Daily Papers

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

Large language models (LLMs) now solve multi-step problems by emitting extended chains of thought. During the process, they often re-derive the same intermediate steps across problems, inflating token usage and latency. This saturation of the context window leaves less capacity for exploration. We study a simple mechanism that converts recurring reasoning fragments into concise, reusable "behaviors" (name + instruction) via the model's own metacognitive analysis of prior traces. These behaviors are stored in a "behavior handbook" which supplies them to the model in-context at inference or distills them into parameters via supervised fine-tuning. This approach achieves improved test-time reasoning across three different settings - 1) Behavior-conditioned inference: Providing the LLM relevant behaviors in-context during reasoning reduces number of reasoning tokens by up to 46% while matching or improving baseline accuracy; 2) Behavior-guided self-improvement: Without any parameter updates, the model improves its own future reasoning by leveraging behaviors from its own past problem solving attempts. This yields up to 10% higher accuracy than a naive critique-and-revise baseline; and 3) Behavior-conditioned SFT: SFT on behavior-conditioned reasoning traces is more effective at converting non-reasoning models into reasoning models as compared to vanilla SFT. Together, these results indicate that turning slow derivations into fast procedural hints enables LLMs to remember how to reason, not just what to conclude.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Existing benchmarks for LLM agents' social behavior typically focus on a single capability dimension and evaluate only behavioral outcomes, overlooking process signals from reasoning and communication. We present M3-BENCH, a benchmark of 24 mixed-motive games with a process-aware evaluation framework spanning three complementary views: Behavioral Trajectory Analysis (BTA), Reasoning Process Analysis (RPA), and Communication Content Analysis (CCA). Evaluating 11 frontier LLMs and a human baseline, M3-BENCH reveals substantial differences in social competence that outcome-only evaluation misses. In particular, we identify an "overthink-undercommunicate" pattern: reasoning models achieve strong internal deliberation scores but often fail to translate them into effective social communication. Although top models can surpass humans on task outcomes, humans exhibit markedly higher cross-view consistency, suggesting that current LLM agents still lack the behavioral coherence characteristic of human social competence. Our analysis further shows that the three-view decomposition surfaces safety-relevant risks, such as cooperative behavior paired with latent opportunistic reasoning, that remain hidden under outcome-only metrics.

Shannon, in his seminal paper introducing information theory, divided the communication into three levels: technical, semantic, and effectivenss. While the technical level is concerned with accurate reconstruction of transmitted symbols, the semantic and effectiveness levels deal with the inferred meaning and its effect on the receiver. Thanks to telecommunications, the first level problem has produced great advances like the internet. Large Language Models (LLMs) make some progress towards the second goal, but the third level still remains largely untouched. The third problem deals with predicting and optimizing communication for desired receiver behavior. LLMs, while showing wide generalization capabilities across a wide range of tasks, are unable to solve for this. One reason for the underperformance could be a lack of "behavior tokens" in LLMs' training corpora. Behavior tokens define receiver behavior over a communication, such as shares, likes, clicks, purchases, retweets, etc. While preprocessing data for LLM training, behavior tokens are often removed from the corpora as noise. Therefore, in this paper, we make some initial progress towards reintroducing behavior tokens in LLM training. The trained models, other than showing similar performance to LLMs on content understanding tasks, show generalization capabilities on behavior simulation, content simulation, behavior understanding, and behavior domain adaptation. Using a wide range of tasks on two corpora, we show results on all these capabilities. We call these models Large Content and Behavior Models (LCBMs). Further, to spur more research on LCBMs, we release our new Content Behavior Corpus (CBC), a repository containing communicator, message, and corresponding receiver behavior.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Representation engineering methods have recently shown promise for enabling efficient steering of model behavior. However, evaluation pipelines for these methods have primarily relied on subjective demonstrations, instead of quantitative, objective metrics. We aim to take a step towards addressing this issue by advocating for four properties missing from current evaluations: (i) contexts sufficiently similar to downstream tasks should be used for assessing intervention quality; (ii) model likelihoods should be accounted for; (iii) evaluations should allow for standardized comparisons across different target behaviors; and (iv) baseline comparisons should be offered. We introduce an evaluation pipeline grounded in these criteria, offering both a quantitative and visual analysis of how effectively a given method works. We use this pipeline to evaluate two representation engineering methods on how effectively they can steer behaviors such as truthfulness and corrigibility, finding that some interventions are less effective than previously reported.

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

Advances in computer vision as well as increasingly widespread video-based behavioral monitoring have great potential for transforming how we study animal cognition and behavior. However, there is still a fairly large gap between the exciting prospects and what can actually be achieved in practice today, especially in videos from the wild. With this perspective paper, we want to contribute towards closing this gap, by guiding behavioral scientists in what can be expected from current methods and steering computer vision researchers towards problems that are relevant to advance research in animal behavior. We start with a survey of the state-of-the-art methods for computer vision problems that are directly relevant to the video-based study of animal behavior, including object detection, multi-individual tracking, individual identification, and (inter)action recognition. We then review methods for effort-efficient learning, which is one of the biggest challenges from a practical perspective. Finally, we close with an outlook into the future of the emerging field of computer vision for animal behavior, where we argue that the field should develop approaches to unify detection, tracking, identification and (inter)action recognition in a single, video-based framework.

When multiple large language models interact in a shared conversation, do they develop differentiated social roles or converge toward uniform behavior? We present a controlled experimental platform that orchestrates simultaneous multi-agent discussions among 7 heterogeneous LLMs on a unified inference backend, systematically varying group composition, naming conventions, and prompt structure across 12 experimental series (208 runs, 13,786 coded messages). Each message is independently coded on six behavioral flags by two LLM judges from distinct model families (Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Sonnet 4.6), achieving mean Cohen's kappa = 0.78 with conservative intersection-based adjudication. Human validation on 609 randomly stratified messages confirmed coding reliability (mean kappa = 0.73 vs. Gemini). We find that (1) heterogeneous groups exhibit significantly richer behavioral differentiation than homogeneous groups (cosine similarity 0.56 vs. 0.85; p < 10^-5, r = 0.70); (2) groups spontaneously exhibit compensatory response patterns when an agent crashes; (3) revealing real model names significantly increases behavioral convergence (cosine 0.56 to 0.77, p = 0.001); and (4) removing all prompt scaffolding converges profiles to homogeneous-level similarity (p < 0.001). Critically, these behaviors are absent when agents operate in isolation, confirming that behavioral diversity is a structured, reproducible phenomenon driven by the interaction of architectural heterogeneity, group context, and prompt-level scaffolding.

Outcome-Based Education (OBE) emphasizes the development of specific competencies through student-centered learning. In this study, we reviewed the importance of OBE and implemented transformer-based models, particularly DistilBERT, to analyze an NLP dataset that includes student feedback. Our objective is to assess and improve educational outcomes. Our approach is better than other machine learning models because it uses the transformer's deep understanding of language context to classify sentiment better, giving better results across a wider range of matrices. Our work directly contributes to OBE's goal of achieving measurable outcomes by facilitating the identification of patterns in student learning experiences. We have also applied LIME (local interpretable model-agnostic explanations) to make sure that model predictions are clear. This gives us understandable information about how key terms affect sentiment. Our findings indicate that the combination of transformer models and LIME explanations results in a strong and straightforward framework for analyzing student feedback. This aligns more closely with the principles of OBE and ensures the improvement of educational practices through data-driven insights.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

Understanding an agent's goals helps explain and predict its behaviour, yet there is no established methodology for reliably attributing goals to agentic systems. We propose a framework for evaluating goal-directedness that integrates behavioural evaluation with interpretability-based analyses of models' internal representations. As a case study, we examine an LLM agent navigating a 2D grid world toward a goal state. Behaviourally, we evaluate the agent against an optimal policy across varying grid sizes, obstacle densities, and goal structures, finding that performance scales with task difficulty while remaining robust to difficulty-preserving transformations and complex goal structures. We then use probing methods to decode the agent's internal representations of the environment state and its multi-step action plans. We find that the LLM agent non-linearly encodes a coarse spatial map of the environment, preserving approximate task-relevant cues about its position and the goal location; that its actions are broadly consistent with these internal representations; and that reasoning reorganises them, shifting from broader environment structural cues toward information supporting immediate action selection. Our findings support the view that introspective examination is required beyond behavioural evaluations to characterise how agents represent and pursue their objectives.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibiting test-time scaling behavior, such as extended reasoning traces and self-verification, have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex, long-term reasoning tasks. However, the robustness of these reasoning behaviors remains underexplored. To investigate this, we conduct a systematic evaluation of multiple reasoning models across three scenarios: (1) problems augmented with lengthy, irrelevant context; (2) multi-turn conversational settings with independent tasks; and (3) problems presented as a subtask within a complex task. We observe an interesting phenomenon: reasoning models tend to produce much shorter reasoning traces (up to 50%) for the same problem under different context conditions compared to the traces produced when the problem is presented in isolation. A finer-grained analysis reveals that this compression is associated with a decrease in self-verification and uncertainty management behaviors, such as double-checking. While this behavioral shift does not compromise performance on straightforward problems, it might affect performance on more challenging tasks. We hope our findings draw additional attention to both the robustness of reasoning models and the problem of context management for LLMs and LLM-based agents.

