ln(1-π) nats, so reliability saturates below 1; (iv) letting the true-accept rate also vary (βsim H) yields a trichotomy -- gates eventually always help, plateau, or actively harm -- decided by the upper-tail exponents of G and H, with closed-form crossover k^dagger. The mechanism is survivorship: errors surviving gates are the high-α ones. The theory is measurable: R repeated verdicts per instance identify the first R moments of G, so two verdicts identify ρ_v; beta-binomial likelihood and NPMLE recover the reliability curve and the ill-posed ceiling. In synthetic tests, independence-based extrapolation underestimates failure by 20x at k=5 and ~3000x at k=10; the correlated fit at R=8 tracks held-out depths. The practical lever is decorrelation -- changing model family, modality, or evidence source -- not adding gates.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Algorithmic approaches to interpreting machine learning models have proliferated in recent years. We carry out human subject tests that are the first of their kind to isolate the effect of algorithmic explanations on a key aspect of model interpretability, simulatability, while avoiding important confounding experimental factors. A model is simulatable when a person can predict its behavior on new inputs. Through two kinds of simulation tests involving text and tabular data, we evaluate five explanations methods: (1) LIME, (2) Anchor, (3) Decision Boundary, (4) a Prototype model, and (5) a Composite approach that combines explanations from each method. Clear evidence of method effectiveness is found in very few cases: LIME improves simulatability in tabular classification, and our Prototype method is effective in counterfactual simulation tests. We also collect subjective ratings of explanations, but we do not find that ratings are predictive of how helpful explanations are. Our results provide the first reliable and comprehensive estimates of how explanations influence simulatability across a variety of explanation methods and data domains. We show that (1) we need to be careful about the metrics we use to evaluate explanation methods, and (2) there is significant room for improvement in current methods. All our supporting code, data, and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/peterbhase/InterpretableNLP-ACL2020

Evaluating large language models (LLMs) on final-answer correctness is the dominant paradigm. This approach, however, provides a coarse signal for model improvement and overlooks the quality of the underlying reasoning process. We argue that a more granular evaluation of reasoning offers a more effective path to building robust models. We decompose reasoning quality into two dimensions: relevance and coherence. Relevance measures if a step is grounded in the problem; coherence measures if it follows logically from prior steps. To measure these aspects reliably, we introduce causal stepwise evaluation (CaSE). This method assesses each reasoning step using only its preceding context, which avoids hindsight bias. We validate CaSE against human judgments on our new expert-annotated benchmarks, MRa-GSM8K and MRa-MATH. More importantly, we show that curating training data with CaSE-evaluated relevance and coherence directly improves final task performance. Our work provides a scalable framework for analyzing, debugging, and improving LLM reasoning, demonstrating the practical value of moving beyond validity checks.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

In this paper, we present InferES - an original corpus for Natural Language Inference (NLI) in European Spanish. We propose, implement, and analyze a variety of corpus-creating strategies utilizing expert linguists and crowd workers. The objectives behind InferES are to provide high-quality data, and, at the same time to facilitate the systematic evaluation of automated systems. Specifically, we focus on measuring and improving the performance of machine learning systems on negation-based adversarial examples and their ability to generalize across out-of-distribution topics. We train two transformer models on InferES (8,055 gold examples) in a variety of scenarios. Our best model obtains 72.8% accuracy, leaving a lot of room for improvement. The "hypothesis-only" baseline performs only 2%-5% higher than majority, indicating much fewer annotation artifacts than prior work. We find that models trained on InferES generalize very well across topics (both in- and out-of-distribution) and perform moderately well on negation-based adversarial examples.

Neural networks achieve remarkable performance through superposition: encoding multiple features as overlapping directions in activation space rather than dedicating individual neurons to each feature. This challenges interpretability, yet we lack principled methods to measure superposition. We present an information-theoretic framework measuring a neural representation's effective degrees of freedom. We apply Shannon entropy to sparse autoencoder activations to compute the number of effective features as the minimum neurons needed for interference-free encoding. Equivalently, this measures how many "virtual neurons" the network simulates through superposition. When networks encode more effective features than actual neurons, they must accept interference as the price of compression. Our metric strongly correlates with ground truth in toy models, detects minimal superposition in algorithmic tasks, and reveals systematic reduction under dropout. Layer-wise patterns mirror intrinsic dimensionality studies on Pythia-70M. The metric also captures developmental dynamics, detecting sharp feature consolidation during grokking. Surprisingly, adversarial training can increase effective features while improving robustness, contradicting the hypothesis that superposition causes vulnerability. Instead, the effect depends on task complexity and network capacity: simple tasks with ample capacity allow feature expansion (abundance regime), while complex tasks or limited capacity force reduction (scarcity regime). By defining superposition as lossy compression, this work enables principled measurement of how neural networks organize information under computational constraints, connecting superposition to adversarial robustness.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