Interpretability research on large language models (LLMs) has yielded important insights into model behaviour, yet recurring pitfalls persist: findings that do not generalise, and causal interpretations that outrun the evidence. Our position is that causal inference specifies what constitutes a valid mapping from model activations to invariant high-level structures, the data or assumptions needed to achieve it, and the inferences it can support. Specifically, Pearl's causal hierarchy clarifies what an interpretability study can justify. Observations establish associations between model behaviour and internal components. Interventions (e.g., ablations or activation patching) support claims how these edits affect a behavioural metric (e.g., average change in token probabilities) over a set of prompts. However, counterfactual claims -- i.e., asking what the model output would have been for the same prompt under an unobserved intervention -- remain largely unverifiable without controlled supervision. We show how causal representation learning (CRL) operationalises this hierarchy, specifying which variables are recoverable from activations and under what assumptions. Together, these motivate a diagnostic framework that helps practitioners select methods and evaluations matching claims to evidence such that findings generalise.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

We investigate the extent to which contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) can engage in exploration, a core capability in reinforcement learning and decision making. We focus on native performance of existing LLMs, without training interventions. We deploy LLMs as agents in simple multi-armed bandit environments, specifying the environment description and interaction history entirely in-context, i.e., within the LLM prompt. We experiment with GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Llama2, using a variety of prompt designs, and find that the models do not robustly engage in exploration without substantial interventions: i) Across all of our experiments, only one configuration resulted in satisfactory exploratory behavior: GPT-4 with chain-of-thought reasoning and an externally summarized interaction history, presented as sufficient statistics; ii) All other configurations did not result in robust exploratory behavior, including those with chain-of-thought reasoning but unsummarized history. Although these findings can be interpreted positively, they suggest that external summarization -- which may not be possible in more complex settings -- is important for obtaining desirable behavior from LLM agents. We conclude that non-trivial algorithmic interventions, such as fine-tuning or dataset curation, may be required to empower LLM-based decision making agents in complex settings.

Computational measurement of human behavior from video has recently become feasible due to major advances in AI. These advances now enable granular and precise quantification of facial expression, head movement, body action, and other behavioral modalities and are increasingly used in psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and mental health research. However, mainstream adoption remains slow. Most existing methods and software are developed for engineering audiences, require specialized software stacks, and fail to provide behavioral measurements at a level directly useful for hypothesis-driven research. As a result, there is a large barrier to entry for researchers who wish to use modern, AI-based tools in their work. We introduce Bitbox, an open-source toolkit designed to remove this barrier and make advanced computational analysis directly usable by behavioral scientists and clinical researchers. Bitbox is guided by principles of reproducibility, modularity, and interpretability. It provides a standardized interface for extracting high-level behavioral measurements from video, leveraging multiple face, head, and body processors. The core modules have been tested and validated on clinical samples and are designed so that new measures can be added with minimal effort. Bitbox is intended to serve both sides of the translational gap. It gives behavioral researchers access to robust, high-level behavioral metrics without requiring engineering expertise, and it provides computer scientists a practical mechanism for disseminating methods to domains where their impact is most needed. We expect that Bitbox will accelerate integration of computational behavioral measurement into behavioral, clinical, and mental health research. Bitbox has been designed from the beginning as a community-driven effort that will evolve through contributions from both method developers and domain scientists.

Motivation is a central driver of human behavior, shaping decisions, goals, and task performance. As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly aligned with human preferences, we ask whether they exhibit something akin to motivation. We examine whether LLMs "report" varying levels of motivation, how these reports relate to their behavior, and whether external factors can influence them. Our experiments reveal consistent and structured patterns that echo human psychology: self-reported motivation aligns with different behavioral signatures, varies across task types, and can be modulated by external manipulations. These findings demonstrate that motivation is a coherent organizing construct for LLM behavior, systematically linking reports, choices, effort, and performance, and revealing motivational dynamics that resemble those documented in human psychology. This perspective deepens our understanding of model behavior and its connection to human-inspired concepts.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

The realization that complex systems such as ecological communities can collapse or shift regimes suddenly and without rapid external forcing poses a serious challenge to our understanding and management of the natural world. The potential to identify early warning signals that would allow researchers and managers to predict such events before they happen has therefore been an invaluable discovery that offers a way forward in spite of such seemingly unpredictable behavior. Research into early warning signals has demonstrated that it is possible to define and detect such early warning signals in advance of a transition in certain contexts. Here we describe the pattern emerging as research continues to explore just how far we can generalize these results. A core of examples emerges that shares three properties: the phenomenon of rapid regime shifts, a pattern of 'critical slowing down' that can be used to detect the approaching shift, and a mechanism of bifurcation driving the sudden change. As research has expanded beyond these core examples, it is becoming clear that not all systems that show regime shifts exhibit critical slowing down, or vice versa. Even when systems exhibit critical slowing down, statistical detection is a challenge. We review the literature that explores these edge cases and highlight the need for (a) new early warning behaviors that can be used in cases where rapid shifts do not exhibit critical slowing down, (b) the development of methods to identify which behavior might be an appropriate signal when encountering a novel system; bearing in mind that a positive indication for some systems is a negative indication in others, and (c) statistical methods that can distinguish between signatures of early warning behaviors and noise.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in simulating human behavior, yet existing agents often exhibit behavioral rigidity, a flaw frequently masked by the self-referential bias of current "LLM-as-a-judge" evaluations. By evaluating against empirical ground truth, we reveal a counter-intuitive phenomenon: increasing the intensity of prompt-driven reasoning does not enhance fidelity but rather exacerbates value polarization, collapsing population diversity. To address this, we propose the Context-Value-Action (CVA) architecture, grounded in the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model and Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Unlike methods relying on self-verification, CVA decouples action generation from cognitive reasoning via a novel Value Verifier trained on authentic human data to explicitly model dynamic value activation. Experiments on CVABench, which comprises over 1.1 million real-world interaction traces, demonstrate that CVA significantly outperforms baselines. Our approach effectively mitigates polarization while offering superior behavioral fidelity and interpretability.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable outcome rewards (RLVR) has effectively scaled up chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Yet, its efficacy in training vision-language model (VLM) agents for goal-directed action reasoning in visual environments is less established. This work investigates this problem through extensive experiments on complex card games, such as 24 points, and embodied tasks from ALFWorld. We find that when rewards are based solely on action outcomes, RL fails to incentivize CoT reasoning in VLMs, instead leading to a phenomenon we termed thought collapse, characterized by a rapid loss of diversity in the agent's thoughts, state-irrelevant and incomplete reasoning, and subsequent invalid actions, resulting in negative rewards. To counteract thought collapse, we highlight the necessity of process guidance and propose an automated corrector that evaluates and refines the agent's reasoning at each RL step. This simple and scalable GTR (Guided Thought Reinforcement) framework trains reasoning and action simultaneously without the need for dense, per-step human labeling. Our experiments demonstrate that GTR significantly enhances the performance and generalization of the LLaVA-7b model across various visual environments, achieving 3-5 times higher task success rates compared to SoTA models with notably smaller model sizes.

Understanding freely moving animal behavior is central to neuroscience, where pose estimation and behavioral understanding form the foundation for linking neural activity to natural actions. Yet both tasks still depend heavily on human annotation or unstable unsupervised pipelines, limiting scalability and reproducibility. We present BehaviorVLM, a unified vision-language framework for pose estimation and behavioral understanding that requires no task-specific finetuning and minimal human labeling by guiding pretrained Vision-Language Models (VLMs) through detailed, explicit, and verifiable reasoning steps. For pose estimation, we leverage quantum-dot-grounded behavioral data and propose a multi-stage pipeline that integrates temporal, spatial, and cross-view reasoning. This design greatly reduces human annotation effort, exposes low-confidence labels through geometric checks such as reprojection error, and produces labels that can later be filtered, corrected, or used to fine-tune downstream pose models. For behavioral understanding, we propose a pipeline that integrates deep embedded clustering for over-segmented behavior discovery, VLM-based per-clip video captioning, and LLM-based reasoning to merge and semantically label behavioral segments. The behavioral pipeline can operate directly from visual information and does not require keypoints to segment behavior. Together, these components enable scalable, interpretable, and label-light analysis of multi-animal behavior.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

Communication is defined as "Who says what to whom with what effect." A message from a communicator generates downstream receiver effects, also known as behavior. Receiver behavior, being a downstream effect of the message, carries rich signals about it. Even after carrying signals about the message, the behavior data is often ignored while training large language models. We show that training LLMs on receiver behavior can actually help improve their content-understanding abilities. Specifically, we show that training LLMs to predict the receiver behavior of likes and comments improves the LLM's performance on a wide variety of downstream content understanding tasks. We show this performance increase over 40 video and image understanding tasks over 23 benchmark datasets across both 0-shot and fine-tuning settings, outperforming many supervised baselines. Moreover, since receiver behavior, such as likes and comments, is collected by default on the internet and does not need any human annotations to be useful, the performance improvement we get after training on this data is essentially free-lunch. We release the receiver behavior cleaned comments and likes of 750k images and videos collected from multiple platforms along with our instruction-tuning data.

Active inference is a unifying theory for perception and action resting upon the idea that the brain maintains an internal model of the world by minimizing free energy. From a behavioral perspective, active inference agents can be seen as self-evidencing beings that act to fulfill their optimistic predictions, namely preferred outcomes or goals. In contrast, reinforcement learning requires human-designed rewards to accomplish any desired outcome. Although active inference could provide a more natural self-supervised objective for control, its applicability has been limited because of the shortcomings in scaling the approach to complex environments. In this work, we propose a contrastive objective for active inference that strongly reduces the computational burden in learning the agent's generative model and planning future actions. Our method performs notably better than likelihood-based active inference in image-based tasks, while also being computationally cheaper and easier to train. We compare to reinforcement learning agents that have access to human-designed reward functions, showing that our approach closely matches their performance. Finally, we also show that contrastive methods perform significantly better in the case of distractors in the environment and that our method is able to generalize goals to variations in the background. Website and code: https://contrastive-aif.github.io/

The process of quantifying and analyzing animal behavior involves translating the naturally occurring descriptive language of their actions into machine-readable code. Yet, codifying behavior analysis is often challenging without deep understanding of animal behavior and technical machine learning knowledge. To limit this gap, we introduce AmadeusGPT: a natural language interface that turns natural language descriptions of behaviors into machine-executable code. Large-language models (LLMs) such as GPT3.5 and GPT4 allow for interactive language-based queries that are potentially well suited for making interactive behavior analysis. However, the comprehension capability of these LLMs is limited by the context window size, which prevents it from remembering distant conversations. To overcome the context window limitation, we implement a novel dual-memory mechanism to allow communication between short-term and long-term memory using symbols as context pointers for retrieval and saving. Concretely, users directly use language-based definitions of behavior and our augmented GPT develops code based on the core AmadeusGPT API, which contains machine learning, computer vision, spatio-temporal reasoning, and visualization modules. Users then can interactively refine results, and seamlessly add new behavioral modules as needed. We benchmark AmadeusGPT and show we can produce state-of-the-art performance on the MABE 2022 behavior challenge tasks. Note, an end-user would not need to write any code to achieve this. Thus, collectively AmadeusGPT presents a novel way to merge deep biological knowledge, large-language models, and core computer vision modules into a more naturally intelligent system. Code and demos can be found at: https://github.com/AdaptiveMotorControlLab/AmadeusGPT.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

Recent work has shown that asking language models to generate reasoning steps improves performance on many reasoning tasks. When moving beyond prompting, this raises the question of how we should supervise such models: outcome-based approaches which supervise the final result, or process-based approaches which supervise the reasoning process itself? Differences between these approaches might naturally be expected not just in final-answer errors but also in reasoning errors, which can be difficult to detect and are problematic in many real-world domains such as education. We run the first comprehensive comparison between process- and outcome-based approaches trained on a natural language task, GSM8K. We find that pure outcome-based supervision produces similar final-answer error rates with less label supervision. However, for correct reasoning steps we find it necessary to use process-based supervision or supervision from learned reward models that emulate process-based feedback. In total, we improve the previous best results from 16.8% to 12.7% final-answer error and 14.0% to 3.4% reasoning error among final-answer-correct solutions.

The idea of personality in descriptive psychology, traditionally defined through observable behavior, has now been extended to Large Language Models (LLMs) to better understand their behavior. This raises a question: do LLMs exhibit distinct and consistent personality traits, similar to humans? Existing self-assessment personality tests, while applicable, lack the necessary validity and reliability for precise personality measurements. To address this, we introduce TRAIT, a new tool consisting of 8K multi-choice questions designed to assess the personality of LLMs with validity and reliability. TRAIT is built on the psychometrically validated human questionnaire, Big Five Inventory (BFI) and Short Dark Triad (SD-3), enhanced with the ATOMIC10X knowledge graph for testing personality in a variety of real scenarios. TRAIT overcomes the reliability and validity issues when measuring personality of LLM with self-assessment, showing the highest scores across three metrics: refusal rate, prompt sensitivity, and option order sensitivity. It reveals notable insights into personality of LLM: 1) LLMs exhibit distinct and consistent personality, which is highly influenced by their training data (i.e., data used for alignment tuning), and 2) current prompting techniques have limited effectiveness in eliciting certain traits, such as high psychopathy or low conscientiousness, suggesting the need for further research in this direction.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

Transformers demonstrate impressive performance on a range of reasoning benchmarks. To evaluate the degree to which these abilities are a result of actual reasoning, existing work has focused on developing sophisticated benchmarks for behavioral studies. However, these studies do not provide insights into the internal mechanisms driving the observed capabilities. To improve our understanding of the internal mechanisms of transformers, we present a comprehensive mechanistic analysis of a transformer trained on a synthetic reasoning task. We identify a set of interpretable mechanisms the model uses to solve the task, and validate our findings using correlational and causal evidence. Our results suggest that it implements a depth-bounded recurrent mechanisms that operates in parallel and stores intermediate results in selected token positions. We anticipate that the motifs we identified in our synthetic setting can provide valuable insights into the broader operating principles of transformers and thus provide a basis for understanding more complex models.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Recent advancements in recommender systems have focused on leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to improve user preference modeling, yielding promising outcomes. However, current LLM-based approaches struggle to fully leverage user behavior sequences, resulting in suboptimal preference modeling for personalized recommendations. In this study, we propose a novel Counterfactual Fine-Tuning (CFT) method to address this issue by explicitly emphasizing the role of behavior sequences when generating recommendations. Specifically, we employ counterfactual reasoning to identify the causal effects of behavior sequences on model output and introduce a task that directly fits the ground-truth labels based on these effects, achieving the goal of explicit emphasis. Additionally, we develop a token-level weighting mechanism to adjust the emphasis strength for different item tokens, reflecting the diminishing influence of behavior sequences from earlier to later tokens during predicting an item. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate that CFT effectively improves behavior sequence modeling. Our codes are available at https://github.com/itsmeyjt/CFT.

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

In this paper, we propose R^3: Learning Reasoning through Reverse Curriculum Reinforcement Learning (RL), a novel method that employs only outcome supervision to achieve the benefits of process supervision for large language models. The core challenge in applying RL to complex reasoning is to identify a sequence of actions that result in positive rewards and provide appropriate supervision for optimization. Outcome supervision provides sparse rewards for final results without identifying error locations, whereas process supervision offers step-wise rewards but requires extensive manual annotation. R^3 overcomes these limitations by learning from correct demonstrations. Specifically, R^3 progressively slides the start state of reasoning from a demonstration's end to its beginning, facilitating easier model exploration at all stages. Thus, R^3 establishes a step-wise curriculum, allowing outcome supervision to offer step-level signals and precisely pinpoint errors. Using Llama2-7B, our method surpasses RL baseline on eight reasoning tasks by 4.1 points on average. Notebaly, in program-based reasoning on GSM8K, it exceeds the baseline by 4.2 points across three backbone models, and without any extra data, Codellama-7B + R^3 performs comparable to larger models or closed-source models.