A/B tests are typically analyzed via frequentist p-values and confidence intervals; but these inferences are wholly unreliable if users endogenously choose samples sizes by *continuously monitoring* their tests. We define *always valid* p-values and confidence intervals that let users try to take advantage of data as fast as it becomes available, providing valid statistical inference whenever they make their decision. Always valid inference can be interpreted as a natural interface for a sequential hypothesis test, which empowers users to implement a modified test tailored to them. In particular, we show in an appropriate sense that the measures we develop tradeoff sample size and power efficiently, despite a lack of prior knowledge of the user's relative preference between these two goals. We also use always valid p-values to obtain multiple hypothesis testing control in the sequential context. Our methodology has been implemented in a large scale commercial A/B testing platform to analyze hundreds of thousands of experiments to date.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Information accounting provides a better foundation for hypothesis testing than does uncertainty quantification. A quantitative account of science is derived under this perspective that alleviates the need for epistemic bridge principles, solves the problem of ad hoc falsification criteria, and deals with verisimilitude by facilitating a general approach to process-level diagnostics. Our argument is that the well-known inconsistencies of both Bayesian and classical statistical hypothesis tests are due to the fact that probability theory is an insufficient logic of science. Information theory, as an extension of probability theory, is required to provide a complete logic on which to base quantitative theories of empirical learning. The organizing question in this case becomes not whether our theories or models are more or less true, or about how much uncertainty is associated with a particular model, but instead whether there is any information available from experimental data that might allow us to improve the model. This becomes a formal hypothesis test, provides a theory of model diagnostics, and suggests a new approach to building dynamical systems models.

Recent studies on transformer-based language models show that they can answer questions by reasoning over knowledge provided as part of the context (i.e., in-context reasoning). However, since the available knowledge is often not filtered for a particular question, in-context reasoning can be sensitive to distractor facts, additional content that is irrelevant to a question but that may be relevant for a different question (i.e., not necessarily random noise). In these situations, the model fails to distinguish the knowledge that is necessary to answer the question, leading to spurious reasoning and degraded performance. This reasoning failure contrasts with the model's apparent ability to distinguish its contextual knowledge from all the knowledge it has memorized during pre-training. Following this observation, we propose teaching the model to reason more robustly by folding the provided contextual knowledge into the model's parameters before presenting it with a question. Our method, RECKONING, is a bi-level learning algorithm that teaches language models to reason by updating their parametric knowledge through back-propagation, allowing them to then answer questions using the updated parameters. During training, the inner loop rapidly adapts a copy of the model weights to encode contextual knowledge into its parameters. In the outer loop, the model learns to use the updated weights to reproduce and answer reasoning questions about the memorized knowledge. Our experiments on two multi-hop reasoning datasets show that RECKONING's performance improves over the in-context reasoning baseline (by up to 4.5%). We also find that compared to in-context reasoning, RECKONING generalizes better to longer reasoning chains unseen during training, is more robust to distractors in the context, and is more computationally efficient when multiple questions are asked about the same knowledge.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Trajectories in complex systems often contain structure that is not captured by the population-averaged, scalar statistics traditionally used to describe them. Here we reconstruct, through independent numerical re-simulation rather than literature review, a systematic search across representational forms - from single scalar statistics, through two independent discrete multi-feature classification attempts, to a trajectory-level structural representation and a diagnostic surrogate test, to a continuous low-dimensional compression - applied to the same underlying trajectory ensemble in a critical complex system. Predictive failure is not explained by insufficient correlation: one discrete representation's own strongest individual feature correlates with the target more strongly (r=0.588) than the eventual successful representation's own headline statistic (r=0.540), yet fails to separate the ensemble's two most consequential cases - while the continuous representation succeeds, robustly, across eight independent scale-removal folds (r=0.677-0.717, all p<0.001). The determining factor was not correlation strength but whether the representation preserved the structure relevant to prediction. These results indicate that the choice of representation determines whether predictive structure in complex systems becomes accessible - a scientific variable in its own right, not a downstream analysis choice.