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Consider this prompt "Draw a unicorn with two horns". Should large language models (LLMs) recognize that a unicorn has only one horn by definition and ask users for clarifications, or proceed to generate something anyway? We introduce concept incongruence to capture such phenomena where concept boundaries clash with each other, either in user prompts or in model representations, often leading to under-specified or mis-specified behaviors. In this work, we take the first step towards defining and analyzing model behavior under concept incongruence. Focusing on temporal boundaries in the Role-Play setting, we propose three behavioral metrics--abstention rate, conditional accuracy, and answer rate--to quantify model behavior under incongruence due to the role's death. We show that models fail to abstain after death and suffer from an accuracy drop compared to the Non-Role-Play setting. Through probing experiments, we identify two main causes: (i) unreliable encoding of the "death" state across different years, leading to unsatisfactory abstention behavior, and (ii) role playing causes shifts in the model's temporal representations, resulting in accuracy drops. We leverage these insights to improve consistency in the model's abstention and answer behaviors. Our findings suggest that concept incongruence leads to unexpected model behaviors and point to future directions on improving model behavior under concept incongruence.

Human biases impact the way people analyze data and make decisions. Recent work has shown that some visualization designs can better support cognitive processes and mitigate cognitive biases (i.e., errors that occur due to the use of mental "shortcuts"). In this work, we explore how visualizing a user's interaction history (i.e., which data points and attributes a user has interacted with) can be used to mitigate potential biases that drive decision making by promoting conscious reflection of one's analysis process. Given an interactive scatterplot-based visualization tool, we showed interaction history in real-time while exploring data (by coloring points in the scatterplot that the user has interacted with), and in a summative format after a decision has been made (by comparing the distribution of user interactions to the underlying distribution of the data). We conducted a series of in-lab experiments and a crowd-sourced experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of interaction history interventions toward mitigating bias. We contextualized this work in a political scenario in which participants were instructed to choose a committee of 10 fictitious politicians to review a recent bill passed in the U.S. state of Georgia banning abortion after 6 weeks, where things like gender bias or political party bias may drive one's analysis process. We demonstrate the generalizability of this approach by evaluating a second decision making scenario related to movies. Our results are inconclusive for the effectiveness of interaction history (henceforth referred to as interaction traces) toward mitigating biased decision making. However, we find some mixed support that interaction traces, particularly in a summative format, can increase awareness of potential unconscious biases.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong potential in generating 'believable human-like' behavior in web environments. Prior work has explored augmenting training data with LLM-synthesized rationales and applying supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to enhance reasoning ability, which in turn can improve downstream action prediction. However, the performance of such approaches remains inherently bounded by the reasoning capabilities of the model used to generate the rationales. In this paper, we introduce Shop-R1, a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework aimed at enhancing the reasoning ability of LLMs for simulation of real human behavior in online shopping environments Specifically, Shop-R1 decomposes the human behavior simulation task into two stages: rationale generation and action prediction, each guided by distinct reward signals. For rationale generation, we leverage internal model signals (e.g., logit distributions) to guide the reasoning process in a self-supervised manner. For action prediction, we propose a hierarchical reward structure with difficulty-aware scaling to prevent reward hacking and enable fine-grained reward assignment. This design evaluates both high-level action types and the correctness of fine-grained sub-action details (attributes and values), rewarding outputs proportionally to their difficulty. Experimental results show that our method achieves a relative improvement of over 65% compared to the baseline.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

The ability to observe the effects of actions performed by others and to infer their intent, most likely goals, or course of action, is known as a plan or intention recognition cognitive capability and has long been one of the fundamental research challenges in AI. Deep learning has recently been making significant inroads on various pattern recognition problems, except for intention recognition. While extensively explored since the seventies, the problem remains unsolved for most interesting cases in various areas, ranging from natural language understanding to human behavior understanding based on video feeds. This paper compares symbolic inverse planning, one of the most investigated approaches to goal recognition, to deep learning using CNN and LTSM neural network architectures, on five synthetic benchmarks often used in the literature. The results show that the deep learning approach achieves better goal-prediction accuracy and timeliness than the symbolic cost-based plan recognizer in these domains. Although preliminary, these results point to interesting future research avenues.

Advancements in AI have led to agents in networked environments increasingly mirroring human behavior, thereby blurring the boundary between artificial and human actors in specific contexts. This shift brings about significant challenges in trust, responsibility, ethics, security and etc. The difficulty in supervising of agent behaviors may lead to issues such as data contamination and unclear accountability. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the "Network Behavior Lifecycle" model, which divides network behavior into 6 stages and systematically analyzes the behavioral differences between humans and agents at each stage. Based on these insights, the paper further introduces the "Agent for Agent (A4A)" paradigm and the "Human-Agent Behavioral Disparity (HABD)" model, which examine the fundamental distinctions between human and agent behaviors across 5 dimensions: decision mechanism, execution efficiency, intention-behavior consistency, behavioral inertia, and irrational patterns. The effectiveness of the model is verified through real-world cases such as red team penetration and blue team defense. Finally, the paper discusses future research directions in dynamic cognitive governance architecture, behavioral disparity quantification, and meta-governance protocol stacks, aiming to provide a theoretical foundation and technical roadmap for secure and trustworthy human-agent collaboration.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) offers a potential boon for AI safety as it allows monitoring a model's CoT to try to understand its intentions and reasoning processes. However, the effectiveness of such monitoring hinges on CoTs faithfully representing models' actual reasoning processes. We evaluate CoT faithfulness of state-of-the-art reasoning models across 6 reasoning hints presented in the prompts and find: (1) for most settings and models tested, CoTs reveal their usage of hints in at least 1% of examples where they use the hint, but the reveal rate is often below 20%, (2) outcome-based reinforcement learning initially improves faithfulness but plateaus without saturating, and (3) when reinforcement learning increases how frequently hints are used (reward hacking), the propensity to verbalize them does not increase, even without training against a CoT monitor. These results suggest that CoT monitoring is a promising way of noticing undesired behaviors during training and evaluations, but that it is not sufficient to rule them out. They also suggest that in settings like ours where CoT reasoning is not necessary, test-time monitoring of CoTs is unlikely to reliably catch rare and catastrophic unexpected behaviors.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intelligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL problem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted as the agent's estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transformations of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving), and that the agent's posterior belief that it will survive increases over time.

Test-time compute has led to remarkable success in the large language model (LLM) community, particularly for complex tasks, where longer chains of thought (CoTs) are generated to enhance reasoning capabilities. However, growing evidence reveals that such reasoning models often produce CoTs plagued by excessive redundancy, including unnecessary verification steps and repetitive reasoning shifts. The root cause lies in post-training of them that overly rely on outcome reward paradigms, as the data of process reward paradigms, which regulate intermediate reasoning steps, is difficult to construct at scale. To address this, we propose PI, a novel framework for Test-time Prompt Intervention. PI provides an interface to dynamically guide and regulate reasoning paths during inference through timely (When module) and proper (How module) interventions and post-intervention sampling (Which module). This allows human problem-solving expertise and cognitive science principles to be seamlessly integrated into LLMs' reasoning processes, enhancing controllability and interpretability. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that PI significantly shortens CoTs while reducing hallucination, yielding more concise and reliable reasoning.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Large Language Models (LLMs) leverage step-by-step reasoning to solve complex problems. Standard evaluation practice involves generating a complete reasoning trace and assessing the correctness of the final answer presented at its conclusion. In this paper, we challenge the reliance on the final answer by posing the following two questions: Does the final answer reliably represent the model's optimal conclusion? Can alternative reasoning paths yield different results? To answer these questions, we analyze intermediate reasoning steps, termed subthoughts, and propose a method based on our findings. Our approach involves segmenting a reasoning trace into sequential subthoughts based on linguistic cues. We start by prompting the model to generate continuations from the end-point of each intermediate subthought. We extract a potential answer from every completed continuation originating from different subthoughts. We find that aggregating these answers by selecting the most frequent one (the mode) often yields significantly higher accuracy compared to relying solely on the answer derived from the original complete trace. Analyzing the consistency among the answers derived from different subthoughts reveals characteristics that correlate with the model's confidence and correctness, suggesting potential for identifying less reliable answers. Our experiments across various LLMs and challenging mathematical reasoning datasets (AIME2024 and AIME2025) show consistent accuracy improvements, with gains reaching up to 13\% and 10\% respectively. Implementation is available at: https://github.com/hammoudhasan/SubthoughtReasoner.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities through test-time computation (TTC) techniques such as chain-of-thought prompting and tree-based reasoning. However, we argue that current reasoning LLMs (RLLMs) lack the ability to systematically explore the solution space. This paper formalizes what constitutes systematic problem solving and identifies common failure modes that reveal reasoning LLMs to be wanderers rather than systematic explorers. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, we uncover persistent issues: invalid reasoning steps, redundant explorations, hallucinated or unfaithful conclusions, and so on. Our findings suggest that current models' performance can appear to be competent on simple tasks yet degrade sharply as complexity increases. Based on the findings, we advocate for new metrics and tools that evaluate not just final outputs but the structure of the reasoning process itself.