Common methods for aligning large language models (LLMs) with desired behaviour heavily rely on human-labelled data. However, as models grow increasingly sophisticated, they will surpass human expertise, and the role of human evaluation will evolve into non-experts overseeing experts. In anticipation of this, we ask: can weaker models assess the correctness of stronger models? We investigate this question in an analogous setting, where stronger models (experts) possess the necessary information to answer questions and weaker models (non-experts) lack this information. The method we evaluate is debate, where two LLM experts each argue for a different answer, and a non-expert selects the answer. We find that debate consistently helps both non-expert models and humans answer questions, achieving 76% and 88% accuracy respectively (naive baselines obtain 48% and 60%). Furthermore, optimising expert debaters for persuasiveness in an unsupervised manner improves non-expert ability to identify the truth in debates. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for the viability of aligning models with debate in the absence of ground truth.

Reasoning traces from chain-of-thought models appear to offer a legible window into how a model arrives at its answer. A growing body of work treats them as such, using LLM judges to diagnose errors, evaluate faithfulness, and provide step-level supervision via process reward models and generative critics. These practices rely on the text of a reasoning step carrying information about its functional role. But does the text actually encode information about which reasoning steps matter? We operationalize the importance of a reasoning step as its advantage: the change in expected reward, e.g., producing the correct final answer, from including that step, estimated via Monte Carlo rollouts. Basing ground truth on these estimates, we evaluate whether LLM judges can identify high-advantage steps and find that sufficiently capable LLMs can outperform a prevalence baseline but fall well short of a noise ceiling. Fine-tuning a model as a step-level critic yields strong improvement for incorrect responses but remains distant from ceiling for correct responses, suggesting that step importance is only partially recoverable from the text of the reasoning trace. Our findings contribute to a growing body of chain-of-thought faithfulness work that cautions against treating the legibility of reasoning traces as interpretability, especially with implications for process reward modeling.

Recent advances in long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning have largely prioritized answer accuracy and token efficiency, while overlooking aspects critical to trustworthiness. We argue that usable reasoning systems must be trustworthy, characterized by three properties: interpretability, faithfulness, and reliability. To this end, we propose ReFIne, a new training framework that integrates supervised fine-tuning with GRPO to encourage models to: (i) improve interpretability by producing structured, tag-based traces with high-level planning that are easier for humans to follow; (ii) enhance faithfulness by explicitly disclosing the decisive information guiding each solution, with consistent cross-section references; and (iii) promote reliability by providing self-assessments of both the derivation's soundness and the confidence of the final answer. We apply ReFIne to the Qwen3 models at multiple scales (1.7B/4B/8B) and evaluate across mathematical benchmarks of varying difficulty. Our experimental results show that ReFIne models generate clearer and better-structured reasoning traces (interpretability +44.0%), more faithfully expose their underlying decision process (faithfulness +18.8%), and offer informative confidence estimates (reliability +42.4%). These findings highlight an overlooked but important direction: reasoning models should be optimized not only for accuracy, but also for broader dimensions of trustworthiness. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Training_Trustworthy_LRM_with_Refine

A central tenet of human cognition is systematicity, the principle that understanding one concept is inherently tied to understanding close variations of that concept. Do reasoning models robustly exhibit such systematicity? If so, we would expect consistent performance on structurally equivalent variants of the same task. Here, we extend established rule induction tasks from cognitive science to assess the systematicity of thought in current reasoning models. Each task family has compositional structure that we use to create structurally equivalent task variations through task isomorphisms such as recombination and substitution. We find that despite being able to correctly solve a task, models often fail on structurally equivalent variants of the same task. These findings suggest that many model behaviors lack systematicity, rendering it difficult to robustly establish the cognitive abilities of reasoning models beyond the particular contexts they were evaluated in.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

Reasoning about necessity and possibility depends on assumptions about accessibility between worlds and about which objects exist at each one. The same inference may therefore hold under one modal system and fail under another. Evaluating language models on such problems requires testing whether their judgments follow the stated semantics rather than a familiar logic. We construct paired modal problems with identical premises and conjecture but different frame or domain conditions; automated reasoning verifies opposite labels. A balanced core prevents the semantic condition alone from revealing the answer. On this core, four of five recent models perform below the condition-only baseline under direct prompting. Yet enabling reasoning mode raises DeepSeek V4 Flash from 4.4% to 88.1% on unchanged prompts. Following stipulated modal semantics thus depends strongly on inference mode as well as model identity. When frame conditions are omitted, models often agree but fit different familiar logics best. We release the formulas, oracle artifacts, countermodels, and responses.

Counterfactual reasoning, a hallmark of intelligence, consists of three steps: inferring latent variables from observations (abduction), constructing alternatives (interventions), and predicting their outcomes (prediction). This skill is essential for advancing LLMs' causal understanding and expanding their applications in high-stakes domains such as scientific research. However, existing efforts in assessing LLM's counterfactual reasoning capabilities tend to skip the abduction step, effectively reducing to interventional reasoning and leading to overestimation of LLM performance. To address this, we introduce executable counterfactuals, a novel framework that operationalizes causal reasoning through code and math problems. Our framework explicitly requires all three steps of counterfactual reasoning and enables scalable synthetic data creation with varying difficulty, creating a frontier for evaluating and improving LLM's reasoning. Our results reveal substantial drop in accuracy (25-40%) from interventional to counterfactual reasoning for SOTA models like o4-mini and Claude-4-Sonnet. To address this gap, we construct a training set comprising counterfactual code problems having if-else condition and test on out-of-domain code structures (e.g. having while-loop); we also test whether a model trained on code would generalize to counterfactual math word problems. While supervised finetuning on stronger models' reasoning traces improves in-domain performance of Qwen models, it leads to a decrease in accuracy on OOD tasks such as counterfactual math problems. In contrast, reinforcement learning induces the core cognitive behaviors and generalizes to new domains, yielding gains over the base model on both code (improvement of 1.5x-2x) and math problems. Analysis of the reasoning traces reinforces these findings and highlights the promise of RL for improving LLMs' counterfactual reasoning.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Reasoning on knowledge graphs is a challenging task because it utilizes observed information to predict the missing one. Particularly, answering complex queries based on first-order logic is one of the crucial tasks to verify learning to reason abilities for generalization and composition. Recently, the prevailing method is query embedding which learns the embedding of a set of entities and treats logic operations as set operations and has shown great empirical success. Though there has been much research following the same formulation, many of its claims lack a formal and systematic inspection. In this paper, we rethink this formulation and justify many of the previous claims by characterizing the scope of queries investigated previously and precisely identifying the gap between its formulation and its goal, as well as providing complexity analysis for the currently investigated queries. Moreover, we develop a new dataset containing ten new types of queries with features that have never been considered and therefore can provide a thorough investigation of complex queries. Finally, we propose a new neural-symbolic method, Fuzzy Inference with Truth value (FIT), where we equip the neural link predictors with fuzzy logic theory to support end-to-end learning using complex queries with provable reasoning capability. Empirical results show that our method outperforms previous methods significantly in the new dataset and also surpasses previous methods in the existing dataset at the same time.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

For many real-world systems, causal ground truth is difficult to obtain, making claims about causal effects hard to assess. We develop methods for evaluating collections of n{2} bivariate causal statements over a set of n variables. In the setting of acyclic linear statements, any such collection can be extended to a unique multivariate causal model, but we argue that this induced model is implausible if it imposes substantial additional confounding to explain observed correlations. We introduce a compatibility score that quantifies this notion of plausibility, notably without relying on the faithfulness assumption. Additionally, we define an incompatibility score for purely graphical bivariate causal statements, based on global consistency constraints that are derived from acyclicity and faithfulness assumptions. We give theoretical and empirical evidence that both scores can successfully distinguish correct from incorrect causal statements in generic settings. Moreover, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our methods by analyzing causal claims made by large language models. Our work aims to provide a foundation for assessing the reliability of causal information derived from human experts or artificial intelligence in settings where alternative forms of validation are unavailable.

Speech language models (speech LLMs) can generate plausible outputs from audio that contains no usable speech evidence. We study this failure as a pre-generation support-estimation problem and present SURE-Voice, a training-free front end that decides whether an audio prompt contains intelligible speech evidence before calling a speech LLM. We build SURE-Challenge with a 640-example SURE-Core split and a 1,920-example SURE-Extended split derived from 120 LibriSpeech source utterances. Using one fixed operating point, an energy screen plus Whisper token confidence raises unsupported accuracy on the held-out Extended test from 0.000--0.133 to 0.919 for six non-degenerate speech LLM backbones, while supported accuracy remains 0.919--0.970 and downstream calls fall from 480 to 287. A 500-clip ESC-50 sanity set shows the same pattern on real environmental audio, with vocal non-speech as a residual failure mode. An overlap diagnostic shows that source attribution remains separate from speech-evidence filtering. The evidence supports a controlled benchmark baseline and a deployment-oriented analysis; it does not establish universal robustness to semantic answerability, gain variation or natural conversations.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

Large Reasoning Models have demonstrated remarkable performance with the advancement of test-time scaling techniques, which enhances prediction accuracy by generating multiple candidate responses and selecting the most reliable answer. While prior work has analyzed that internal model signals like confidence scores can partly indicate response correctness and exhibit a distributional correlation with accuracy, such distributional information has not been fully utilized to guide answer selection. Motivated by this, we propose DistriVoting, which incorporates distributional priors as another signal alongside confidence during voting. Specifically, our method (1) first decomposes the mixed confidence distribution into positive and negative components using Gaussian Mixture Models, (2) then applies a reject filter based on positive/negative samples from them to mitigate overlap between the two distributions. Besides, to further alleviate the overlap from the perspective of distribution itself, we propose SelfStepConf, which uses step-level confidence to dynamically adjust inference process, increasing the separation between the two distributions to improve the reliability of confidences in voting. Experiments across 16 models and 5 benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art approaches.