Despite the growing reasoning capabilities of recent large language models (LLMs), their internal mechanisms during the reasoning process remain underexplored. Prior approaches often rely on human-defined concepts (e.g., overthinking, reflection) at the word level to analyze reasoning in a supervised manner. However, such methods are limited, as it is infeasible to capture the full spectrum of potential reasoning behaviors, many of which are difficult to define in token space. In this work, we propose an unsupervised framework (namely, RISE: Reasoning behavior Interpretability via Sparse auto-Encoder) for discovering reasoning vectors, which we define as directions in the activation space that encode distinct reasoning behaviors. By segmenting chain-of-thought traces into sentence-level 'steps' and training sparse auto-encoders (SAEs) on step-level activations, we uncover disentangled features corresponding to interpretable behaviors such as reflection and backtracking. Visualization and clustering analyses show that these behaviors occupy separable regions in the decoder column space. Moreover, targeted interventions on SAE-derived vectors can controllably amplify or suppress specific reasoning behaviors, altering inference trajectories without retraining. Beyond behavior-specific disentanglement, SAEs capture structural properties such as response length, revealing clusters of long versus short reasoning traces. More interestingly, SAEs enable the discovery of novel behaviors beyond human supervision. We demonstrate the ability to control response confidence by identifying confidence-related vectors in the SAE decoder space. These findings underscore the potential of unsupervised latent discovery for both interpreting and controllably steering reasoning in LLMs.

Abstention, the refusal of large language models (LLMs) to provide an answer, is increasingly recognized for its potential to mitigate hallucinations and enhance safety in building LLM systems. In this survey, we introduce a framework to examine abstention behavior from three perspectives: the query, the model, and human values. We review the literature on abstention methods (categorized based on the development stages of LLMs), benchmarks, and evaluation metrics, and discuss the merits and limitations of prior work. We further identify and motivate areas for future research, such as encouraging the study of abstention as a meta-capability across tasks and customizing abstention abilities based on context. In doing so, we aim to broaden the scope and impact of abstention methodologies in AI systems.

We consider identification of average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) within the difference-in-differences (DiD) framework in the presence of endogenous sample selection. First, we establish that the usual DiD estimand fails to recover meaningful treatment effects, even if selection and treatment assignment are independent. Next, we partially identify the ATT for individuals who are always observed post-treatment regardless of their treatment status, and derive bounds on this parameter under different sets of assumptions about the relationship between sample selection and treatment assignment. Extensions to the repeated cross-section and two-by-two comparisons in the staggered adoption case are explored. Furthermore, we provide identification results for the ATT of three additional empirically relevant latent groups by incorporating outcome mean dominance assumptions which have intuitive appeal in applications. Finally, two empirical illustrations demonstrate the approach's usefulness by revisiting (i) the effect of a job training program on earnings(Calonico & Smith, 2017) and (ii) the effect of a working-from-home policy on employee performance (Bloom, Liang, Roberts, & Ying, 2015).

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

Most recommendation benchmarks evaluate how well a model imitates user behavior. In financial advisory, however, observed actions can be noisy or short-sighted under market volatility and may conflict with a user's long-term goals. Treating what users chose as the sole ground truth, therefore, conflates behavioral imitation with decision quality. We introduce Conv-FinRe, a conversational and longitudinal benchmark for stock recommendation that evaluates LLMs beyond behavior matching. Given an onboarding interview, step-wise market context, and advisory dialogues, models must generate rankings over a fixed investment horizon. Crucially, Conv-FinRe provides multi-view references that distinguish descriptive behavior from normative utility grounded in investor-specific risk preferences, enabling diagnosis of whether an LLM follows rational analysis, mimics user noise, or is driven by market momentum. We build the benchmark from real market data and human decision trajectories, instantiate controlled advisory conversations, and evaluate a suite of state-of-the-art LLMs. Results reveal a persistent tension between rational decision quality and behavioral alignment: models that perform well on utility-based ranking often fail to match user choices, whereas behaviorally aligned models can overfit short-term noise. The dataset is publicly released on Hugging Face, and the codebase is available on GitHub.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Moral reasoning is a complex cognitive process shaped by individual experiences and cultural contexts and presents unique challenges for computational analysis. While natural language processing (NLP) offers promising tools for studying this phenomenon, current research lacks cohesion, employing discordant datasets and tasks that examine isolated aspects of moral reasoning. We bridge this gap with UniMoral, a unified dataset integrating psychologically grounded and social-media-derived moral dilemmas annotated with labels for action choices, ethical principles, contributing factors, and consequences, alongside annotators' moral and cultural profiles. Recognizing the cultural relativity of moral reasoning, UniMoral spans six languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish, capturing diverse socio-cultural contexts. We demonstrate UniMoral's utility through a benchmark evaluations of three large language models (LLMs) across four tasks: action prediction, moral typology classification, factor attribution analysis, and consequence generation. Key findings reveal that while implicitly embedded moral contexts enhance the moral reasoning capability of LLMs, there remains a critical need for increasingly specialized approaches to further advance moral reasoning in these models.

Agentic search leverages LLMs to solve complex user information needs by executing a multi-step process of planning, searching, and synthesizing information to provide answers. This paradigm introduces unique challenges for LLMs' agentic reasoning capabilities when interacting with search systems. In this paper, we propose an LLM-based pipeline to study effective reasoning behavior patterns in agentic search by analyzing agentic search trajectories. Using this pipeline, we identify four beneficial reasoning behaviors: Information Verification, Authority Evaluation, Adaptive Search, and Error Recovery. Based on these findings, we propose a technique called Behavior Priming to train agentic search models. It synthesizes trajectories that exhibit these four behaviors and integrates them into the agentic search model through SFT, followed by standard reinforcement learning. Experiments on Qwen3-1.7B and Llama3.2-3B-Instruct across three web benchmarks and seven multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that behavior priming 1) yields significant performance gains compared to training with direct RL, and 2) outperforms other SFT-then-RL baselines, such as those SFT on randomly selected trajectories or on trajectories with merely correct outcomes. Crucially, we demonstrate that the reasoning behaviors, rather than the correctness of the final answer, is the critical factor for achieving strong performance in RL: SFT on trajectories with reasoning behaviors but incorrect answers leads to comparable performance with SFT on those with reasoning behaviors and correct answers. Our analysis further reveals that the introduced reasoning behaviors endow models with more effective exploration (higher pass@k and entropy) and test-time scaling (longer trajectories) capabilities, providing a strong foundation for RL. Our code are avalible at https://github.com/cxcscmu/Behavior_Priming_For_Agentic_Search.

The growing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in instruction-following and context-understanding lead to the era of agents with numerous applications. Among these, task planning agents have become especially prominent in realistic scenarios involving complex internal pipelines, such as context understanding, tool management, and response generation. However, existing benchmarks predominantly evaluate agent performance based on task completion as a proxy for overall effectiveness. We hypothesize that merely improving task completion is misaligned with maximizing user satisfaction, as users interact with the entire agentic process and not only the end result. To address this gap, we propose PIPA, a unified evaluation protocol that conceptualizes the behavioral process of interactive task planning agents within a partially observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) paradigm. The proposed protocol offers a comprehensive assessment of agent performance through a set of atomic evaluation criteria, allowing researchers and practitioners to diagnose specific strengths and weaknesses within the agent's decision-making pipeline. Our analyses show that agents excel in different behavioral stages, with user satisfaction shaped by both outcomes and intermediate behaviors. We also highlight future directions, including systems that leverage multiple agents and the limitations of user simulators in task planning.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

Is there a canonical way to think of agency beyond reward maximisation? In this paper, we show that any type of behaviour complying with physically sound assumptions about how macroscopic biological agents interact with the world canonically integrates exploration and exploitation in the sense of minimising risk and ambiguity about states of the world. This description, known as active inference, refines the free energy principle, a popular descriptive framework for action and perception originating in neuroscience. Active inference provides a normative Bayesian framework to simulate and model agency that is widely used in behavioural neuroscience, reinforcement learning (RL) and robotics. The usefulness of active inference for RL is three-fold. a) Active inference provides a principled solution to the exploration-exploitation dilemma that usefully simulates biological agency. b) It provides an explainable recipe to simulate behaviour, whence behaviour follows as an explainable mixture of exploration and exploitation under a generative world model, and all differences in behaviour are explicit in differences in world model. c) This framework is universal in the sense that it is theoretically possible to rewrite any RL algorithm conforming to the descriptive assumptions of active inference as an active inference algorithm. Thus, active inference can be used as a tool to uncover and compare the commitments and assumptions of more specific models of agency.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in role-playing tasks. However, there is limited research on whether LLMs can accurately simulate user behavior in real-world scenarios, such as social media. This requires models to effectively analyze a user's history and simulate their role. In this paper, we introduce FineRob, a novel fine-grained behavior simulation dataset. We collect the complete behavioral history of 1,866 distinct users across three social media platforms. Each behavior is decomposed into three fine-grained elements: object, type, and content, resulting in 78.6k QA records. Based on FineRob, we identify two dominant reasoning patterns in LLMs' behavior simulation processes and propose the OM-CoT fine-tuning method to enhance the capability. Through comprehensive experiments, we conduct an in-depth analysis of key factors of behavior simulation and also demonstrate the effectiveness of OM-CoT approachCode and dataset are available at \url{https://github.com/linkseed18612254945/FineRob}

Large reasoning models (LRMs) already possess a latent capacity for long chain-of-thought reasoning. Prior work has shown that outcome-based reinforcement learning (RL) can incidentally elicit advanced reasoning behaviors such as self-correction, backtracking, and verification phenomena often referred to as the model's "aha moment". However, the timing and consistency of these emergent behaviors remain unpredictable and uncontrollable, limiting the scalability and reliability of LRMs' reasoning capabilities. To address these limitations, we move beyond reliance on prompts and coincidental "aha moments". Instead, we explicitly align models with three meta-abilities: deduction, induction, and abduction, using automatically generated, self-verifiable tasks. Our three stage-pipeline individual alignment, parameter-space merging, and domain-specific reinforcement learning, boosting performance by over 10\% relative to instruction-tuned baselines. Furthermore, domain-specific RL from the aligned checkpoint yields an additional 2\% average gain in the performance ceiling across math, coding, and science benchmarks, demonstrating that explicit meta-ability alignment offers a scalable and dependable foundation for reasoning. Code is available at: https://github.com/zhiyuanhubj/Meta-Ability-Alignment

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) are an increasingly deployed class of agents that take actions on GUIs to accomplish user goals. In this paper, we show that CUAs consistently exhibit Blind Goal-Directedness (BGD): a bias to pursue goals regardless of feasibility, safety, reliability, or context. We characterize three prevalent patterns of BGD: (i) lack of contextual reasoning, (ii) assumptions and decisions under ambiguity, and (iii) contradictory or infeasible goals. We develop BLIND-ACT, a benchmark of 90 tasks capturing these three patterns. Built on OSWorld, BLIND-ACT provides realistic environments and employs LLM-based judges to evaluate agent behavior, achieving 93.75% agreement with human annotations. We use BLIND-ACT to evaluate nine frontier models, including Claude Sonnet and Opus 4, Computer-Use-Preview, and GPT-5, observing high average BGD rates (80.8%) across them. We show that BGD exposes subtle risks that arise even when inputs are not directly harmful. While prompting-based interventions lower BGD levels, substantial risk persists, highlighting the need for stronger training- or inference-time interventions. Qualitative analysis reveals observed failure modes: execution-first bias (focusing on how to act over whether to act), thought-action disconnect (execution diverging from reasoning), and request-primacy (justifying actions due to user request). Identifying BGD and introducing BLIND-ACT establishes a foundation for future research on studying and mitigating this fundamental risk and ensuring safe CUA deployment.

Recent advances in test-time scaling have led to the emergence of thinking LLMs that exhibit self-reflective behaviors and multi-step reasoning. While RL drives this self-improvement paradigm, a recent study (Gandhi et al., 2025) shows that RL alone does not truly instill these new reasoning abilities - it merely draws out behaviors already present in the base models. This raises a question: How can we train the models that don't exhibit such thinking behavior to develop it in the first place? To this end, we propose ThinkTuning, a GRPO-based interactive training approach where we augment the rollouts of a student model with the guidance from a teacher model. A simple idea from classroom practice inspires our method: a teacher poses a problem, lets the student try an answer, then gives corrective feedback -- enough to point the mind in the right direction and then show the solution. Each piece of feedback reshapes the student's thoughts, leading them to arrive at the correct solution. Similarly, we find that this type of implicit supervision through feedback from a teacher model of the same size improves the reasoning capabilities of the student model. In particular, on average, our method shows a 3.85% improvement over zero-shot baselines across benchmarks, and on MATH-500, AIME and GPQA-Diamond it shows 2.08%, 2.23% and 3.99% improvements over the vanilla-GRPO baseline. Source code is available at https://github.com/3rdAT/ThinkTuning.

The research explores the steerability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's ChatGPT iterations. By employing a behavioral psychology framework called OCEAN (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism), we quantitatively gauged the model's responsiveness to tailored prompts. When asked to generate text mimicking an extroverted personality, OCEAN scored the language alignment to that behavioral trait. In our analysis, while "openness" presented linguistic ambiguity, "conscientiousness" and "neuroticism" were distinctly evoked in the OCEAN framework, with "extroversion" and "agreeableness" showcasing a notable overlap yet distinct separation from other traits. Our findings underscore GPT's versatility and ability to discern and adapt to nuanced instructions. Furthermore, historical figure simulations highlighted the LLM's capacity to internalize and project instructible personas, precisely replicating their philosophies and dialogic styles. However, the rapid advancements in LLM capabilities and the opaque nature of some training techniques make metric proposals degrade rapidly. Our research emphasizes a quantitative role to describe steerability in LLMs, presenting both its promise and areas for further refinement in aligning its progress to human intentions.

This paper introduces CoBRA, a novel toolkit for systematically specifying agent behavior in LLM-based social simulation. We found that conventional approaches that specify agent behavior through implicit natural-language descriptions often do not yield consistent behavior across models, and the resulting behavior does not capture the nuances of the descriptions. In contrast, CoBRA introduces a model-agnostic way to control agent behavior that lets researchers explicitly specify desired nuances and obtain consistent behavior across models. At the heart of CoBRA is a novel closed-loop system primitive with two components: (1) Cognitive Bias Index that measures the demonstrated cognitive bias of a social agent, by quantifying the agent's reactions in a set of validated classic social science experiments; (2) Behavioral Regulation Engine that aligns the agent's behavior to exhibit controlled cognitive bias. Through CoBRA, we show how to operationalize validated social science knowledge (i.e., classical experiments) as reusable "gym" environments for AI -- an approach that may generalize to richer social and affective simulations beyond bias alone.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

Personality traits have long been studied as predictors of human behavior. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) suggest similar patterns may emerge in artificial systems, with advanced LLMs displaying consistent behavioral tendencies resembling human traits like agreeableness and self-regulation. Understanding these patterns is crucial, yet prior work primarily relied on simplified self-reports and heuristic prompting, with little behavioral validation. In this study, we systematically characterize LLM personality across three dimensions: (1) the dynamic emergence and evolution of trait profiles throughout training stages; (2) the predictive validity of self-reported traits in behavioral tasks; and (3) the impact of targeted interventions, such as persona injection, on both self-reports and behavior. Our findings reveal that instructional alignment (e.g., RLHF, instruction tuning) significantly stabilizes trait expression and strengthens trait correlations in ways that mirror human data. However, these self-reported traits do not reliably predict behavior, and observed associations often diverge from human patterns. While persona injection successfully steers self-reports in the intended direction, it exerts little or inconsistent effect on actual behavior. By distinguishing surface-level trait expression from behavioral consistency, our findings challenge assumptions about LLM personality and underscore the need for deeper evaluation in alignment and interpretability.