Some things are impossible, but some things may be even more impossible than impossible. Levitating a feather using one's mind is impossible in our world, but fits into our intuitive theories of possible worlds, whereas levitating a feather using the number five cannot be conceived in any possible world ("inconceivable"). While prior work has examined the distinction between improbable and impossible events, there has been little empirical research on inconceivability. Here, we investigate whether people maintain a distinction between impossibility and inconceivability, and how such distinctions might be made. We find that people can readily distinguish the impossible from the inconceivable, using categorization studies similar to those used to investigate the differences between impossible and improbable (Experiment 1). However, this distinction is not explained by people's subjective ratings of event likelihood, which are near zero and indistinguishable between impossible and inconceivable event descriptions (Experiment 2). Finally, we ask whether the probabilities assigned to event descriptions by statistical language models (LMs) can be used to separate modal categories, and whether these probabilities align with people's ratings (Experiment 3). We find high-level similarities between people and LMs: both distinguish among impossible and inconceivable event descriptions, and LM-derived string probabilities predict people's ratings of event likelihood across modal categories. Our findings suggest that fine-grained knowledge about exceedingly rare events (i.e., the impossible and inconceivable) may be learned via statistical learning over linguistic forms, yet leave open the question of whether people represent the distinction between impossible and inconceivable as a difference not of degree, but of kind.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

When a large language model fails a reasoning task, it is often assumed to lack the underlying capability. However, this conflates a genuine absence of reasoning with a late-stage output bottleneck. We observe a consistent readout gap across diverse reasoning benchmarks: hidden-state probes successfully decode correct answers even when native sequence scoring completely collapses due to structural biases. To test whether instance-specific logic survives this collapse, we introduce a diagnostic protocol using a minimal, target-label-free additive correction. Fitting just two parameters on as few as 25 unlabeled examples recovers 9--34 accuracy points for Qwen3.5 models, transferring successfully to OLMo-2-1B and Llama-3.1-8B. Crucially, these recovered decisions persist on hard instances unresolved by simple lexical overlap and significantly exceed count-preserving permutation baselines. Our results show that many apparent zero-shot reasoning deficits are expression failures masking intact internal logic, urging a narrower interpretation of benchmark evaluations.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is the prevailing paradigm for grounding Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the mechanisms governing how models integrate groups of conflicting retrieved evidence remain opaque. Does an LLM answer a certain way because the evidence is factually strong, because of a prior belief, or merely because it is repeated frequently? To answer this, we introduce GroupQA, a curated dataset of 1,635 controversial questions paired with 15,058 diversely-sourced evidence documents, annotated for stance and qualitative strength. Through controlled experiments, we characterize group-level evidence aggregation dynamics: Paraphrasing an argument can be more persuasive than providing distinct independent support; Models favor evidence presented first rather than last, and Larger models are increasingly resistant to adapt to presented evidence. Additionally, we find that LLM explanations to group-based answers are unfaithful. Together, we show that LLMs behave consistently as vulnerable heuristic followers, with direct implications for improving RAG system design.

Causal inference is often focused on average effects, which can hide important aspects of the effect distributions. Here we consider the entire posterior effects distribution by estimating full counterfactual outcome distributions. We propose a methodology for inference on counterfactual distributions which builds upon the martingale posterior framework of Fong et al. (2023). This provides a highly flexible approach to estimating densities, distribution functions, and derived quantities such as quantiles, which coherently quantifies the epistemic uncertainty on any target estimand of interest. As the predictive recursions are based on an underlying nonparametric model (a Dirichlet process mixture model), our method naturally inherits robustness with respect to restrictive parametric assumptions. In addition, implementation of our method is typically very fast. This approach can be applied to marginal or conditional counterfactual distributions and is easily extended to an instrumental variables setup. Using the concept of almost conditionally identically distributed random variables, we prove convergence of the martingale posterior inference on the counterfactual outcome distributions for the causal models considered in the paper. We illustrate our approach on both simulated and real data. Using the latter, we investigate the effect of zinc lozenges on common cold duration, the impact of vitamin A supplementation on children's survival rates with one-sided non-compliance (analysed in Imbens and Rubin, 1997a) and the effect of job training (LaLonde, 1986).