In classic instruction following, language like "I'd like the JetBlue flight" maps to actions (e.g., selecting that flight). However, language also conveys information about a user's underlying reward function (e.g., a general preference for JetBlue), which can allow a model to carry out desirable actions in new contexts. We present a model that infers rewards from language pragmatically: reasoning about how speakers choose utterances not only to elicit desired actions, but also to reveal information about their preferences. On a new interactive flight-booking task with natural language, our model more accurately infers rewards and predicts optimal actions in unseen environments, in comparison to past work that first maps language to actions (instruction following) and then maps actions to rewards (inverse reinforcement learning).

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Reasoning is most powerful when an LLM accurately aggregates relevant information. We examine the critical role of information aggregation in reasoning by requiring the LLM to analyze sports narratives. To succeed at this task, an LLM must infer points from actions, identify related entities, attribute points accurately to players and teams, and compile key statistics to draw conclusions. We conduct comprehensive experiments with real NBA basketball data and present SportsGen, a new method to synthesize game narratives. By synthesizing data, we can rigorously evaluate LLMs' reasoning capabilities under complex scenarios with varying narrative lengths and density of information. Our findings show that most models, including GPT-4o, often fail to accurately aggregate basketball scores due to frequent scoring patterns. Open-source models like Llama-3 further suffer from significant score hallucinations. Finally, the effectiveness of reasoning is influenced by narrative complexity, information density, and domain-specific terms, highlighting the challenges in analytical reasoning tasks.

The 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge is designed to rigorously track progress toward solving long-horizon tasks by physical agents in simulated environments. BEHAVIOR-1K focuses on everyday household tasks that people most want robots to assist with and these tasks introduce long-horizon mobile manipulation challenges in realistic settings, bridging the gap between current research and real-world, human-centric applications. This report presents our solution to the 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge in a very close 2nd place and substantially outperforms the rest of the submissions. Building on π_{0.5}, we focus on systematically building our solution by studying the effects of training techniques and data. Through careful ablations, we show the scaling power in pre-training and post-training phases for competitive performance. We summarize our practical lessons and design recommendations that we hope will provide actionable insights for the broader embodied AI community when adapting powerful foundation models to complex embodied scenarios.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

We present ManzaiSet, the first large scale multimodal dataset of viewer responses to Japanese manzai comedy, capturing facial videos and audio from 241 participants watching up to 10 professional performances in randomized order (94.6 percent watched >= 8; analyses focus on n=228). This addresses the Western centric bias in affective computing. Three key findings emerge: (1) k means clustering identified three distinct viewer types: High and Stable Appreciators (72.8 percent, n=166), Low and Variable Decliners (13.2 percent, n=30), and Variable Improvers (14.0 percent, n=32), with heterogeneity of variance (Brown Forsythe p < 0.001); (2) individual level analysis revealed a positive viewing order effect (mean slope = 0.488, t(227) = 5.42, p < 0.001, permutation p < 0.001), contradicting fatigue hypotheses; (3) automated humor classification (77 instances, 131 labels) plus viewer level response modeling found no type wise differences after FDR correction. The dataset enables culturally aware emotion AI development and personalized entertainment systems tailored to non Western contexts.

This paper introduces an interdisciplinary framework called Machine Psychology, which merges principles from operant learning psychology with a specific Artificial Intelligence model, the Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS), to enhance Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) research. The core premise of this framework is that adaptation is crucial to both biological and artificial intelligence and can be understood through operant conditioning principles. The study assesses this approach via three operant learning tasks using OpenNARS for Applications (ONA): simple discrimination, changing contingencies, and conditional discrimination tasks. In the simple discrimination task, NARS demonstrated rapid learning, achieving perfect accuracy during both training and testing phases. The changing contingencies task showcased NARS's adaptability, as it successfully adjusted its behavior when task conditions were reversed. In the conditional discrimination task, NARS handled complex learning scenarios effectively, achieving high accuracy by forming and utilizing intricate hypotheses based on conditional cues. These findings support the application of operant conditioning as a framework for creating adaptive AGI systems. NARS's ability to operate under conditions of insufficient knowledge and resources, coupled with its sensorimotor reasoning capabilities, establishes it as a robust model for AGI. The Machine Psychology framework, by incorporating elements of natural intelligence such as continuous learning and goal-driven behavior, offers a scalable and flexible approach for real-world applications. Future research should investigate using enhanced NARS systems, more advanced tasks, and applying this framework to diverse, complex challenges to further progress the development of human-level AI.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

While reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has advanced LLM reasoning in structured domains like mathematics and programming, its application to general-domain reasoning tasks remains challenging due to the absence of verifiable reward signals. To this end, methods like Reinforcement Learning with Reference Probability Reward (RLPR) have emerged, leveraging the probability of generating the final answer as a reward signal. However, these outcome-focused approaches neglect crucial step-by-step supervision of the reasoning process itself. To address this gap, we introduce Probabilistic Process Supervision (P2S), a novel self-supervision framework that provides fine-grained process rewards without requiring a separate reward model or human-annotated reasoning steps. During reinforcement learning, P2S synthesizes and filters a high-quality reference reasoning chain (gold-CoT). The core of our method is to calculate a Path Faithfulness Reward (PFR) for each reasoning step, which is derived from the conditional probability of generating the gold-CoT's suffix, given the model's current reasoning prefix. Crucially, this PFR can be flexibly integrated with any outcome-based reward, directly tackling the reward sparsity problem by providing dense guidance. Extensive experiments on reading comprehension and medical Question Answering benchmarks show that P2S significantly outperforms strong baselines.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLM) have led to a new class of autonomous agents, renewing and expanding interest in the area. LLM-powered Multiagent Systems (MAS) have thus emerged, both for assistive and simulation purposes, yet tools for realistic human behavior simulation -- with its distinctive challenges and opportunities -- remain underdeveloped. Existing MAS libraries and tools lack fine-grained persona specifications, population sampling facilities, experimentation support, and integrated validation, among other key capabilities, limiting their utility for behavioral studies, social simulation, and related applications. To address these deficiencies, in this work we introduce TinyTroupe, a simulation toolkit enabling detailed persona definitions (e.g., nationality, age, occupation, personality, beliefs, behaviors) and programmatic control via numerous LLM-driven mechanisms. This allows for the concise formulation of behavioral problems of practical interest, either at the individual or group level, and provides effective means for their solution. TinyTroupe's components are presented using representative working examples, such as brainstorming and market research sessions, thereby simultaneously clarifying their purpose and demonstrating their usefulness. Quantitative and qualitative evaluations of selected aspects are also provided, highlighting possibilities, limitations, and trade-offs. The approach, though realized as a specific Python implementation, is meant as a novel conceptual contribution, which can be partially or fully incorporated in other contexts. The library is available as open source at https://github.com/microsoft/tinytroupe.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Over the last decade, explainable AI has primarily focused on interpreting individual model predictions, producing post-hoc explanations that relate inputs to outputs under a fixed decision structure. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled agentic AI systems whose behaviour unfolds over multi-step trajectories. In these settings, success and failure are determined by sequences of decisions rather than a single output. While useful, it remains unclear how explanation approaches designed for static predictions translate to agentic settings where behaviour emerges over time. In this work, we bridge the gap between static and agentic explainability by comparing attribution-based explanations with trace-based diagnostics across both settings. To make this distinction explicit, we empirically compare attribution-based explanations used in static classification tasks with trace-based diagnostics used in agentic benchmarks (TAU-bench Airline and AssistantBench). Our results show that while attribution methods achieve stable feature rankings in static settings (Spearman ρ= 0.86), they cannot be applied reliably to diagnose execution-level failures in agentic trajectories. In contrast, trace-grounded rubric evaluation for agentic settings consistently localizes behaviour breakdowns and reveals that state tracking inconsistency is 2.7times more prevalent in failed runs and reduces success probability by 49\%. These findings motivate a shift towards trajectory-level explainability for agentic systems when evaluating and diagnosing autonomous AI behaviour. Resources: https://github.com/VectorInstitute/unified-xai-evaluation-framework https://vectorinstitute.github.io/unified-xai-evaluation-framework

Large language models (LLMs) have been widely applied across various domains of finance. Since their training data are largely derived from human-authored corpora, LLMs may inherit a range of human biases. Behavioral biases can lead to instability and uncertainty in decision-making, particularly when processing financial information. However, existing research on LLM bias has mainly focused on direct questioning or simplified, general-purpose settings, with limited consideration of the complex real-world financial environments and high-risk, context-sensitive, multilingual financial misinformation detection tasks (\mfmd). In this work, we propose \mfmdscen, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating behavioral biases of LLMs in \mfmd across diverse economic scenarios. In collaboration with financial experts, we construct three types of complex financial scenarios: (i) role- and personality-based, (ii) role- and region-based, and (iii) role-based scenarios incorporating ethnicity and religious beliefs. We further develop a multilingual financial misinformation dataset covering English, Chinese, Greek, and Bengali. By integrating these scenarios with misinformation claims, \mfmdscen enables a systematic evaluation of 22 mainstream LLMs. Our findings reveal that pronounced behavioral biases persist across both commercial and open-source models. This project will be available at https://github.com/lzw108/FMD.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Web agents hold great potential for automating complex computer tasks, yet their interactions involve long-horizon, sequential decision-making with irreversible actions. In such settings, outcome-based supervision is sparse and delayed, often rewarding incorrect trajectories and failing to support inference-time scaling. This motivates the use of Process Reward Models (WebPRMs) for web navigation, but existing approaches remain limited: scalar WebPRMs collapse progress into coarse, weakly grounded signals, while checklist-based WebPRMs rely on brittle template matching that fails under layout or semantic changes and often mislabels superficially correct actions as successful, providing little insight or interpretability. To address these challenges, we introduce WebArbiter, a reasoning-first, principle-inducing WebPRM that formulates reward modeling as text generation, producing structured justifications that conclude with a preference verdict and identify the action most conducive to task completion under the current context. Training follows a two-stage pipeline: reasoning distillation equips the model with coherent principle-guided reasoning, and reinforcement learning corrects teacher biases by directly aligning verdicts with correctness, enabling stronger generalization. To support systematic evaluation, we release WebPRMBench, a comprehensive benchmark spanning four diverse web environments with rich tasks and high-quality preference annotations. On WebPRMBench, WebArbiter-7B outperforms the strongest baseline, GPT-5, by 9.1 points. In reward-guided trajectory search on WebArena-Lite, it surpasses the best prior WebPRM by up to 7.2 points, underscoring its robustness and practical value in real-world complex web tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in reasoning with the emergence of reasoning models like OpenAI-o1 and DeepSeek-R1. Recent research focuses on integrating reasoning capabilities into the realm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) via outcome-supervised reinforcement learning (RL) approaches, while the correctness of intermediate think-and-search steps is usually neglected. To address this issue, we design a process-level reward module to mitigate the unawareness of intermediate reasoning steps in outcome-level supervision without additional annotation. Grounded on this, we propose Learning to Think-and-Search (LeTS), a novel framework that hybridizes stepwise process reward and outcome-based reward to current RL methods for RAG. Extensive experiments demonstrate the generalization and inference efficiency of LeTS across various RAG benchmarks. In addition, these results reveal the potential of process- and outcome-level reward hybridization in boosting LLMs' reasoning ability via RL under other scenarios. The code will be released soon.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

We present BEHAVIOR-1K, a comprehensive simulation benchmark for human-centered robotics. BEHAVIOR-1K includes two components, guided and motivated by the results of an extensive survey on "what do you want robots to do for you?". The first is the definition of 1,000 everyday activities, grounded in 50 scenes (houses, gardens, restaurants, offices, etc.) with more than 9,000 objects annotated with rich physical and semantic properties. The second is OMNIGIBSON, a novel simulation environment that supports these activities via realistic physics simulation and rendering of rigid bodies, deformable bodies, and liquids. Our experiments indicate that the activities in BEHAVIOR-1K are long-horizon and dependent on complex manipulation skills, both of which remain a challenge for even state-of-the-art robot learning solutions. To calibrate the simulation-to-reality gap of BEHAVIOR-1K, we provide an initial study on transferring solutions learned with a mobile manipulator in a simulated apartment to its real-world counterpart. We hope that BEHAVIOR-1K's human-grounded nature, diversity, and realism make it valuable for embodied AI and robot learning research. Project website: https://behavior.stanford.edu.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

We propose a novel task, G4C, to study teacher-student natural language interactions in a goal-driven and grounded environment. Dungeons and Dragons (D&D), a role-playing game, provides an ideal setting to investigate such interactions. Here, the Dungeon Master (DM), i.e., the teacher, guides the actions of several players -- students, each with their own personas and abilities -- to achieve shared goals grounded in a fantasy world. Our approach is to decompose and model these interactions into (1) the DM's intent to guide players toward a given goal; (2) the DM's guidance utterance to the players expressing this intent; and (3) a theory-of-mind (ToM) model that anticipates the players' reaction to the guidance one turn into the future. We develop a novel reinforcement learning (RL) method for training a DM that generates guidance for players by rewarding utterances where the intent matches the ToM-anticipated player actions. Human and automated evaluations show that a DM trained to explicitly model intents and incorporate ToM of the players using RL generates better-quality guidance that is 3x more likely to fulfill the DM's intent than a vanilla natural language generation (NLG) approach.

Language model evaluation is a daunting task: prompts are brittle, corpus-level perplexities are vague, and the choice of benchmarks are endless. Finding examples that show meaningful, generalizable differences between two LMs is crucial to understanding where one model succeeds and another fails. Can this process be done automatically? In this work, we propose methodology for automated comparison of language models that uses performance-aware contextual embeddings to find fine-grained features of text where one LM outperforms another. Our method, which we name BehaviorBox, extracts coherent features that demonstrate differences with respect to the ease of generation between two LMs. Specifically, BehaviorBox finds features that describe groups of words in fine-grained contexts, such as "conditional 'were' in the phrase 'if you were'" and "exclamation marks after emotional statements", where one model outperforms another within a particular datatset. We apply BehaviorBox to compare models that vary in size, model family, and post-training, and enumerate insights into specific contexts that illustrate meaningful differences in performance which cannot be found by measures such as corpus-level perplexity alone.

Despite their success in numerous fields, the potential of foundation models for modeling and understanding human behavior remains largely unexplored. We introduce Be.FM, one of the first open foundation models designed for human behavior modeling. Built upon open-source large language models and fine-tuned on a diverse range of behavioral data, Be.FM can be used to understand and predict human decision-making. We construct a comprehensive set of benchmark tasks for testing the capabilities of behavioral foundation models. Our results demonstrate that Be.FM can predict behaviors, infer characteristics of individuals and populations, generate insights about contexts, and apply behavioral science knowledge.

It is known that human speech and certain animal vocalizations can convey meaningful content because we can decipher the content that a given utterance does convey. This paper explores an alternative approach to determining whether a signal is meaningful, one that analyzes only the signal itself and is independent of what the conveyed meaning might be. We devise a method that takes a waveform as input and outputs a score indicating its degree of `meaningfulness`. We cluster contiguous portions of the input to minimize the total description length, and then take the length of the code of the assigned cluster labels as meaningfulness score. We evaluate our method empirically, against several baselines, and show that it is the only one to give a high score to human speech in various languages and with various speakers, a moderate score to animal vocalizations from birds and orcas, and a low score to ambient noise from various sources.

Even with various regulations in place across countries and social media platforms (Government of India, 2021; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2022, digital abusive speech remains a significant issue. One potential approach to address this challenge is automatic text detoxification, a text style transfer (TST) approach that transforms toxic language into a more neutral or non-toxic form. To date, the availability of parallel corpora for the text detoxification task (Logachevavet al., 2022; Atwell et al., 2022; Dementievavet al., 2024a) has proven to be crucial for state-of-the-art approaches. With this work, we extend parallel text detoxification corpus to new languages -- German, Chinese, Arabic, Hindi, and Amharic -- testing in the extensive multilingual setup TST baselines. Next, we conduct the first of its kind an automated, explainable analysis of the descriptive features of both toxic and non-toxic sentences, diving deeply into the nuances, similarities, and differences of toxicity and detoxification across 9 languages. Finally, based on the obtained insights, we experiment with a novel text detoxification method inspired by the Chain-of-Thoughts reasoning approach, enhancing the prompting process through clustering on relevant descriptive attributes.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.